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Title:  “Understanding the Intelligence Practices of State, Local, and Tribal Law 
Enforcement Agencies” 
 
Project Abstract:  State, local, and tribal (SLT) law enforcement agencies play a critical role in 
securing the homeland, and understanding and improving the intelligence practices of these 
agencies will enhance public safety.  Better intelligence must be collected, analyzed, and shared, 
but little is known about the intelligence practices of SLT agencies.  This project addresses these 
gaps.  Specifically, we examine the experiences of SLT agencies and fusion centers for building 
an intelligence capacity, understand critical gaps in the sharing of information regarding 
intelligence, and identify obstacles related to other key intelligence issues, such as measuring 
performance and communication between agencies.  In addition, we examine the activities of 
three fusion centers to identify strategies that appear to be successful in increasing the 
information flow across agencies, the major obstacles of effective intelligence gathering and 
information sharing, and to identify key practices for integrating domestic intelligence into the 
information sharing environment and overcoming these obstacles.   
 Our research design consisted of two methodologies.  First, we conducted a national 
survey of SLT agencies with two different samples.  Our first sample consisted of personnel 
responsible for establishing state fusion centers and thus was critically involved in building the 
state-level intelligence infrastructure.  The second sample was comprised of state, local, and 
tribal personnel charged with building an intelligence capacity in different sized agencies in all 
regions of the country.  Second, we conducted three fusion center (FC) case studies.  The data 
collection strategy for the case studies included compiling and analyzing open source documents, 
and then conducting interviews with key informants.  Our focus was on examining how local, 
street-level intelligence is managed and brought into the intelligence process to prevent terrorist 
incidents and to address a variety of criminal threats. 
 Although there are a large number of important findings discussed in this report, there are 
several highlighted here.  First, although significant progress has been made post-9/11 installing 
fundamental policy and procedures related to building the intelligence capacity of law 
enforcement, there is significant room for improvement and a need to move agencies forward to 
be consistent with key requirements.  Second, fusion centers are farther along instituting policies 
and practices than individual law enforcement agencies, most likely because there has been an 
extensive focus on developing fusion center operations and expertise by both the Department of 
Homeland Security and Department of Justice.  Third, both samples of respondents stressed that 
they have worked at building relationships with a diverse range of agencies, but they also 
indicated that they are not completely satisfied with these relationships. Fourth, there is an 
overwhelming amount of information going into and out of these agencies, and it is likely, 
without having enough analysts within the organization or analysts not effectively trained to 
process this information, that there are missed opportunities for strategic and tactical 
understanding of homeland security and criminal threats.    Fifth, assessing performance of 
analysts is quite difficult but respondents highlighted the need to focus on the quality of strategic 
and tactical products produced.  Sixth, an analysis of the types of products produced and 
analytical procedures used on a daily basis also highlighted some of the differences in the 
intelligence mission of state, local, tribal law enforcement agencies and fusion centers.  
Specifically, fusion centers were more likely to be fostering information sharing connections, 
conducting a greater range of different types of analysis, and working with public health and 
other hazards-related data on a daily basis.  Seventh, the SLT and FC respondents noted 
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considerable variation in access to formal communication systems.  Because of the DHS and 
DOJ explicit focus on developing fusion centers, it should not be surprising that the centers have 
more access to data bases and networks than do individual law enforcement agencies.  Finally, 
the case studies provide valuable insights into some of the best practices of fusion centers, but 
also indicated that these centers are works in progress constantly having to adapt to rapid 
changes in their external environment.  
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“Understanding the Intelligence Practices of State, Local, 
and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies” 
 
Executive Summary  
 
Purpose 
 
 The September 11th attacks impacted society generally, and law enforcement specifically, 
in dramatic ways.   One of the major trends has been changing expectations regarding criminal 
intelligence practices among state, local, and tribal (SLT) law enforcement agencies, and the 
need to coordinate intelligence efforts and share information at all levels of government.  In fact, 
enhancing intelligence efforts has emerged as a critical issue for the prevention of terrorist acts.  
An increasing number of SLT law enforcement agencies have expanded their intelligence 
capacity, and there have been fundamental changes in the national, state, and local information 
sharing infrastructure.  Moreover, critical to these expanding information sharing expectations is 
the institutionalization of fusion centers.   Despite these dramatic changes, an expanding role, 
and the acknowledgement that local law enforcement intelligence is critical to the prevention and 
deterrence of terrorist acts, very little research exists that highlights issues related to the 
intelligence practices of SLT law enforcement agencies and fusion centers.  It is important to 
identify best practices for enhancing the flow of good intelligence into the intelligence process 
by documenting the current experiences of these agencies in building an intelligence capacity.  
There is a critical need for describing what these agencies are doing to build an intelligence 
capacity, assessing the state of information sharing among agencies, identifying various barriers 
that impede collaborative partnerships, and developing innovative ways to measure performance 
in these areas, although not much is known and government and law enforcement officials are 
seeking solutions.   
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 This project addresses these gaps.  Specifically, a national survey was developed to 
examine the experiences of SLT agencies and fusion centers for building an intelligence 
capacity, to understand critical gaps in the sharing of information regarding intelligence, and to 
identify obstacles related to other key intelligence issues, such as measuring performance and 
communication between agencies.  In addition, the activities of three fusion centers were 
examined to identify strategies that appear to be successful in increasing the information flow 
across agencies, the major obstacles of effective intelligence gathering and information sharing, 
and to identify the best practices for integrating domestic intelligence into the information 
sharing environment and overcoming these obstacles.   
 
Research Design  
 In sum, there are two elements to the research design.  In the first element, the research 
team conducted a national survey on the intelligence practices with two different samples of key 
personnel.  The first sample consisted of personnel from fusion centers and has been involved in 
the development of the state-level intelligence infrastructure.  The second survey sample consists 
of line-level officers and other individuals charged with building an intelligence capacity for 
individual agencies.  The second element of the research design was to conduct three case studies 
at fusion centers to better understand how they have managed important intelligence issues.  
In order to provide an overview of the major issues facing law enforcement agencies and 
fusion centers, the research team distributed Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved 
questionnaires via a web-designed survey to two groups of law enforcement personnel.  The first 
group included individuals who had attended training programs designed and delivered by the 
School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University, and funded by the Department of 
Homeland Security.  For the most part, those individuals selected to attend the training generally 
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were assigned to develop or re-engineer the intelligence capacity within their agency.  Most had 
little previous experience in law enforcement intelligence and were seeking guidance, through 
the training, on how to develop their intelligence capacity. This sampling strategy, which 
includes personnel from significantly different sized police agencies in all geographic regions of 
the country, was chosen for three reasons.  First, in attending this training, these officers were 
identified by their respective SLT agency as a representative of the intelligence function within 
the agency.  Second, as such this sample includes law enforcement personnel who have a 
working understanding of key issues tied to building an intelligence capacity, and thus will be 
able to address specifically the problems with putting knowledge into practice.  Third, their 
awareness of the contemporary intelligence structures, requirements, and formal communication 
networks increases the likelihood that they will have direct knowledge about the strengths and 
weaknesses of these issues.  Although not all agencies are represented in our sample, the 
diversity of agencies and personnel that have attended the training, representing all types of 
agencies from all levels of these organizations, ensures that the sample includes personnel that 
will have crucial information for understanding the problems of information sharing, 
performance measurement, and formal communication networks as viewed by state, local and 
tribal law enforcement personnel.     
The second group was attendees at the 2007 and 2008 National Fusion Center 
Conferences.  The research team decided to survey the participants at these conferences rather 
than sending surveys directly to fusion centers for two reasons.  First, participants in the 
conference will not only be fusion center staff (including possibly having multiple respondents 
from the same center), but include others from various levels of government and a range of key 
disciplines.  Thus, the research team assumed the sample would include a broad range of 
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individuals critical to effective intelligence practices in the United States.  Second, the research 
team assumed that since most fusion centers would send multiple personnel, there would be 
multiple indicators on key measures for each fusion center.   
The intent behind the decision to administer a web-based survey instead of a mail survey 
was to simplify the response process for informants and to reliably capture the data they 
submitted.  The final drafts consisted of 103 (law enforcement survey) and 125 (fusion center 
survey) structured, semi-structured, or open-ended questions.  Although the survey instruments 
were long, the research team opted for breadth and providing opportunities for the respondents to 
engage a variety of critical intelligence issues.  In general, the surveys captured their intelligence 
experiences, issues related to information sharing and strategies that could promote better 
information sharing, how intelligence practices are assessed and what metrics are being used to 
measure performance, and identify the communication networks that exist for information 
sharing.  The research team also collected several indicators on the type of agency, role of 
intelligence in the agency, and characteristics of the respondent.   
The research team also completed three in-depth case studies of fusion centers.  The data 
collection strategy for the case studies was to select two that were using innovative strategies to 
address these critical issues.  These agencies were identified through the surveys, contacts with 
key staff, and in consultation with the grant program manager and subject matter experts.  In 
addition, the third case study was chosen in order to interview personnel who were working in a 
fusion center in transition.  The research team concluded that since fusion centers are at various 
points of development that it was critical to receive input from an emerging fusion center that 
was managing challenging issues (e.g., change in management and other personnel; developing 
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new policies and procedures; staff learning new job responsibilities, developing new information 
sharing partnerships).   
For each fusion center that was selected, the research team began by compiling and 
analyzing open source documents regarding their efforts to address these issues.  In addition, site 
visits were conducted to better understand their relationship and work in the intelligence area.    
The research team provides an overview of the structure, activities, and development of each 
fusion center, and discusses best practices for responding to critical issues examined in the 
survey.  The primary focus of each case study was to better understand the issues addressed in 
the survey:  intelligence practices, information sharing, performance measurement, and 
communication networks.  Other issues examined include experience with terrorism incidents 
and the production of intelligence regarding the terrorist threat, organizational structures that are 
part of the law enforcement intelligence community, collection requirements and reasons for 
relying on particular types of raw information, coordination, and information sharing practices 
within an agency, key assessment and evaluation activities, the important legal, cultural, and 
political issues that impact these processes, the role of intelligence in overall law enforcement 
operations, and perspectives of cooperation internally and externally.   
 
Findings  
 
The research team surveyed state, local, and tribal law enforcement officers and fusion 
center personnel and conducted three case studies to better understand intelligence practices, 
information sharing, performance metrics, and communication networks.  This section highlights 
some of the key findings.   
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1.  It appears that significant progress has been made post 9/11 installing fundamental 
policy and procedures related to building the intelligence capacity of law enforcement 
and fusion center agencies.  Both respondents from state, local, tribal law enforcement 
agencies and fusion centers indicated that they were familiar with intelligence guidelines 
and standards, had a good working knowledge of threats in their community, and have 
some working knowledge of intelligence-led policing.   Personnel also indicated that they 
have attempted to take advantage of the wide range of training opportunities available for 
intelligence analysts.    
2.  Despite the progress that has been made, there is significant room for improvement 
and development.  For example, although respondents indicated that they were familiar 
with national standards and guidelines, they also expressed the belief that the policies and 
procedures within their agency have yet to reconcile with these requirements.  Similarly, 
the respondents noted they were aware of the threats, but identified a need to build a 
capacity to better identify these threats and noted shortages in resources and personnel in 
accomplishing these goals.  Also, they were aware of key civil rights and privacy issues, 
but respondents reported there is considerable work that needs to be done in their 
agencies to ensure agencies are fully compliant.     
3.  Fusion centers appear to be farther along addressing many different issues, including 
instituting an intelligence-led policing philosophy, establishing and being compliant with 
privacy issues, and fostering relationships with other agencies.  Not all fusion centers 
were fully functional at the time of the survey, but had plans and goals to provide them 
direction along with guidance available from their peers as well as federally-supported 
training and technical assistance. 
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4.  Critical to prevention and response is the sharing of information.  In addition, it is 
clear that a wide range of law enforcement, community, government and private 
businesses may have information that is important to the intelligence fusion process thus 
it is important to build relationships with a diverse range of agencies and organizations.  
Both SLT and fusion center respondents indicated that that they have worked at building 
relationships with different agencies especially other law enforcement agencies, but 
fusion centers had closer relationships with a more diverse range of agencies and were 
more likely to be working with National Guard, transportation, public health, homeland 
security, emergency management, fire marshal, and critical infrastructure personnel.    
5.  Although many information linkages have been established, the respondents also 
indicated that they were not completely satisfied with these relationships.  That is, it 
appears that the personnel were working with other agencies and making connections, but 
they think the relationships need further development to ensure consistent, substantive 
and timely information sharing.   
6.  There is an overwhelming amount of information going into and out of these agencies, 
and it is likely, without having enough analysts within the organization or analysts not 
effectively trained to process this information, that there are missed opportunities for 
strategic and tactical understanding of homeland security and criminal threats.     
7.   Both SLT and FC respondents agreed that the quality of intelligence products 
produced should be critical to the assessment of performance by analysts.  There was 
some variation when comparing the two samples of respondents Information sharing and 
the quality of products was somewhat more important to fusion center respondents while 
having intelligence that led specifically to arrests, investigations, and convictions was 
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more important to the SLT agency respondents.  This difference may be indicative of a 
misunderstanding among SLT officers regarding the value and purpose of intelligence 
analysts as well as the responsibility of operational units to act on the intelligence 
products in order to interrupt threats and pursue investigations 
8.  An analysis of the types of products produced and analytical procedures used on a 
daily basis also highlighted some of the differences in the intelligence mission of state, 
local, tribal law enforcement agencies and fusion centers.  Specifically, fusion centers 
were more likely to be fostering information sharing connections, conducting a greater 
range of different types of analysis, and working with public health and other hazards 
related data on a daily basis.  This should be expected given the roles and national 
standards for fusion centers. 
9.  It is important to consider the formal communication patterns that support and impede 
the intelligence process.  These systems are critical because they provide an additional 
way for homeland security and intelligence officials to promote a necessary 
understanding of the procedures that need to be followed for better information sharing.  
The findings that were presented indicated that both SLT and FC respondents think that 
they have access to key communication systems and other sources of information that 
might be used to enhance intelligence products.  Fusion center respondents were however 
somewhat more critical when asked whether RISS.net, LEO, HSIN, ATIX, and FBINET 
meet their intelligence and information sharing needs.   Not surprisingly, the results also 
indicated that a higher percentage of fusion center respondents noted that they had access 
to various critical sources of intelligence information, including HSIN, RISS.net, 
FBINET, LEIU, and Health Related data.   
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10.   The case studies of fusion centers are valuable in that they provide in-depth 
coverage of structural, policy, and strategic approaches that have been successful.  The 
organizations studied were guided by a litany of formal policies and comprised of 
multiple task-specific units.  These formalities allow for a strategic division of labor for 
specialized persons to perform specialized tasks – thus improving effectiveness and 
efficiency.   
11.  Each of the case studies also revealed that the fusion centers were “works in 
progress” and that the agencies had to update and embrace changes motivated by shifts in 
their external environment.  For example, the Florida Fusion Center conducted an 
assessment of information sharing gaps between law enforcement agencies within the 
state of Florida.  One of the findings from this gap analysis was that local law 
enforcement was not engaging in information sharing as a result of poor, or nonexistent, 
commitment to the intelligence-led approach.  At the Southern Nevada Counter-
Terrorism Center, a strong administrative commitment to an intelligence-led approach 
was established when Sheriff Doug Gillespie announced (multiple times) that the Las 
Vegas Metro Police Department (the primary agency of the SNCTC) was going to fully 
embrace this new philosophy.  
 
Policy Implications 
 
The status of law enforcement intelligence in SLT agencies appears to be similar to the 
early development of community- and problem-solving policing during the early 1990s.  Law 
enforcement officers and executives recognize the importance of intelligence yet the 
implementation of law enforcement intelligence remains uneven a decade after 9/11.  Several 
factors may contribute to this.  First, the philosophical underpinnings of law enforcement 
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intelligence was significantly changed and broadened, hence a resocialization process among 
intelligence personnel had to occur.  Second, while the 9/11 attacks remain as the benchmark for 
change, in reality new standards – such as the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan and 
training programs did not emerge until 2003.  Moreover, new standards and directions continue 
to evolve even at the time of this writing.  Third, it simply takes time to develop new 
organizations such as fusion centers and get them at an operational level.  Similarly, training and 
developing new policies in America’s 16,000 law enforcement agencies is a massive task, 
particularly when new processes – such a participating in a fusion center – must be marketed and 
sold to the agencies as wise investment in resources.   
Uneven development and evolution is even more the case when considering the 
intelligence-led policing philosophy and practice.  Although respondents were familiar with the 
term ILP, the results suggest that most agencies are at an early stage of implementation.  Indeed, 
there are different conceptual understandings of ILP and different visions of the role ILP should 
hold in law enforcement organizations.  Like the community policing movement, these results 
reveal clear needs for training and commitment of resources and for addressing the tension 
between specialization and generalization.  Additionally, the goal of increasing intelligence 
capacity and adopting ILP comes at a time that SLT agencies operate under significant budgetary 
constraints.  Finally, the results suggest the potential for fusion centers to serve a critical role in 
continued development of the law enforcement intelligence capacity in local agencies.   
 Although the results of this study point to clear progress in the development of law 
enforcement intelligence capacity, they also reveal challenges.  Clearly, there is a need for the 
commitment of resources in the form of personnel and training.  Given the federated and 
decentralized structure of law enforcement in the U.S., it is critical that mid- to large agencies 
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have analysts who can conduct local level analysis as well as push information and intelligence 
to Fusion centers..  Small agencies need to have intelligence liaison officers who can serve as 
“nodes” in the intelligence network.  This requires commitment of resources at a time that many 
agencies are not hiring or even cutting personnel.  Law enforcement executives as well as 
policymakers at local, state, and federal levels will need to consider the implications of these 
budgetary issues.  While many executives acknowledge that the use of analysts make the agency 
“work smarter” thereby having a great effect on crime and community order, it remains a 
difficult concept to sell to the public and politicians. 
 It is also clear that there is a need for continued and expanded training.  This includes 
specific training for analysts, fusion center personnel, and intelligence managers. It also, 
however, means more general training for all SLT personnel on ILP and the role of SLT officers 
in the intelligence process to include what types of information can be shared, the process for 
sharing information, and the application of guidelines to protect privacy, civil rights and civil 
liberties. 
 Law enforcement executives also need to seriously consider and resolve several issues 
related to specialization and generalization.  At one level is the issue of whether the intelligence 
capacity is viewed as specifically focused on homeland security and the threat of terrorism or 
whether it is viewed as building “all-crimes, all-hazards” capacity.  On the one hand, the need to 
develop capacity and expertise focused on terrorism can justify a more specialized focus.  As the 
commander of a local police department intelligence unit told us, “what keeps me awake is 
missing a tip or lead suggesting an Al Qaeda-type attack.”  On the other hand, the results of this 
study, combined with prior studies, suggests the potential power of the “all-crimes, all-hazards” 
focus.  Prior research demonstrates the high level of involvement of terrorist groups in a variety 
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of criminal activity that brings these individuals in contact with SLT agencies (Damphouse and 
Smith, 2004; Smith et al. 2002; Hamm, 2005).  The present study indicates a high proportion of 
Suspicious Activity Reports involving all-crimes.  These results suggest that the continued 
development of the network of SLT agencies, linked to fusion centers and federal law 
enforcement and ultimately linked to the Intelligence Community (with appropriate firewalls and 
privacy safeguards) will be best served through the all-crimes, all-hazards information flow.  
Additionally, it strikes us that the costs of the investment in intelligence capacity will yield the 
greatest benefits for SLT agencies when the capacity equips such agencies to address not only 
terrorism but a range of criminal threats (e.g., organized crime, gangs, violent crime, drugs). 
 A parallel question of specialization/generalization relates to training and responsibilities 
within SLT agencies.  On the basis of these findings, it appears that most agencies to date have 
developed intelligence capacity through training of officers and analysts dedicated or at least 
focused on intelligence assignments.  Thus, the respondents to our surveys indicate a fairly high 
level of knowledge and expertise themselves but report much lower levels of familiarity 
throughout the organization.  Again, this is similar to early stages of community- and problem-
oriented policing when specialist officers were tasked with implementation but the majority of 
officers and supervisors focused on so-called “real policing.”  The danger is that the intelligence 
function becomes a specialized function divorced from the larger organization, what Toch and 
Grant (1991) once referred to as an “innovation ghetto.”  The risk is that information flow from 
street-level officers and investigators to analysts does not occur.  Similarly, analysts do not fully 
understand the needs of officers and investigators. This, too, suggests the need for broad training 
on the intelligence function, the role of analysts, and ILP.  
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 The development of a national network of 72 fusion centers (as of this writing) represents 
a monumental undertaking and achievement.  Yet, there has been criticism of the fusion centers 
in two broad areas:  Fusion center operations and the protection of civil liberties.  The results of 
the current study suggest that the fusion centers are playing a critical role in the nation’s 
domestic intelligence capacity and could play an even more important role in the future.  The co-
location of personnel from SLT, federal law enforcement and, in some cases, the private sector 
appears to mitigate some of the historic, cultural, and organizational barriers to information 
sharing. Consequently, the fusion center’s occupy an organizational or network “space” that is 
“closer” to both federal law enforcement and the SLTs.  They appear to be a critical network 
“node” for the movement of information and intelligence “up-from” and “back-to” the local 
level.  Further, the survey results and case studies reflect the specialized expertise in terms of 
both human capital (analysts) and technology that many SLT agencies will never attain (with the 
exception of large metropolitan departments).  The fusion centers are already displaying an 
impressive range of information sources and high frequency actionable intelligence products.  
Based on these findings, the loss of these fusion centers would result in both a loss of analytic 
capability and a disconnect between SLT and federal law enforcement and ultimately the 
intelligence community.  Consequently, these results appear to call for continued investment and 
development of the network of fusion centers.  
 Perhaps the most critical point for successful intelligence is the quality of the analysis.  
The need for continual training of analysts, particularly in the area of critical thinking, and the 
recognition that analysts are practicing professionals – not simply “civilians in the intelligence 
unit” – are among the factors which need to be recognized and address by law enforcement 
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leaders.  Greater attention by management needs to be provided for the professional development 
of intelligence analysts in order to increase the quality and utility of analytic outputs. 
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“Understanding the Intelligence Practices of State, Local, 
and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies” 
 
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
 The September 11th attacks impacted society generally, and law enforcement specifically, 
in dramatic ways.   One of the major trends has been changing expectations regarding criminal 
intelligence practices among state, local, and tribal (SLT) law enforcement agencies, and the 
need to coordinate intelligence efforts and share information at all levels of government.  In fact, 
enhancing intelligence efforts has emerged as a critical issue for the prevention of terrorist acts.  
An increasing number of SLT law enforcement agencies have expanded their intelligence 
capacity, and there have been fundamental changes in the national, state, and local information 
sharing infrastructure.1  Moreover, critical to these expanding information sharing expectations is 
the institutionalization of fusion centers.   Despite these dramatic changes, an expanding role, 
and the acknowledgement that local law enforcement intelligence is critical to the prevention and 
deterrence of terrorist acts, very little research exists that highlights issues related to the 
intelligence practices of SLT law enforcement agencies and fusion centers.2  It is important to 
identify best practices for enhancing the flow of good intelligence into the intelligence process 
by documenting the current experiences of these agencies in building an intelligence capacity.  
There is a critical need for describing what these agencies are doing to build an intelligence 
capacity, assessing the state of information sharing among agencies, identifying various barriers 
that impede collaborative partnerships, and developing innovative ways to measure performance 
                                                 
1 Many of these changes are a product of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 which 
created the Information Sharing Environment (ISE).  The ISE has had a significant influence on the development of 
fusion centers and intelligence-related programming of SLT law enforcement agencies, such as the Nationwide 
Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI). 
2 Since many of the changes in law enforcement intelligence did not occur until 2003 or after, the true growth of 
fusion centers did not begin until around 2004-05, it is not surprising that there is little scientific research. 
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in these areas, although not much is known and government and law enforcement officials are 
seeking solutions.   
 This project addresses these gaps.  Specifically, a national survey was developed to 
examine the experiences of SLT agencies and fusion centers for building an intelligence 
capacity, to understand critical gaps in the sharing of information regarding intelligence, and to 
identify obstacles related to other key intelligence issues, such as measuring performance and 
communication between agencies.  In addition, the activities of three fusion centers were 
examined to identify strategies that appear to be successful in increasing the information flow 
across agencies, the major obstacles of effective intelligence gathering and information sharing, 
and to identify the best practices for integrating domestic intelligence into the information 
sharing environment and overcoming these obstacles.   
  
Relevant Literature  
 Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, there has been a considerable investment of 
resources in many different government sectors to better prepare, respond, and recover from 
terrorism.  One critical investment area has been in improving the law enforcement intelligence 
capacity at all levels of government.  The changes in the intelligence practices for state, local, 
and tribal agencies has been particularly pronounced.  Many law enforcement agencies had 
eliminated their intelligence units, starting in the late 1960s, in reaction to a proliferation of civil 
rights lawsuits alleging systemic practices of collection and retaining information about people 
where there was no articulable nexus between the individual and criminal activity.  In the 1980s 
there was some significant restructuring of state and local law enforcement intelligence as a 
result of several factors: 
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• Structural and policy changes to intelligence units, predominantly in major cities and 
states, that were built on the precedence set in civil rights cases relating to law 
enforcement intelligence practices. 
• The implementation of 28 CFR Part 23 by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Policy which established guidelines for the collection, retention, review, 
dissemination and purging of information in federally funded, multijurisdictional 
criminal intelligence records systems that were managed by state or local law 
enforcement agencies. 
• The articulation of the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU) File Guidelines 
which made 28 CFR Part 23 more “policy-based” and, as a de facto effect, set the 
standard that the guidelines should be used by all law enforcement agencies, whether 
or not they received federal funds. 
• The expansive growth (and reach) of the drug trade, largely driven by the Columbian 
drug cartels, required a different approach to drug investigations, relying on 
intelligence and information sharing.3 
 
Following the September 11th attacks, and more specifically following the March 2002 
IACP/COPS4 Intelligence Summit, it was recognized that to provide an effective and 
comprehensive barrier to future terrorist attacks law enforcement agencies had to re-engineer 
their current intelligence capacity and, in many cases, they had to build an intelligence capacity 
from the ground up.  The concept and application of law enforcement intelligence was beginning 
a metamorphosis at that time, driven by new concepts and standards, largely being driven by the 
                                                 
3 The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Intelligence Centers are one of the best examples of this. 
4 International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). 
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Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) and the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council 
(CICC).  (Many of these changes are currently ongoing).  New resources and training 
opportunities were becoming available and change was occurring comparatively fast.  Among 
the challenges were that agencies were having difficulty accepting the changes, both 
conceptually and from a staffing perspective.   
One significant factor that occurred was that the GIWG developed the National Criminal 
Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) which recommended, among other things, that every law 
enforcement agency, regardless of size, develop an intelligence capacity.  The purpose was  to 
“understand the implications of information collection, analysis, and intelligence sharing,” and 
“must have an organized mechanism to receive and manage intelligence as well as a mechanism 
to report and share critical information with other law enforcement agencies” (Carter, 2009: 1).  
The development of this capacity has resulted in a significant expansion of the intelligence 
function in law enforcement agencies, the institutionalization of intelligence units, and a 
significant need for providing intelligence training to all levels of law enforcement.   
 The growth of intelligence practices in SLT agencies has coincided with an increasing 
acknowledgement within various levels of government of the importance of SLT law 
enforcement for enhancing the value of intelligence related to terrorism (see Cilluffo, Clark and 
Downing, 2011).   Congress made it generally clear in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 that 
state and local information was critical for preventing and preparing for terrorist events, and that 
federal, state, and local entities should work to embrace strategies that would dramatically 
increase the sharing of information (see General Accounting Office, 2003; 2007; President’s 
National Strategy for Information Sharing, 2007).  Perhaps more importantly, the Information 
Sharing Environment Implementation Plan, a product of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
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Prevention Act of 2004, placed significant responsibilities on state and local law enforcement 
agencies for collecting and sharing information for purposes of countering terrorism (PM-ISE, 
2006.)  This conclusion highlights the recognition that each level of government has unique 
information sources within its specific environment and is in a position to harness its various 
assets in the most effective way to accomplish the broad goals of the counterterrorism mission.   
The importance of SLT’s contribution to the intelligence process can be highlighted in 
several ways.  First, the National Strategy for Information Sharing (2007) highlights the 
importance of sharing threat information with many sectors of society, and specifically 
highlights the need for SLT law enforcement agencies to foster a culture of fusing information 
on crime and terrorist related incidents, support efforts to detect and prevent attacks, and develop 
training and awareness programs on terrorism.  Second, although the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation is the lead agency for the investigation of terrorism, the types of information 
provided by various sources and the sheer number of cases and leads requiring follow-up, 
highlights the importance of involving local law enforcement in terrorist investigations (Davis et 
al., 2004).  Third, it is critical to note that terrorism is a local event, and as such SLT law 
enforcement agencies are in a unique position to contribute important raw information based on 
their knowledge about the criminal activities of individuals, groups, and organizations operating 
in local communities.  One report states, “The 800,000 plus law enforcement officers across the 
country know their communities most intimately and, therefore, are best placed to function as the 
‘eyes and ears’ of an extended national security community. They have the experience to 
recognize what constitutes anomalous behavior in their areas of responsibility and can either stop 
it at the point of discovery (a more traditional law enforcement approach) or follow the anomaly 
or criminal behavior, either unilaterally or jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
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to extract the maximum intelligence value from the activity (a more intelligence-based 
approach)” (Masse, O’Neil, and Rollins, 2007).  In addition, there is evidence in both cases of 
international and domestic terrorism where state and local law enforcement officers have 
encountered terrorists through such activities as traffic stops, yet did not know the threat these 
individuals posed because of information barriers.  This  clearly highlights the need for  SLT law 
enforcement agencies to have access to timely and actionable intelligence which may lead to the 
prevention and response to terrorist acts (see Cilluffo, Clark and Dunning, 2011; Cooney, Rojek, 
and Kaminski, 2011;  9/11 Commission Report).  Fourth, critical infrastructures and high-value 
targets are dispersed widely in the United States, and many of these potential targets are located 
in rural and less-populated areas.  Local law enforcement agencies in these communities are in 
the best position to recognize when suspicious situations occur near these critical targets.  Fifth, 
survey research, supported by extensive anecdotal experience of the research team, indicates that 
the terrorism experiences and expectations regarding intelligence work of state and local 
agencies increased after September 11th  (Davis et al., 2004).  
Terrorism scholarship examining the behaviors and patterns of terrorists operating on 
U.S. soil also supports the conclusion that there are significant opportunities for SLT law 
enforcement agencies to significantly enhance the amount, quality, and reliability of both critical 
sensitive information and intelligence.  Brent Smith and colleagues’ American Terrorism Study 
is one of the most important domestic terrorism data collection efforts to date (Smith, 1994). 
This project, conducted in cooperation with the FBI’s Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, 
includes persons under federal indictment as a result of an investigation under the FBI’s 
Counterterrorism Program. These researchers were provided lists (1980-1989; 1990-1996; 1997-
2002) of persons indicted, and then traveled to federal courthouses to collect data from trial 
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transcripts and docket information. These data have been used by various principal investigators 
to answer a variety of important questions, including the prosecution and punishment of 
international and domestic terrorists (Smith, Damphousse, Jackson and Sellers, 2002), 
prosecutorial strategies in terrorism cases (Smith and Orvis, 1993), and the empirical validation 
of the growth of leaderless resistance tactics (Damphousse and Smith, 2004).  These data 
highlight that the base of operations for domestic right-wing groups is rural areas and left-wing 
groups operate generally in urban areas.  Similarly, Smith and colleagues found that terrorists are 
much more likely to engage in planning activities and to commit preparatory crimes compared to 
traditional criminals, and importantly the patterns of preparatory conduct vary by type of terrorist 
group (Smith, Damphousse, & Roberts, 2006).   For example, they found that right-wing terrorist 
groups are more mobile than international terrorists, and tend to commit crimes farther from their 
home.  Smith and colleagues concluded that this may either be evidence that far-right groups 
have broader support networks which allow them to freely to move around the country or it 
could reflect that far-right terrorists tend to reside in rural locations (p. 46).  It was found that 
left-wing and international terrorist groups committed many more preparatory crimes compared 
to right-wing and single issue terrorist groups and were more likely to separate their acts from 
their targets (pp. 36; 52).  Findings such as this can be an important source of information used in 
strategic intelligence analysis.  It can help refine the parameters of the threat picture and provide 
direction for the development of investigative leads. 
Similarly, Hamm (2005) compared the types of crimes committed by international and 
domestic terrorist groups.  His analysis of data from the American Terrorism Study found that 
international terrorists were statistically more likely to commit aircraft violations, motor vehicle 
crimes, violations of explosions, and some types of firearms violations.  In contrast, domestic 
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terrorists were more likely to commit mail fraud, racketeering, robbery, burglary, and violations 
of destructive devices.  He stressed that both international and domestic terrorists come into 
contact with law enforcement in the normal course of crime investigations because of their 
failures, the types of crimes they commit, and their preparatory activities.  Hamm concluded that 
his study provides “strong empirical support for the notion that terrorist-oriented criminality has 
distinguishing features” (p. 22), and that these “different crimes require different skills and 
opportunities and identifying these differences may take law enforcement a step closer to 
prevention” (p. 19).  Once again, the value of these findings can be useful for giving direction to 
the types of information that should be collected for both strategic and tactical intelligence 
analysis. 
These research studies clearly show the great potential of strengthening intelligence 
capabilities and enhancing the information sharing among agencies in different geographic 
locations and in other branches/jurisdictions of government.  But not much is known about the 
status of SLT intelligence practices.  It is critically important to first describe how law 
enforcement personnel have responded to the need to build an intelligence capacity.  Are they 
familiar with national intelligence standards?  Intelligence-led policing? Fusion center resources 
and capabilities?  Terrorism/Intelligence Liaison Officer programs?  Constitutional standards and 
restrictions unique to the intelligence process? Have they been trained to national standards and 
do they feel as though there agency is prepared to effectively contribute to the intelligence 
enterprise of the Information Sharing Environment?   
In addition to describing the current state of intelligence practices among SLT law 
enforcement agencies, this study also examines the fusion center perspective on these critical 
intelligence issues.   One of the important roles that state fusion centers is intended to play in the 
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information sharing environment is to act as a conduit between SLT agencies and both the 
federal law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community.   It is thus important to 
highlight the status of several issues critical to building an intelligence capacity in both SLT 
agencies and fusion centers.  This study highlights issues related to information sharing, the 
evaluation of performance in intelligence agencies, and how and what information is being 
shared across intelligence networks.  A better understanding of these issues and the identification 
of innovative ways that they might be better addressed, could significantly enhance the effective 
use of intelligence practices to define threats and ultimately enhance public safety.  These 
specific areas of this project are discussed in more detail below.  In addition, this report 
highlights how these issues have been addressed by specific agencies in order to provide insights 
into how to address critical issues in collecting substantive information for the intelligence 
process.  
 
Information Sharing  
  There have certainly been specifically directed efforts to implement initiatives to address 
concerns about information sharing.  For example, the creation of the Global Intelligence 
Working Group (GIWG) and their first product, the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 
(NCISP), has been critically important for developing an effective intelligence capacity among 
state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies and, consequently enhancing information 
sharing at all levels of government.  In addition, the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces 
(JTTF) has increased dramatically since 9/11 which, while investigative bodies, utilize the 
products of the intelligence process as well as aid in collecting information that meets 
intelligence requirements. The development of state and major urban area fusion centers has also 
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had a significant effect on intelligence production and information sharing.  While the seventy-
two officially recognized fusion centers are under the control of their respective state or local 
jurisdiction, they comply with federal standards, serve as a clearinghouse of information for 
DHS and generally provide opportunities for federal, state, and local law enforcement to share 
and disseminate information about terrorism and criminal threats.  Finally, the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevent Act of 2004 mandates that the President establish an Information 
Sharing Environment (ISE).  The implementation plan for this ISE, which was released in 
November 2006, states that “This environment will create a powerful national capability to 
share, search, and analyze terrorism information across jurisdictional boundaries and provide a 
distributed, secure, and trusted environment for transforming data into actionable information. 
The resulting environment will also recognize and leverage the vital roles played by State and 
major urban area information fusion centers, which represent crucial investments toward 
improving the nation’s counterterrorism capacity” (p. xiv).   
While this responsibility has developed more slowly, there have been significant strides 
in the last two-three years.  While there has been a significant void in empirical research that 
attempts to examine issues related to information sharing among law enforcement agencies, there 
is some work that provides a general understanding of relatively recent concerns, but only one is 
a national study that specifically focused on state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies.   
First, the General Accounting Office (2003) reviewed critical documents related to 
information sharing, interviewed officials from various agencies, and surveyed 29 federal law 
enforcement agencies, all 50 home security offices, all cities with a population of 100,000 or 
greater (N=485), and a random sample of smaller cities (N=242).  The surveys were sent to the 
mayor who either completed the survey or delegated the completion to the chief of police, an 
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assistant, or other emergency management personnel.   There were many important findings 
highlighted in this report, but several concern information sharing limitations.  Among these 
findings were that: 1). Officials from federal, state, and local governments do not think the 
process of sharing information is “effective” or “very effective;” 2). They do not routinely 
receive the information they need to protect the homeland; 3). The information received is not 
timely; 4). Opportunities are routinely missed to obtain and provide information to the federal 
government; and 5). Law enforcement agencies are not receiving the types of information they 
need to effectively prevent terrorist attacks.  Importantly, it should be noted that when these data 
were collected in 2003, virtually none of the currently available information sharing tools were 
in place, including fusion centers.   
The Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCC) examined the intelligence and information 
sharing needs between major city law enforcement agencies and federal law enforcement.  Some 
of the observations in the MCC position paper are particularly important for the current project.  
The chiefs conclude that the federal government must better integrate local law enforcement to 
take full advantage of their capabilities (p.  17), and they also stated that with background on 
terrorists and timely intelligence, “law enforcement would have the background from which it 
could take seemingly random or unconnected events—such as minor traffic violations—and 
place them into a larger context, thereby being able to perceive a bigger picture of potential 
attack or recognize the need to pass the information to an appropriate homeland security partner 
agency” (p. 22).   
The RAND Corporation has conducted two national surveys related to domestic 
preparedness and intelligence (Riley and Hoffman, 1995; Riley, Treverton, Wilson, and Davis, 
2005).  The 1995 survey focused on preparedness issues for state and local law enforcement.  
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The important conclusion of the study was that there was very little intelligence and strategic 
assessment capability and poor information sharing between federal and state law enforcement 
officials. Of course, the significant changes that were produced in the post-9/11 era, largely 
under GIWG leadership were intended to address these problems.   
Prior to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, RAND did a second 
survey and several case studies to examine issues related to local and state intelligence efforts.  
The study concludes that SLT law enforcement agencies have played an increasingly important 
role in responding to and preventing terrorism.  Law enforcement agencies wanted better 
intelligence sharing, needed improvements in communication interoperability, and thought that 
training improvements were necessary.  In addition, even small agencies, if assessing their threat 
risk as high, were very proactive in focusing their preparedness efforts. 
Recently, the Homeland Security Policy Institute published a research brief that 
highlighted the results of a survey that was administered to individuals attending the Intelligence 
Unit Commanders Group of the Major Cities Chief Association (Cilluffo, Clark and Downing, 
2011).  Forty-two surveys were completed.   Several of the findings highlighted in the research 
brief relate to the issues examined in this study.  First, they found that all respondents had a 
working relationship with their local fusion center, and the respondents thought there was value 
in maintaining that relationship.  Second, the respondents were willing to share information 
through key channels, such as the FBI’s National Data Exchange and Nationwide Suspicious 
Activity Reporting Initiative. Third, they noted that they preferred to share information locally 
first, then regionally, and then finally federally.  Fourth, the respondents indicated that their best 
source of terrorism information was the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces followed by the local 
fusion centers.   
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Although it is generally understood that intelligence must be shared widely, there has 
been very little empirical research that identifies key obstacles to information sharing.  The 
studies discussed above provide valuable background information and highlights some of the key 
obstacles in effectively using state and local intelligence in the war of terrorism.  However, the 
GAO study does not specifically focus on law enforcement efforts and the RAND study was 
conducted in 2002 prior to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and before 
the GIWG had issued any of its standards, recommendations or best practices.   The brief by the 
Homeland Security Policy Institute is based on surveys completed by only respondents from 
major cities.  The field of intelligence has changed incredibly since 2002, and it is important to 
examine current issues specific to law enforcement efforts in the area of intelligence.  In 
addition, these studies do not focus on the efforts to improve intelligence flow and there has not 
been a systematic attempt to examine how fusion centers strategically fuse intelligence and what 
promising strategies exist to enhance information sharing.   
 
Performance Measures and Intelligence 
 There is clearly a need for the development of performance standards related to 
information collection, intelligence analysis, and information sharing.  A key maxim of 
organizational behavior is that what gets measured gets done (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). The 
absence of performance measures and metrics for law enforcement intelligence makes it 
impossible for policymakers to assess progress towards enhancing the Information Sharing 
Culture, and leaves fusion centers and individual agencies vulnerable to intelligence gaps. 
In general, the accurate measurement of performance related to intelligence has several 
potential benefits (see General Accounting Office, 2006; Johnson, 2005).  First, these measures 
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are valuable for the improvement of programs and strategies.  Second, change is most likely to 
occur in iterative steps, and thus accurate performance measures can help an organization 
monitor improvement steps, highlight problem areas, and suggest approaches for accomplishing 
goals.  Third, such measures would be valuable in making personnel allocation, training needs 
and allocating resources within the organization.  Fourth, such measures can hold organizations 
and individuals accountable for accomplishing goals.  Finally, according to a GAO report (2006, 
p. 11), “in a risk management process, agencies can use performance measurement to assess 
progress towards meeting homeland security goals. The intended effect of assessing such 
progress, when coupled with other aspects of the risk management process, is the reduction of 
risk.”  Beyond these organizational factors, an overarching measure important for law 
enforcement intelligence is ensuring that all information collection, retention and dissemination 
activities are consistent with constitutional standards. 
 There is very little evidence that intelligence performance and the products of 
information sharing are being consistently and empirically measured in any meaningful way.  
Intelligence leaders and analysts, however, have provided anecdotal support for the conclusion 
that there are significant limits to both the amount and quality of information shared, and have 
voiced frustrations about the inability to accurately assess performance.  The problem may not be 
a lack of data and information, but just the opposite:  state fusion centers and analysts have been 
overwhelmed with data but are only receiving limited actionable information.  This problem is 
significant because such information still has to be processed, thus leaving little time to focus on 
producing helpful analytic products and distributing reports.  In many instances, it also appears 
that intelligence products disseminated by fusion centers may simply be a “re-packaging” of 
intelligence products, not new information.  According to Treverton et al. (2006: 14), “the United 
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States has been obsessed with data, and that has come at the expense of judgment. Rather than 
maintaining the ideal of speaking truth to power, intelligence has focused on gathering 
information. In many ways, this is a function of wealth—a big budget can buy lots of gadgets. 
The problem is that with all these so-called added capabilities, technologists assert we can collect 
everything.” 
 
Communication 
A final, but related issue to the research areas discussed above, concerns our examination 
of how SLT law enforcement agencies communicate information about intelligence issues, the 
formal communication systems, the general understanding and ratings of usefulness of the 
technical systems that exist for information sharing, and identifying best practices to address 
issues related to communication and user acceptance.  Communications in the intelligence 
process has three broad elements:  technology, policy and human. 
Communication is a challenge for all organizations, but the autonomy of each law 
enforcement agency and fusion center functionally equates to a fragmented structure of law 
enforcement intelligence in the United States that increases the difficulties in communicating 
effectively.  The flow of communication across the ISE is thus dependent on the capacity of 
SLT, their ties to fusion centers, and the links to federal agencies and the private sector.  
Consequently, regardless of agency size, law enforcement needs timely and reliable information 
to conduct criminal inquiries and respond effectively in crisis situations.  Of particular 
importance are how important procedures and policies about intelligence are understood and 
practiced by SLT law enforcement agencies and what mechanisms exist to enhance the sharing 
of these ideas in the current environment.   
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Research Design and Methods 
 In sum, there are two elements to the research design.  In the first element, the research 
team conducted a national survey on the intelligence practices with two different samples of key 
personnel.  The first sample consisted of personnel from fusion centers and has been involved in 
the development of the state-level intelligence infrastructure.  The second survey sample consists 
of line-level officers and other individuals charged with building an intelligence capacity for 
individual agencies.  The second element of the research design was to conduct three case studies 
at fusion centers to better understand how they have managed important intelligence issues.  
 
Surveys of Key Personnel 
In order to provide an overview of the major issues facing law enforcement agencies and 
fusion centers, the research team distributed Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved 
questionnaires via a web-designed survey to two groups of law enforcement personnel.  The first 
group included individuals who had attended training programs designed and delivered by the 
School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University, and funded by the Department of 
Homeland Security.  For the most part, those individuals selected to attend the training generally 
were assigned to develop or re-engineer the intelligence capacity within their agency.  Most had 
little previous experience in law enforcement intelligence and were seeking guidance, through 
the training, on how to develop their intelligence capacity. This sampling strategy, which 
includes personnel from significantly different sized police agencies in all geographic regions of 
the country, was chosen for three reasons.  First, in attending this training, these officers were 
identified by their respective SLT agency as a representative of the intelligence function within 
the agency.  Second, as such this sample includes law enforcement personnel who have a 
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working understanding of key issues tied to building an intelligence capacity, and thus will be 
able to address specifically the problems with putting knowledge into practice.  Third, their 
awareness of the contemporary intelligence structures, requirements, and formal communication 
networks increases the likelihood that they will have direct knowledge about the strengths and 
weaknesses of these issues.  Although not all agencies are represented in our sample, the 
diversity of agencies and personnel that have attended the training, representing all types of 
agencies from all levels of these organizations, ensures that the sample includes personnel that 
will have crucial information for understanding the problems of information sharing, 
performance measurement, and formal communication networks as viewed by state, local and 
tribal law enforcement personnel.     
The second group was attendees at the 2007 and 2008 National Fusion Center 
Conferences.  The research team decided to survey the participants at these conferences rather 
than sending surveys directly to fusion centers for two reasons.  First, participants in the 
conference will not only be fusion center staff (including possibly having multiple respondents 
from the same center), but include others from various levels of government and a range of key 
disciplines.  Thus, the research team assumed the sample would include a broad range of 
individuals critical to effective intelligence practices in the United States.  Second, the research 
team assumed that since most fusion centers would send multiple personnel, there would be 
multiple indicators on key measures for each fusion center.   
The intent behind the decision to administer a web-based survey instead of a mail survey 
was to simplify the response process for informants and to reliably capture the data they 
submitted.  A group of state, local, and tribal law enforcement intelligence leaders, who 
constitute the Advisory Board of the Michigan State University Intelligence Program, served as 
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subject matter experts and scrutinized preliminary drafts; a separate group of law enforcement 
officials then took part in a pretest of both surveys to identify ambiguous or poorly worded 
questions, issues that were overlooked, and items that could be potentially difficult to answer 
correctly.  The final drafts consisted of 103 (law enforcement survey) and 125 (fusion center 
survey) structured, semi-structured, or open-ended questions.  Although the survey instruments 
were long, the research team opted for breadth and providing opportunities for the respondents to 
engage a variety of critical intelligence issues.  In general, the surveys captured their intelligence 
experiences, issues related to information sharing and strategies that could promote better 
information sharing, how intelligence practices are assessed and what metrics are being used to 
measure performance, and identify the communication networks that exist for information 
sharing.  The research team also collected several indicators on the type of agency, role of 
intelligence in the agency, and characteristics of the respondent.   
The surveys were administered using software purchased by Michigan State University 
that is ideal for web-based survey design and data collection (see SnapSurvey.com).  Prior to the 
data collection phase, it was necessary to ensure no individuals appeared in both sampling 
frames.  In early June 2009 an e-mail was sent to each addressee outlining the purpose of the 
study and inviting them to complete a self-administered, online questionnaire.  The research 
team recorded replies that took the form of automated server notifications telling us the source 
addresses were invalid and formal refusals, and then corrected the sampling frame by removing 
individuals who could not be contacted in addition to those who declined to participate. 
Invitation e-mails were sent to the law enforcement sample of 2,882, followed by 2395 e-
mails with a unique identifier and one of two URLs a respondent could use to access the 
appropriate survey a week later.  In the case of the fusion center sample, 872 invitations and 772 
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follow up emails were transmitted.  As e-mail replies and survey submissions appeared, the 
research team readjusted the sampling frames so subsequent requests targeted only those who 
had not communicated with us.  Further follow up e-mails were issued a second, third, and fourth 
time at approximately monthly intervals; the fifth and final reminders were sent at the end of 
March 2010 and the collection window closed a month later. 
 
Table 1.1: Numbers of responses by intelligence workers. 
 
 Group 
Responses Law enforcement Fusion centers 
Valid 414 88 
Undelivered email 313 52 
Declined 57 31 
 
Table 1.1 shows the response totals the research plan elicited.  Using the formula of valid 
responses / (first phase invitations - undelivered invitations - declined invitations), the response 
rate for individual respondents was 20.4 percent for the law enforcement sample and 12.8 
percent for the fusion center sample.   
The response rate was lower than expected.  In order to learn why the response rates were 
not higher, the research team conducted follow up telephone interviews with 100 randomly 
selected participants in the law enforcement sample.    Among the key reasons that were 
consistently reported for not responding were: 
1. Job responsibilities.  A number of individuals stated that they had been reassigned or 
promoted and no longer worked in the intelligence function.  As a result they either felt 
the survey no longer applied to them or they were not familiar with current activities in 
the intelligence function. 
2. The survey length.  In order to fully explore the nature of and challenges to law 
enforcement intelligence work, both surveys asked respondents more than 100 questions.  
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Feedback suggests individuals were uncomfortable committing to this task, especially 
when they were at work.  As one informant remarked, “Thirty minutes is too long, there’s 
no way I have time to take a survey for half an hour – we’re under massive pressure as it 
is.” 
3. One response per agency.  Several individuals declined because they knew a colleague 
from the same agency had already responded.  One person even indicated his work group 
had instituted an informal policy whereby they only respond to one survey per week and 
this task is rotated around the group.  While it is possible to control for a limited number 
of responses when departments are small, it becomes problematic in the case of larger 
organizations and fusion centers. 
4. Security.  A handful of individuals were concerned about the security implications of 
sharing information about intelligence activities outside of the law enforcement 
community.  This was a somewhat surprising finding since the study aims to inform 
public policy by identifying general, not agency specific, trends about law enforcement 
intelligence work.  However, even though the study was funded by the National Institute 
of Justice of the U.S. Department of Justice, there was skepticism about the legitimacy of 
the data collection exercise. 
 
Demographic information 
Table 1.2 provides information regarding the position of the respondents and their tenure 
in the agency.  Mean figures suggest 47.1 sworn officers (n=247, SD=346.8), 77.4 professional 
staff (non-sworn and not analysts) (n=210, SD=966.6), and 13.6 analysts (n=133, SD=30.3) 
make up the law enforcement sample’s intelligence workforce.  The large measures of dispersion 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 39 
indicate there was considerable variation and it was evident that some data points reflected the 
belief that all agency workers service the intelligence function.   
 Unsurprisingly, respondents indicate fusion centers employ fewer workers.  On average, 
there are 10.0 sworn officers (n=68, SD=15.7), 18.8 professional staff (non-sworn and not 
analysts) (n=61, SD=21.7), and 12.0 analysts (n=66, SD=13.3) working in these organizations.  
However, as Table 1.2 illustrates, most fusion center workers (48.0%) have held their position 
for between one and three years, in marked contrast to law enforcement workers (21.9%) who 
tend to have remained in the same role for more than ten years.   
 
Table 1.2: Position and Tenure within their Agency. 
 
 Law enforcement  Fusion centers 
 N Percent  N Percent 
Role      
Administrator 119 30.3  46 57.5 
Supervisor 90 22.9  18 22.5 
Investigator 116 29.5  6 7.5 
Analyst 68 17.3  10 12.5 
Tenure      
Less than a year 3 0.8  10 13.3 
1-3 years 27 6.9  36 48.0 
4-9 years 78 19.9  24 32.0 
10-15 years 86 21.9  3 4.0 
More than 15 years 199 50.6  2 2.7 
 
 
Table 1.2 also displays categorical counts for the job roles and intelligence career tenure 
of study participants.  Most law enforcement (30.3%) and fusion center workers (57.5%) serve as 
administrators.  The next largest groups for the SLT sample include law enforcement 
investigators (29.5%) and supervisors (22.9%).  Analysts represented 17.3 percent of the SLT 
sample.  Over 22 percent of the FC respondents were supervisors, 12.5 percent were analysts, 
and 7.5 were investigators.   
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Case Studies  
The research team completed three in-depth case studies of fusion centers.  The data 
collection strategy for the case studies was to select two that were using innovative strategies to 
address these critical issues.  These agencies were identified through the surveys, contacts with 
key staff, and in consultation with the grant program manager and subject matter experts.  In 
addition, the third case study was chosen in order to interview personnel who were working in a 
fusion center in transition.  The research team concluded that since fusion centers are at various 
points of development that it was critical to receive input from an emerging fusion center that 
was managing challenging issues (e.g., change in management and other personnel; developing 
new policies and procedures; staff learning new job responsibilities, developing new information 
sharing partnerships).   
For each fusion center that was selected, the research team began by compiling and 
analyzing open source documents regarding their efforts to address these issues.  In addition, site 
visits were conducted to better understand their relationship and work in the intelligence area.    
The research team provides an overview of the structure, activities, and development of each 
fusion center, and discusses best practices for responding to critical issues examined in the 
survey.  The primary focus of each case study was to better understand the issues addressed in 
the survey:  intelligence practices, information sharing, performance measurement, and 
communication networks.  Other issues examined include experience with terrorism incidents 
and the production of intelligence regarding the terrorist threat, organizational structures that are 
part of the law enforcement intelligence community, collection requirements and reasons for 
relying on particular types of raw information, coordination, and information sharing practices 
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within an agency, key assessment and evaluation activities, the important legal, cultural, and 
political issues that impact these processes, the role of intelligence in overall law enforcement 
operations, and perspectives of cooperation internally and externally.   
 
Structure of the Final Report 
 The research team presents the results of this study in eight chapters.  Chapters 2 through 
4 present the survey results.  In Chapter 2, information is presented about the organizational 
policies and staff knowledge of intelligence issues, Chapter 3 engages issues on information 
sharing, and Chapter 4 discusses performance metrics and communication networks.  Chapter 5 
provides additional survey results from the fusion center personnel, and discusses the results of 
the Michigan Intelligence Operations Center case study.  Chapter 6 provides a detailed 
description of the Florida Fusion Center and Chapter 7 discusses the Southern Nevada Counter-
Terrorism Center.  The final chapter provides a summary of the results and discusses 
implications for policy, practice, and future research.  
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Chapter 2:  Organizational Policies and Worker Knowledge of Key Intelligence Issues 
The September 11th attacks fundamentally changed the structure, expectations, and 
requirements of law enforcement intelligence operations.  Although there have been significant 
changes and challenges facing the federal law enforcement community, this project focuses on 
what has occurred at state, local, and tribal levels.  The most significant changes have been the 
development of new national standards and initiatives promulgated by the Global Intelligence 
Working Group as well as the widespread development of fusion centers.  There were only a few 
fusion centers – typically called Regional Intelligence Centers -- that existed prior to 9/11. This 
expansion and its impact on local law enforcement is noted in a report recently released by DHS 
documenting progress made towards implementing recommendations from the 9/11 
Commission.  Specifically, it was stated that “While fusion centers did not exist ten years ago, 
today there are 72 recognized fusion centers throughout the country…that are uniquely situated 
to empower front-line law enforcement, public safety, fire service, emergency response, public 
health, critical infrastructure protection, and private sector security personnel to understand local 
implications of national intelligence, thus enabling local officials to better protect their 
communities” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011:12). One of the underlying reasons 
for the creation of these fusion centers was to establish an information sharing clearinghouse for 
state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies as part of the Information Sharing Environment.   
Such centers were designed to help tear down “silos of information” by building trust and 
communication channels among and between law enforcement agencies, and developing 
nationwide criminal information connectivity.   Technology provides opportunities to collect and 
share mass amounts of information, but managing and making sense of the data that is available 
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is a great challenge.  The development of fusion centers were designed to help manage a growing 
amount of two-way SLT information sharing more effectively and efficiently.  
 Critical to responding to terrorism and other multi-jurisdictional crimes is local 
information collected from state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies.  There are 
documented cases of criminal extremists having routine contact with SLT law enforcement 
officers that led to prevention of an attack, but there have also been some missed opportunities, 
most notably 9/11.  For example, evidence has shown that terrorists commit precursor crimes 
that put them in contact with various law enforcement officers.  One concern, however, is that 
potentially relevant and important information is not shared and thus an opportunity to prevent a 
potential serious act may be missed.  The new intelligence structure was designed to fix some of 
these gaps in information sharing.  State, local, and tribal agencies have been urged to develop an 
intelligence capacity so that they may effectively share threat information across jurisdictions as 
well as provide information to analysts who may more effectively define the threat picture.  A 
significant challenge, however, is that SLT agencies must absorb the costs of building an 
intelligence capacity as “an unfunded mandate.”  The lack of dedicated resources makes the 
building of an effective intelligence capacity particularly challenging.  
This chapter provides an introduction that relates to this changing intelligence structure  
on six survey issues.  First, staff attitudes toward preparedness for terrorist and other types of 
criminal events are examined.  Second, staff knowledge of key intelligence mandates are 
assessed.  Third, the knowledge and understanding of the intelligence-led policing concept is 
discussed.  Fourth, attitudes about civil liberties are examined.  Fifth, training programs the 
respondents have taken, as well as intelligence training priorities, are discussed.  Sixth, formal 
policies and practices are examined that support the building of an intelligence capacity.  Where 
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applicable, the results compare the fusion center respondents to all other law enforcement 
respondents, as well as by the administrator, supervisor, investigator and analyst results.   
 
Attitudes Toward Agency Preparedness 
Table 2.1 provides information about agency preparedness.  The first two items focused 
on understanding the threats existing in their region as well as their preparation in responding to 
these threats.  The results are insightful.   A majority (63.4%) of the SLT respondents thought to 
be either very aware or aware of the threats facing their region with little variation when 
comparing the responses by position within the agency (e.g., administrator, supervisor, 
investigator, and analyst).   However, over 94 percent of the fusion center (FC) respondents said 
that they were very aware or aware of such threats facing their region.   Similarly, nearly 43 
percent of the SLT respondents stated that their agency was very prepared or prepared for the 
threats in their region (an almost equal number stated that they were somewhat prepared), but 
over 67 percent of the FC respondents said they were very prepared or prepared for homeland 
security threats.  In addition, when comparing the SLT responses by position in the organization, 
the responding analysts were much more likely to say that the organization was very prepared or 
prepared.  Over 66 percent of the analysts said that the organization was prepared or very 
prepared compared to 46 percent of administrators, 33 percent of supervisors, and 36 percent of 
investigators.  Thus, although the FC respondents and analysts thought that they were prepared 
for the threats in their region; other SLT personnel did not feel as strongly about their 
preparation.   
Table 2.1    Attitudes Towards Agency Preparedness 
Question SLT Fusion 
Center 
Administration Supervisor Investigator Analyst 
Agency       
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aware of  
threats1  
63.4% 94.1% 68.9% 63.2% 57.3% 70.5% 
Agency 
prepared for 
threats2 
 
42.7% 
 
67.4% 
 
46.2% 
 
32.6% 
 
35.7% 
 
66.1% 
Far along is 
agency in 
having an 
intelligence 
capacity3 
 
9.2% 
 
14.1% 
 
8.4% 
 
6.7% 
 
7.0% 
 
16.2% 
Agency has 
sufficient 
staff4 
 
2.9% 
 
1.2% 
 
1.7% 
 
1.1% 
 
4.3% 
 
3.0% 
Agency has 
capacity to 
identify 
threats4 
 
13.3% 
 
19.2% 
 
14.5% 
 
16.9% 
 
7.3% 
 
18.6% 
Agency 
provides 
timely 
intell4 
 
16.7% 
 
17.9% 
 
16.2% 
 
19.0% 
 
12.7% 
 
24.1% 
Fusion 
center 
products 
have 
content to 
aid in 
prevention 
of crime4 
 
 
16.8% 
 
 
NA 
 
 
17.8% 
 
 
20.0% 
 
 
12.9% 
 
 
18.0% 
1 Very aware/aware; 2 Very prepared/prepared; 3 Very far; 4 Strongly Agree 
 
The results in Table 2.1 also show that there is widespread agreement that the law 
enforcement community has a long way to go in building an intelligence capacity—a conclusion 
indicated by the respondents taking both surveys.  Less than ten percent of the SLT respondents 
thought that their agency was far along in developing and maintaining a criminal intelligence 
capacity, 13 percent strongly agreed that they had the capacity to identify the characteristics of 
events that represent the indicators or precursors of threats, and only 17 percent thought their 
agency provides actionable intelligence in a timely manner.  Only 14 percent of the FC 
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respondents thought that they were very far along in developing and maintaining an intelligence 
capacity, 19 percent strongly agreed that they had the characteristics of events that represent 
indicators and/or precursors, and nearly 18 percent strongly agreed that the center provides 
intelligence in a timely manner.  It is not surprising, but very few SLT respondents and FC 
respondents thought they had a sufficient number of staff to achieve their agency’s intelligence 
capacity mission.   
 
Knowledge of Key Intelligence Mandates 
Table 2.2 presents knowledge of key intelligence mandates.  The results from this table 
also support the conclusion that building an intelligence capacity for both FCs and SLT agencies 
is a work in progress and very few respondents think their agency has reached optimum levels.  
The state, local, and tribal respondents were very familiar or somewhat familiar with the 
National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan and the intelligence-led policing concept, but they 
were much less familiar with the Department of Homeland Security’s Target Capability List.  
There was not much variation in the responses to this general awareness of these mandates when 
comparing the different levels of the organization.  Fusion center respondents were more likely 
to be very or somewhat familiar with the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, the Target 
Capability List, and the intelligence-led policing concept compared to the SLT respondents.   
Table 2.2.  Respondent Knowledge of Key Intelligence Mandates 
Question SLT Fusion 
Center 
Administrator Supervisor Investigator Analyst 
Familiar 
with 
NCISP1 
 
63.7% 
 
88.6% 
 
65.5% 
 
57.8% 
 
68.1% 
 
60.3% 
Familiar 
with TCL1 
 
37.8% 
 
72.7% 
 
40.3% 
 
44.8% 
 
31.0% 
 
34.4% 
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Familiar 
with ILP1 
 
70.3% 
 
86.2% 
 
70.6% 
 
65.9% 
 
68.1% 
 
79.1% 
Agency 
follows 
NCISP recs2 
 
9.4% 
 
19.0% 
 
3.6% 
 
11.8% 
 
10.0% 
 
15.3% 
Agency 
aligns with 
TCL2 
 
6.0% 
 
7.6% 
 
3.8% 
 
5.1% 
 
6.8% 
 
4.2% 
1Very familiar/familiar; 2Completely  
 
It is interesting that the respondents agreed that, although they were generally familiar 
with the National Criminal Sharing Plan, the Target Capability list, and Intelligence-Led 
Policing, they have yet to put these mandates into practice.  Only nine percent of the SLT 
respondents said that their agency’s intelligence function follows the National Criminal Sharing 
Plan and just six percent said it aligns with the Target Capability list.  Nineteen percent of the FC 
respondents said that their agency’s intelligence function followed the NCISP recommendations 
and over seven percent said that it aligns with the Target Capability list.  
 
Intelligence-Led Policing 
The adoption of intelligence-led policing (ILP) is gaining momentum among state, local, 
and tribal law enforcement agencies.  The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) 
intelligence summit in 2002 recommended the adoption of ILP by America’s state, local and 
tribal law enforcement agencies in the post-9/11 era (IACP, 2002).  This was reinforced by a 
recommendation in the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) to adopt ILP and 
has been echoed broadly by law enforcement leaders as well as reflected in new programming by 
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U. S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
(Carter, 2009).  The demand for intelligence-led policing has come from a variety of government 
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recommendations, reports, and mandates.  Moreover, government funding has provided 
incentives for agencies to adopt intelligence-led policing to explore its different applications– 
such as the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s “Targeting Violent Crime Initiative” (TVCI).   
 Very few of the agencies surveyed, however, have implemented intelligence-led policing.  
Table 2.3 presents these results.  On average, only 18.7 percent of the SLT respondents said that 
their agency had adopted intelligence-led policing.  Analysts were somewhat more likely than 
administrators, supervisors, and investigators to believe their organization had adopted ILP.  In 
contrast, over 29 percent of the FC respondents indicated that their agency had adopted ILP.   
Not only did a larger percentage of FC respondents indicate that their agency had adopted ILP, 
they were also somewhat more likely to indicate that it was very effective.  Over 38 percent of 
the FC respondents indicated that ILP was very effective in their agency.  Although investigators 
and analysts were somewhat more optimistic about the effectiveness of ILP in their agency, 
under 30 percent of all SLT respondents thought that ILP functioned very effectively in their 
agency.   
Table 2.3.   Understanding Intelligence-Led Policing  
Question SLT Fusion 
Center 
Administrator Supervisor Investigator Analyst 
Agency 
Adopted 
ILP 
 
18.7% 
 
29.1% 
 
16.8% 
 
14.8% 
 
20.0% 
 
26.5% 
ILP 
effective in 
agency1 
 
28.0% 
 
37.5% 
 
20.0% 
 
25.0% 
 
36.4% 
 
33.3% 
Agency 
chief exec 
supports 
ILP2 
 
23.3% 
 
51.2% 
 
28.0% 
 
21.2% 
 
17.3% 
 
31.7% 
Analysts in 
agency 
familiar 
with ILP2 
 
13.8% 
 
28.4% 
 
10.5% 
 
13.3% 
 
14.4% 
 
20.0% 
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Personnel 
in agency 
familiar 
with ILP2 
 
3.2% 
 
18.5% 
 
2.5% 
 
2.3% 
 
3.5% 
 
6.2% 
1 Very Effective; 2  Strongly Agree 
  
A recent study of Intelligence-Led Policing implementation found that both familiarity 
with, and commitment to, the ILP concept increased the likelihood of successful implementation 
(Carter, 2011).  The respondents from both surveys indicated that most analysts and other 
personnel in their organization were not familiar with the ILP concept.  Only 14 percent of the 
SLT respondents strongly agreed that analysts were very familiar with the ILP concept and just 
over three percent said that other personnel in the organization were very familiar with this 
concept.  Although the percentages were somewhat higher when examining the FC responses, 
just over 28 percent strongly agreed that the analysts in the fusion center were familiar and over 
18 percent strongly agreed that others in the agency were familiar with the ILP concept.   
Critical to the promotion of this concept is the attitudes of the chief executive about the 
adoption of ILP—without commitment from command staff it is unlikely that ILP will have 
much of an impact on organizational processes.  It appears that the FC respondents thought that 
the chief executives were much more supportive of the ILP concept.   Over 51 percent of these 
respondents strongly agreed that their chief executive supports ILP.  In contrast, just over 23 
percent of the SLT respondents strongly agreed that the chief executive supports ILP.   
 
Civil Liberties 
 Table 2.4 provides data on perceptions of civil liberties.  Most of the SLT respondents 
and FC respondents indicated that suspicious activity reports include personal identifying 
information of suspicious persons.  Nearly 78 percent of the SLT respondents and 75 percent of 
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the FC respondents said that suspicious activity reports include such information.  Only 17 
percent of the SLT respondents and 27 percent of the FC respondents said that these reports are 
entered into an information system outside of their agency, but the SLT analysts were much less 
likely to indicate that such reports were entered into other information systems.5   
 The remaining results presented in Table 2.4 represent more general issues related to 
privacy and protection of civil liberties.  As a precursor discussion, 28 CFR Part 23, is a federal 
regulation prescribing guidelines for the collection, retention, review, dissemination and purging 
of “criminal intelligence information”.  The regulation stipulates it only applies to law 
enforcement agencies that operate a federally funded multijurisdictional criminal intelligence 
records system.  However, as a new national standard, the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing 
Plan (NCISP) provides broader application, recommending that all law enforcement agencies 
that have criminal intelligence records adhere to 28 CFR Part 23, whether or not they receive 
federal funding.  As a result, the research team included these questions as a benchmark to 
measure adoption of the NCISP recommendations.  Just over half of the SLT respondents 
indicated that their criminal intelligence records system was 28 CFR Part 23 compliant, but over 
82 percent of the FC respondents indicated such compliance.  The surprising aspect of this 
finding is that since one responsibility of fusion centers is to serve as repositories for “criminal 
intelligence information” and virtually all of them receive some type of federal funding 
(although that funding may not specifically be to support the “criminal intelligence records 
system”) one would assume that all fusion centers were 28 CFR Part 23 compliant.6  As a caveat, 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that at the time of these surveys, the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative  (NSI) 
had been developed but was still in the Evaluation Environment (EE) phase.  While there had been widespread 
discussion of the initiative, its implementation was still in progress.  The question was addressed in this survey 
because there had been some vocal concern about the NSI expressed by the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU). 
6 Beyond the NCISP recommendation, the Fusion Center Guidelines also explicitly recommend that fusion centers 
also adhere to the regulation. 
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some of the fusion centers were still in development at the time of the survey – if surveyed again 
today this percentage would most likely be higher.   
Further on the question of 28 CFR Part 23 compliance, it is very interesting to compare 
the SLT analysts’ responses to the administrator, supervisor, and investigator results.  
Specifically, the analysts were much more likely to indicate that the agency’s criminal 
intelligence records system were compliant with 28 CFR Part 23 compared to others in the 
organization.  For example, over 72 percent of the analysts said they were compliant compared 
to 48 percent of the administrators, 42 percent of the supervisors, and 55 percent of the 
investigators.  An explanation for this is that the analysts’ training typically focuses more on the 
28 CFR Part 23 guidelines and the analysts tend to work with the criminal intelligence records on 
a more consistent basis than other than other staff members.  As a result, the analysts’ responses 
may simply reflect a more informed response to the question. 
Less than half of the SLT and FC respondents said that their privacy policy meet federal 
policy standards, although most of the remaining respondents indicated that their policy was in 
the process of being modified.  In the last two years there has been a concerted effort, including 
federal technical assistance, to ensure that the fusion centers have a privacy policy in place that 
meet the privacy standards of the Information Sharing Environment.  Once again, if the survey 
was taken today, the percentage of fusion centers with a privacy policy meeting these standards 
would likely be higher. 
Similarly, less than half of the SLT respondents and 63 percent of the FC respondents 
indicated that their agency distinguishes between permanent and temporary intelligence files 
within their intelligence records policy.  It should be noted that the distinction between 
temporary and permanent intelligence records are not part of the 28 CFR Part 23 guidelines, but 
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simply a policy mechanism employed by many law enforcement agencies to deal with “tips and 
leads” that have not yet met the criminal predicate standard.  Those agencies and fusion centers 
not reporting the use of both types of files may have simply opted to not retain any criminal 
intelligence records unless the criminal predicate has been established. 
Table 2.4.   Attitudes on Civil Liberties 
Question SLT Fusion 
Center 
Administrator Supervisor Investigator Analyst 
SARs have 
identifying 
information 
 
77.9% 
 
75.0% 
 
78.8% 
 
76.2% 
 
88.2% 
 
73.0% 
SARs 
entered into 
outside info 
system 
 
16.7% 
 
27.1% 
 
18.8% 
 
16.3% 
 
21.2% 
 
7.9% 
Agency 
distinguishes 
perm. and 
temp. intel 
files 
 
 
47.4% 
 
 
62.7% 
 
 
 
46.2% 
 
 
39.5% 
 
 
50.4% 
 
 
58.8% 
Privacy 
policy meets 
federal 
standards 
 
47.4% 
 
45.9% 
 
50.4% 
 
43.2% 
 
45.2% 
 
54.4% 
Crim.  intel 
records 
system  are 
28 CFR Part 
23compliant 
 
 
52.7% 
 
 
82.4% 
 
 
47.9% 
 
 
42.0% 
 
 
55.3% 
 
 
72.1% 
 
 
Training 
A critical mechanism for building an effective intelligence capacity is providing training 
to staff in all levels of the organization on policies, procedures, civil rights, and organizational 
change issues.  Indeed, the Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training Standards produced by the 
GIWG emphasize the need and minimum training content for Chief Executives, commanders 
and supervisors, analysts and line officers.  Some funding agencies have supported the creation 
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of training programs related to building an intelligence capacity and some other programs are 
available from specific law enforcement agencies.  For example, all of the SLT members have 
attended MSU’s Intelligence Toolbox Training in order to be in the sample, and beyond this, 
approximately 30 percent of the fusion center sample attended this training.  Table 2.5 presents 
whether SLT respondents, SLT analysts, and fusion center personnel have attended other types 
of training programs.   Of the training programs considered, training provided by State and Local 
Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) was most likely to be attended by the analysts in these 
agencies.  Fifty-three percent of all SLT respondents, 58 percent of SLT analysts, and 73 percent 
of FC personnel indicated that their analysts had attended SLATT training.   A relatively high 
number of respondents indicated that their analysts attended the Fundamentals of Intelligence 
Analyst Training (FIAT) and 28 CFR Part 23 training.  Approximately 35 percent of SLT 
respondents and analysts indicated that their analysts attended FIAT training, and 35 percent of 
all SLT respondents and 47 percent of SLT analysts indicated that their analysts attended 28 
CFR 23 training7.  Nearly 77 percent of FC respondents indicated that their analysts attended 
FIAT training and 76 percent indicated they attended 28 CFR 23 training.  Over 20 percent of the 
SLT respondents indicated that their analysts attended the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center analyst training and the National White Collar Crime Centers Analyst training.  A 
somewhat higher percentage of SLT analysts and FC respondents indicated that their analysts 
attended these two trainings.  In general, a smaller percentage of respondents indicated that their 
analysts attended the other trainings considered, including the FBI’s Center for Intelligence 
Training8, the DEA’s Federal Law Enforcement Analyst Training (FLEAT), Regional 
                                                 
7 The Bureau of Justice Assistance provides 28 CFR Part 23 training both as an “in class” model and an online 
where there is testing a certificate issued.  The survey did not distinguish between the training delivery methods. 
8 This has recently been renamed the Intelligence and Analysis Training Unit (IATU). 
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CounterDrug Training Academy (RCTA), and the Department of Homeland Security’s DHS 
Report Writing workshop.  
Table 2.5. National Training Participation 
Training SLT Fusion Center Analyst 
FIAT Analyst Training 33.9% 77.2% 35.9% 
FLETC Analyst 
Training 
22.6% 44.3% 34.4% 
FBI Center for Intel 
Training 
8.6% 15.2% 9.4% 
FLEAT Analyst 
Training 
12.5% 26.6% 21.9% 
NWCCC Analyst 
Training 
21.1% 40.5% 25.0% 
SLATT Analyst 
Training 
53.0% 73.4% 57.8% 
28 CFR 23 35.1% 75.9% 46.9% 
Regional CounterDrug  
Intel Training 
14.3% 22.8% 10.9% 
DHS Report Writing 13.1% NA 23.4% 
 
Beyond the training programs attended, the research team wanted to document training 
priorities by asking what type of training, in general, analysts were required to complete and 
whether the agency provided any specific training on intelligence issues.  Table 2.6 provides the 
responses for SLT and FC respondents.  Fusion centers, in general, had a much higher number of 
training priorities.  For example, over 78 percent of the fusion respondents indicated that analysts 
were required to receive training on the agency’s privacy policy and 68 percent indicated that 
analysts were required to receive training on precursor activities of terrorists.9  Over 31 percent 
of the FC respondents indicated that analysts were required to receive specific training on 
intelligence-led policing.  Forty-one percent of the SLT respondents indicated that analysts were 
required to receive training on precursor activities of terrorists, 39 percent indicated that they 
                                                 
9 It should be noted this training is largely related to the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative. 
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received training on the agency’s privacy policy, and 82 percent said they received specific 
training on ILP.  These results are consistent with earlier findings presented that compared 
general awareness of ILP issues and concerns about civil rights organizations across the two 
samples of respondents.   
A relatively large number of respondents indicated that their agency was attempting to 
train others in different ways to assist with the collection of suspicious activities and intelligence 
requirements.  Over 87 percent of the FC respondents and 82 percent of the SLT respondents 
indicated that line level officers were trained to identify and report information related to 
suspicious activities.  Eighty-three percent of the FC respondents indicated that they trained other 
partners (e.g., businesses, community organizations) and 43 percent indicated they trained 
citizens to identify suspicious activities in their community.  In comparison, 40 percent of the 
SLT respondents indicated they trained other partners and 28 percent indicated they trained 
citizens to identify suspicious activities.  Almost half of the SLT respondents indicated that they 
provided academy training on the role and function of intelligence in their agency and 77 percent 
of the FC respondents indicated they provided such training.  Approximately one-third of both 
samples of respondents indicated that they train other law enforcement officers on privacy and 
civil rights issues.  Prior to the law enforcement intelligence initiatives that were products of the 
9/11 attacks and the subsequent creation of the Global Intelligence Working Group, there was 
virtually no intelligence related training for law enforcement personnel who  were not assigned 
to a dedicated intelligence unit, gang unit or drug unit.  As a result, the percentages of agencies 
reporting intelligence-training to non-intelligence staff represent significant progress. 
 
Table 2.6. Agency Training Priorities  
Training SLT Fusion Center 
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Specific training on ILP 19.0% 31.7% 
Agency’s privacy policy 38.8% 78.3% 
Precursor activities of 
terrorists 
41.1% 68.7% 
Suspicious activities 81.6% 87.1% 
Trained non-traditional 
partners 
40.1% 82.9% 
Trained citizens 27.9% 42.9% 
Provided academy 
training 
49.3% 77.1% 
Provided training on 
civil rights issues 
35.7% 38.6% 
 
 
Formal Policies and Procedures 
 Table 2.7 documents the formal policies and procedures that are in place related to 
building an intelligence capacity.  Most of these policies and procedures represent the building 
blocks critical to achieving a mature intelligence capacity, and in general, about half of the 
respondents indicated that their agency had put most of these policies and procedures in place.  
Nearly 46 percent of the SLT respondents and 59 percent of the FC respondents indicated that 
the agency had a policy designed expressly to guide their intelligence function, and 34 percent of 
the SLT respondents and 62 percent of the FC respondents indicated that their agency has an 
intelligence capacity mission statement.  Over 60 percent of the SLT respondents and 79 percent 
of the FC respondents indicated that their agency had a formal approval process for entering into 
a Memorandum of Understanding for information and intelligence sharing with other law 
enforcement agencies/entities, although only 44 percent of the SLT respondents said their agency 
had defined goals and objectives for collecting, analyzing, producing and sharing information 
compared to over 81 percent of the FC respondents.   While these data reflect significant growth 
of intelligence-related policies and procedures, a caveat is that the survey was sent to a purposive 
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sample of individuals working in an intelligence-related assignment-- in the universe of 
American law enforcement agencies, the proportions would be smaller.   
 Several of the survey items relate to the management of potential intelligence sources.  
Nearly 39 percent of the SLT respondents indicated that their agency has a suspicious activity 
reporting policy, and 74 percent said their suspicious activities reports are for all crimes.  In 
comparison, 49 percent of the FC respondents said their agency had a suspicious activity 
reporting policy, and 73 percent indicated that they had these reports for all crimes.  Over half of 
the SLT respondents and over 60 percent of the FC respondents said that their agency had either 
or both a Terrorism Liaison Officer and Intelligence Liaison Program.  New initiatives and 
guidelines were developed for Fusion Center Liaison Officers after the survey data were 
collected.  Once again, a survey administered today would likely see this number increase 
significantly.  Nearly 68 percent of the SLT respondents indicated that the agency has a formal 
policy for managing informants and 47 percent indicated that the agency deconflicts information 
in their intelligence records system.  A somewhat smaller percentage of FC respondents said that 
they had an articulated policy and procedures for managing informants, but a higher percentage 
stated that their agency deconflicts information in their intelligence records system.    
  Several of the questions build on the earlier discussion of responding to privacy and civil 
rights concerns.  For example, 32 percent of the SLT respondents indicated that their agency 
regularly audits their intelligence function and records, nearly 52 percent indicated their agency 
has a policy to handle both sensitive but unclassified information and classified information, 41 
percent indicated that legal counsel has reviewed and approved all procedures related to building 
an intelligence capacity, and 62 percent indicated that the information stored in criminal 
intelligence files is evaluated according to source reliability and content validity before being 
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included in a criminal intelligence files.  Thirty percent of these respondents, however, indicated 
that their privacy policy has never been updated to be aligned with new or revised laws or court 
decisions.  The FC respondents were somewhat more likely to indicate that such policies were in 
place.  For example, 46 percent said they audit their intelligence function and records, 67 percent 
said they have a policy to handle sensitive but unclassified and classified information, 67 percent 
indicated that legal counsel had reviewed and approved all policies and procedures, and nearly 
80 percent indicated that the information stored in criminal intelligence files was evaluated 
according to source reliability and content validity.   One would expect the fusion centers to 
report higher percentages on these variables because there has been a more directed training and 
technical assistance effort directed toward fusion centers by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) because of the DHS obligations to establish functional two-way information 
between DHS (in particular) and state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies. 
Table 2.7.  Summary of Policies and Formal Practices 
Question SLT Fusion Center 
Policy to guide intel function 45.9% 59.3% 
Regularly audits intel function 
and records 
32.1% 46.5% 
TLO/ILO program 51.2% 67.7% 
Policy for sensitive info 51.7% 67.4% 
SAR policy 38.7% 49.4% 
SARs for all crimes 74.0% 72.9% 
Intel capacity mission 
statement 
34.0% 61.6% 
Policies & procedures for 
managing informants 
67.5% 60.0% 
Formal approval process for 
MOU for info & intel with 
other law enforcement entities 
61.2% 78.8% 
Legal counsel has approved all 
policies & procedures of intel 
41.3% 66.7% 
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capacity 
Agency NEVER updates 
privacy policy 
29.2% 8.9% 
Agency has goals for 
collecting, analyzing, 
producing, & sharing info 
44.3% 81.0% 
Agency established process to 
identify/track reports of 
suspicious activity 
56.1% 78.2% 
Agency deconflicts info in 
intel records system 
47.0% 67.9% 
Crim. intel files is evaluated 
for reliability & validity 
before put in intel file 
62.0% 79.5% 
Agency developed collection 
requirements based on risk 
assessment results 
34.6% 55.7% 
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Chapter 3.  Information Sharing 
One of the key elements to the successful use of intelligence for prevention is widespread 
information sharing.  According to the Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan,  
“Strengthening our nation’s ability to share terrorism information constitutes a cornerstone of our 
national strategy to protect the American people and our institutions and to defeat terrorists and 
their support networks at home and abroad” (McNamara, 2006: xiii).  Similarly, the President’s 
National Strategy for Information Sharing (2007, p. 1) states, “Our success in preventing future 
terrorist attacks depends upon our ability to gather, analyze, and share information on 
intelligence regarding those who want to attack us, the tactics they use, and the targets that they 
intend to attack.”  Agencies and individuals must know how to identify relevant threat 
information, collect it without violating civil liberties, know who the information should be 
shared with, and must be willing to share it.   Although there are many agencies that will provide 
information that will have to be shared to be successful in preventing terrorist attacks, SLT law 
enforcement agencies play a particularly important role for identifying and intervening in 
domestic threats.  Moreover, although state and major urban area fusion centers have provided a 
vehicle to perhaps enhance the flow of local intelligence, these centers are still in development 
with little empirically known about their information sharing relationships with other agencies.  
Considering that information sharing among law enforcement agencies has historically been a 
problematic issue, there is reason to suspect that it will be necessary to develop innovative 
strategies to promote information sharing across SLT law enforcement agencies and with the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and state fusion centers.  
While both the Global Intelligence Working Group and the Program Manager for the 
Information Sharing Environment are providing important standards and guidelines for sharing 
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intelligence and information among fusion centers, SLT agencies and federal law enforcement, a 
scientific assessment of information sharing practices has not occurred.  The research team 
reminds the reader that the data collected in this study represents information sharing practices at 
the time the survey was completed by respondents – new initiatives and practices have occurred 
in the time interval between data collection and this report of the findings.  Nonetheless, this data 
provide an important empirical benchmark that was not previously available. 
 Although the 9/11 attacks did not initiate the call for better information sharing among 
government agencies, the attacks did enhance the urgency to take action.  There are many 
examples that can be taken from congressional hearings, reports, and legislative initiatives that 
demonstrate the widespread conclusion that the sharing of information must be improved. For 
example, the USA PATRIOT ACT specifically cites the need to improve information sharing 
and that the “wall” between the intelligence and law enforcement communities must be torn 
down.  The 9/11 Commission report highlights multiple information sharing failures and missed 
opportunities to prevent the attacks, and importantly concludes:  “The culture of agencies feeling 
they own the information they gathered at taxpayer expense must be replaced by a culture in 
which the agencies instead feel they have a duty to the information—to repay the taxpayers’ 
investment by making that information available” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States, 2004: 417).  Other examples of government commission reports that 
highlight the problems with information flow and the need to improve information sharing 
include the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, The National Strategy for Homeland 
Security and The National Security for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and 
Key Assets, the General Accounting Office’s 2003 and 2007 reports on strengthening 
information sharing, and the report from The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission 2005 
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report.  Perhaps, however, one of the most significant factors was the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 which created the Information Sharing Environment. 
 This chapter focuses on how state, local, tribal and fusion center personnel think about 
law enforcement intelligence sharing practices.  The research team examines who the 
respondents consult on intelligence issues and their satisfaction with their relationship with 
various federal, state, and local agencies.  Similarly, the study examines how these individuals 
rate their closeness to other law enforcement agencies, but also how well they are intersected 
with other community, political, and government agencies.  In addition, information sharing 
inputs and outputs, and the methods used to share information are examined.   
 
The Nature of Relationships with Other Agencies  
 Table 3.1 provides the results from asking about the likelihood that respondents would 
contact various agencies for intelligence and threat-related information.  The results are provided 
for all SLT respondents, FC respondents, and SLT administrators, supervisors, investigators, and 
analysts.  Both SLT and FC respondents were likely to rely heavily on others within their own 
agency when having questions about intelligence issues.  Over 66 percent of the SLT 
respondents and over 75 percent of the FC respondents indicated that they were very likely to 
consult other staff in their own agency.  Close to or more than half of both SLT and FC 
respondents were very likely to consult the FBI, state or local law enforcement agencies, and 
experts in the field.  Both SLT and FC respondents were less likely to consult government 
officials and government attorneys.    Table 3.1 is interesting for two additional reasons.  First, in 
general, similar percentages of SLT and FC respondents were very likely to consult the same 
sources when they have intelligence-related questions, although FC respondents indicated that 
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they were very likely to use a few sources more frequently.   For example, a higher percentage of 
FC respondents indicated that they were very likely to consult the FBI, state law enforcement 
agencies, experts in the field, and other state fusion centers.   Only about 30 percent of the SLT 
respondents were very likely to consult other fusion centers on intelligence issues compared to 
over 61 percent of the FC respondents.  This makes sense but it also provides evidence related to 
the structure of intelligence sharing, and that fusion centers appear to have open lines of 
communication and thus would be expected to, in turn, push any intelligence received from other 
fusion centers throughout their states.  Indeed, this empirically supports the rationale on which 
the development of fusion centers was based.  Second, SLT administrators, supervisors, 
investigators, and analysts appeared to use these sources similarly with just one exception.  State, 
local, tribal analysts were somewhat less likely to say that they would consult the FBI on 
intelligence issues compared to supervisors and investigators and much less likely compared to 
administrators.  Since analysts tend to be non-sworn, it is likely that this finding reflects 
organizational culture as much as information sharing practices. 
Table 3.1.  Consults Other Agencies on Intelligence Issues 
Agency SLT FC Administration Supervisor Investigator Analyst 
FBI 47.9% 57.7% 60.7% 48.8% 40.4% 35.6% 
State FC 45.1% NA 50.4% 41.0% 39.3% 50.8% 
Other State 
FC 
 
28.7% 
 
61.5% 
 
28.9% 
 
32.1% 
 
22.5% 
 
32.8% 
Other Fed 
LEA 
 
42.5% 
 
46.8% 
 
47.0% 
 
40.5% 
 
42.7% 
 
34.5% 
State LEA 53.9% 60.8% 56.9% 54.1% 52.8% 50.0% 
Other 
Local LEA 
 
59.6% 
 
56.6% 
 
64.7% 
 
60.2% 
 
57.7% 
 
52.5% 
Other Staff 
in Agency 
 
66.2% 
 
75.6% 
 
71.2% 
 
67.9% 
 
60.4% 
 
65.5% 
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Govt 
Officials 
 
33.1% 
 
31.2% 
 
37.4% 
 
31.7% 
 
28.7% 
 
34.5% 
Govt 
Attorneys 
 
22.9% 
 
32.5% 
 
26.1% 
 
21.3% 
 
22.0% 
 
18.5% 
Experts in 
Field 
 
45.9% 
 
63.2% 
 
49.1% 
 
39.2% 
 
48.5% 
 
45.5% 
 
 Table 3.2 explores these relationships in a somewhat different way as respondents were 
asked to reflect on the closeness of the relationship with various agencies.  In addition, the 
research team asked respondents to not only reflect on the closeness of their relationship with 
other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, but also with a number of government 
and community agencies, the national guard, and the private sector.   The results are similar to 
the discussion presented above.  Both SLT and FC respondents similarly rated the closeness of 
their relationship with other law enforcement relationships, although more FC respondents rated 
the relationship with state law enforcement as being very close.  Approximately 39 percent of 
SLT and FC respondents rated their relationship with the FBI and other federal law enforcement 
agencies as very close, 64 percent rated their relationship with local law enforcement agencies, 
and 10 percent rated their relationship with tribal agencies as being very close.  Fifty-three 
percent of the SLT respondents thought their relationship with state law enforcement agencies, 
but 68 percent of FC respondents rated their relationship as very close. This difference makes 
sense as state fusion centers and state police think similarly about the geographic boundaries of 
their work, and in many states (like Michigan discussed below), the state police are either the 
lead or one of the lead agencies responsible for fusion center operations.  When comparing the 
SLT responses by position in the agency, analysts were less likely to define their relationship 
with the FBI, local law enforcement, and hospitals, but more likely to define their relationship 
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with the state fusion centers, Department of Corrections, and the National Guard as being very 
close.  
 
Table 3.2.  Working Relationship with Other Agencies 
Agency SLT FC Administration Supervisor Investigator Analyst 
FBI1 39.1% 39.0% 46.6% 34.5% 39.1% 33.3% 
Other Fed 37.3% 40.7% 39.7% 29.1% 42.2% 38.7% 
State LE 53.0% 67.9% 60.5% 46.0% 51.8% 54.0% 
Local LE 64.4% 63.8% 71.7% 63.5% 60.2% 61.3% 
Tribal LE 10.7% 10.5% 6.3% 8.0% 8.5% 28.6% 
State FC 37.1% NA 36.0% 31.8% 36.9% 50.8% 
Other FC 18.9% 48.8% 20.9% 13.8% 17.2% 25.9% 
State Govt 
Officials 
 
19.6% 
 
31.7% 
 
23.3% 
 
9.9% 
 
23.2% 
 
21.1% 
Infrastructure 
Security Rep 
 
21.6% 
 
39.5% 
 
23.6% 
 
23.1% 
 
15.5% 
 
29.1% 
Dept of 
Corrections 
 
31.1% 
 
41.3% 
 
25.0% 
 
30.1% 
 
35.6% 
 
40.0% 
Emergency 
Mgmt 
 
36.0% 
 
48.8% 
41.9% 31.0% 32.0%  
41.4% 
Fire Marshal 30.9% 39.5% 30.4% 30.5% 29.6% 36.2% 
Homeland 
Security 
 
29.2% 
 
54.9% 
 
34.5% 
 
23.2% 
 
25.0% 
 
37.3% 
IRS 11.2% 13.8% 9.6% 7.5% 15.3% 14.0% 
Hospitals 22.2% 13.6% 25.2% 23.2% 22.2% 16.4% 
Private Sector 15.8% 16.3% 19.8% 9.9% 16.0% 18.2% 
Public Health 22.4% 35.8% 26.8% 18.3% 22.3% 23.6% 
Public Works 28.7% 20.0% 29.2% 32.1% 26.3% 25.9% 
Transportation 22.7% 29.6% 25.4% 20.5% 20.2% 25.5% 
National 
Guard 
 
25.2% 
 
58.4% 
 
23.9% 
 
20.5% 
 
24.0% 
 
38.9% 
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1Very Close 
 
 The results presented in Table 3.2 also indicate that fusion centers have closer 
relationships with a wider variety of institutions and agencies.  Again, this would be expected as 
most fusion centers have adopted an “all crimes all hazards” approach, which fundamentally 
requires the building of diverse relationships.  Fusion center respondents were more likely to say 
that their relationship with other fusion centers, state government officials, critical infrastructure 
representatives, Department of Corrections, emergency management, fire marshals, homeland 
security, public health, transportation, and the National Guard was very close.   For example, 
only 25 percent of the SLT respondents noted that there relationship with the National Guard 
was very close compared to nearly 60 percent of the FC respondents who define this relationship 
as being very close.  Similarly, 30 percent of the SLT respondents but 55 percent of the FC 
respondents defined their relationship with homeland security as being very close.  Only 22 
percent of the SLT respondents but 40 percent of the FC respondents said that their relationship 
with critical infrastructure representatives was very close.  These findings support some 
successes have been achieved on the conceptual foundation of fusion centers with respect to 
developing diverse information sharing partners. 
 
Satisfaction with Relationships 
 Table 3.3 presents the results on respondents’ evaluation of their satisfaction with how 
their agency relates to other agencies.  These results are interesting especially when contrasted 
with the findings from the previous two tables.   In general, only a modest number of SLT and 
FC respondents were very satisfied with their relationship with the agencies noted and there was 
not much variation when comparing the two groups.  For example, approximately 20 percent of 
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SLT and FC respondents were very satisfied with their relationship with the FBI, other federal 
law enforcement agencies, and emergency management personnel.  A somewhat higher 
percentage of both SLT and FC respondents were very satisfied with their relationship with state 
and local law enforcement agencies.   Approximately 28 percent of SLT respondents and 35 
percent of the FC respondents were very satisfied with their relationship with state law 
enforcement agencies, and over 38 percent of the SLT and FC respondents indicated that they 
were very satisfied with their relationship with local law enforcement agencies.  Both SLT and 
FC respondents were not very satisfied with their relationship with tribal law enforcement, public 
health, and private sector agencies.   
Table 3.3.  Satisfaction with Relationship 
Agency SLT FC Administration Supervisor Investigator Analyst 
 
FBI1 
 
20.6% 
 
20.0% 
 
28.8% 
 
18.4% 
 
15.6% 
 
16.9% 
 
Other Fed 
LEA 
 
16.4% 
 
19.0% 
 
21.8% 
 
9.3% 
 
12.5% 
 
20.0% 
 
State FC 
 
22.4% 
 
NA 
 
24.1% 
 
18.8% 
 
21.9% 
 
25.8% 
 
State LEA 
 
27.9% 
 
35.0% 
 
29.7% 
 
28.9% 
 
22.2% 
 
34.8% 
 
Local LEA 
 
38.0% 
 
38.8% 
 
44.3% 
 
32.6% 
 
35.8% 
 
36.8% 
 
Tribal LEA 
 
4.9% 
 
3.9% 
 
6.1% 
 
1.3% 
 
2.8% 
 
10.9% 
Private 
Sector 
 
7.0% 
 
10.5% 
 
9.4% 
 
8.4% 
 
4.5% 
 
6.3% 
Public 
Health 
 
9.6% 
 
15.2% 
 
18.5% 
 
4.8% 
 
6.4% 
 
6.3% 
Emergency       
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Mgmt 17.6% 22.8% 29.7% 9.6% 14.8% 11.1% 
1 Very Satisfied 
 
 There was some variation in satisfaction with the relationship comparing across position 
in the SLT agencies.  For example, supervisors, investigators, and analysts were less satisfied 
with their relationship with the FBI compared to the administrators in the sample, and 
supervisors and investigators were less satisfied with their relationship with other federal law 
enforcement compared to administrators and analysts.  Supervisors, investigators, and analysts 
were also less likely to be satisfied with their relationship with local law enforcement, public 
health agencies, and emergency management agencies.   
 There are a wide variety of factors that are going to affect satisfaction with different 
agencies – historical experiences, organizational culture and even personalities are among these 
factors.  Thus, closer examination of these variables will provide more insight into the true 
nature of satisfaction in these relationships. 
 
Information Sharing Practices 
 In this section, we look more deeply at information sharing practices.  Both fusion centers 
and SLT agencies have significant amounts of information coming into the organization that has 
to be managed, assessed, processed, and determined if it is indicative of a criminal threat.  If 
there is a requirement or a need for the information to be shared, it will be packaged and 
distributed within the organization or shared with the appropriate external constituencies.  
Although much of this information might have little value from an intelligence perspective, some 
of it might be considered critical – such as suspicious activity -- and thus there is the need to 
ensure that the right information gets shared with the people and agencies who are likely to need 
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to know the information.  Since organizations have information both coming in and being 
disseminated, the research team included a series of questions that speak to the inputs and 
outputs of the organization.  These results are presented in Tables 3.4 and 3.5.   
 Table 3.4 includes the results on some of the types of data, information, and intelligence 
that are brought into the organization.  The results indicated that the agencies surveyed are 
overwhelmed with information.  Although there is some variation in the sources of information, 
analysts from both SLT and FCs receive significant amounts of information on a daily basis.  For 
example, 35 percent of the SLT respondents said their agency receives suspicious activity 
reports, 41 percent said they receive crime reports, 62 percent said they receive news reports, 55 
percent receive open source information, 37 percent receive 9-1-1 calls data, 34 percent receive 
human intelligence, and 27 percent receive TIPS line data on a daily basis.  Other information 
that comes into the organization daily includes threat assessments (20.6%), witness/suspect 
statements (15.7%), and crime maps (15.0%).  Similarly, fusion center respondents also 
indicated that a significant amount of information comes into the organization on a daily basis.  
Specifically, 45 percent said that suspicious activity reports, 50 percent said crime reports, over 
80 percent said that news reports and open source information, 43 percent said TIPS line data, 
and 32 percent human intelligence comes in on a daily basis.  Although not coming into the 
organization as frequently, fusion centers still receive crime maps, witness/suspect statements, 
threat assessments and 9-1-1 call data.   
 
Table 3.4.  Information Sharing Practices (Input) 
Question SLT Fusion Center 
Frequency of intel 
analysts receiving 
information from:1 
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Suspicious Activity 
Reports 
 
35.3% 
 
45.8% 
Crime Reports 40.5% 50.0% 
Crime Maps 15.0% 23.5% 
Witness/Suspect 
Statements 
 
15.7% 
 
14.7% 
Threat Assessments 20.6% 16.9% 
News Reports 61.9% 84.3% 
Open Source Information 55.0% 81.2% 
Human Intelligence 33.6% 31.9% 
TIPS Line 27.2% 42.6% 
9-1-1 Calls 36.9% 20.6% 
Frequency of receiving 
actionable intelligence 
from:  
  
 
DHS 
 
42.7% 
 
56.0% 
FBI 40.4% 46.6% 
DEA 33.2% 33.8% 
DOD 20.1% 23.0% 
State Fusion Centers 50.1% NA 
Other Fusion Centers 31.1% 72.3% 
Coast Guard 18.2% 30.1% 
ICE 32.1% 35.6% 
Border Patrol 22.3% 25.0% 
NDIC 15.0% 26.4% 
US Attorneys 24.6% 35.6% 
State Police 50.8% 75.0% 
DOC 37.2% 56.1% 
State Health Department 20.0% 36.9% 
State Attorney General 22.9% 26.8% 
National Guard 17.7% 41.9% 
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Local/Tribal Police 39.7% 54.7% 
Sheriff 55.6% 73.0% 
Fire Services 34.5% 27.0% 
Private Businesses 24.0% 30.1% 
Critical Infrastructure 
Security Representatives 
 
20.2% 
 
39.7% 
1Daily  2Very Frequently/Frequently 
 
 
 Other data presented in Table 3.4 relates directly to the amount of actionable intelligence 
that is being received by the agencies in the study.  Similar to the conclusion from above, the 
agencies in this study are clearly being provided a significant amount of intelligence that needs 
to be processed by the organization for some type of operational response or awareness.  A large 
number of organizations appear to be sharing information very frequently or frequently with 
these agencies, and as would be expected, the fusion center respondents indicated that the 
amount of actionable intelligence was even greater.  In fact, a higher percentage of FC 
respondents stated that their agency very frequently or frequently received actionable 
intelligence from every agency listed except fire services.  More than half of the FC respondents 
noted that their agency receives actionable intelligence very frequently or frequently from state 
police, sheriffs, other fusion centers, department of homeland security, department of 
corrections, and local and/or tribal law enforcement.   At least 30 percent of the FC respondents 
said that very frequently or frequently receive actionable intelligence from the FBI, DEA, Coast 
Guard, ICE, United States Attorneys, the State Health Department, the National Guard, private 
businesses, and critical infrastructure staff.   Although a smaller percentage of SLT respondents 
note that they thought their agency received actionable intelligence frequently or very frequently 
compared to the FC respondents, SLT agencies are receiving significant amount of actionable 
intelligence and the distribution of responses is quite similar to the fusion center results.  
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Respondents from state, local, and tribal agencies were most likely to state that their agency very 
frequently or frequently received actionable intelligence from the sheriffs, state police, the state 
fusion center, Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and the Department of Corrections.  
While not collected in the data, interviews and anecdotal evidence indicates that a notable 
portion of intelligence assessments and situational awareness bulletins are duplicative in that law 
enforcement personnel are often on multiple notification lists and reports, such as an FBI/DHS 
Joint Intelligence Bulletin, which may be sent to an individual from more than one source. 
 The many post-9/11 information sharing initiatives appear to be producing results since 
respondents reported considerable output and information sharing from both SLT and FC 
agencies.  These results are presented in Table 3.5.   Although 60 percent of the SLT agencies 
said their agency never provided specific intelligence briefings to federal law enforcement, 42 
percent said they never provided briefings to other law enforcement agencies, and 21 percent 
said they never attended intelligence sharing meetings in a typical month, SLT respondents did 
indicate that they were very frequently or frequently sharing actionable intelligence with a 
number of organizations.  For example, 61 percent of the respondents indicated that their agency 
very frequently or frequently provide actionable intelligence to other local law enforcement 
agencies, 55 percent did so for state law enforcement agencies, 38 percent said they did so for 
the FBI, and 44 percent they shared information with other federal law enforcement agencies.   
As would be expected, the FC respondents were much less likely to note that their 
agencynever had intelligence briefings with federal law enforcement agencies, state, local, tribal 
law enforcement agencies, or intelligence sharing meetings.  In addition, at least half of the FC 
respondents indicated that that were very frequently or frequently sharing information with 
federal, state, and local law enforcement, the FBI, other fusion centers, state government 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 73 
officials, critical infrastructure security representatives, Department of Corrections, Emergency 
Management, fire marshals, homeland security, and the National Guard.  
Table 3.5.  Information Sharing Practices (Output) 
Question SLT Fusion Center 
# monthly intel briefings to federal 
LEA (% indicating never) 
 
59.4% 
 
28.2% 
# monthly intel briefings to state, local, 
& tribal LEA 
 
41.7% 
 
12.7% 
#monthly intel sharing meetings 
attended by staff 
 
23.4% 
 
6.2% 
Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to FBI1 
 
37.7% 
 
63.7% 
Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to other federal agencies1 
 
43.5% 
 
55.2% 
Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to state law enforcement1 
 
54.8% 
 
84.0% 
Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to local law enforcement1 
 
60.5% 
 
77.3% 
Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to tribal law enforcement1 
 
14.7% 
 
22.5% 
Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to state fusion centers1 
 
36.2% 
 
NA 
Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to other fusion centers1 
 
24.4% 
 
63.0% 
Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to state government officials1 
 
25.8% 
 
52.0% 
Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to critical infrastructure security 
representatioves1 
 
26.4% 
 
57.5% 
 
Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to Department of Corrections1 
 
34.9% 
 
52.7% 
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Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to Emergency Management1 
 
35.9% 
 
60.5% 
Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to Fire Marshalls1 
 
30.6% 
 
50.0% 
Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to Homeland Security1 
 
33.9% 
 
68.0% 
Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to IRS1 
 
16.7% 
 
                25.7% 
Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to Hospitals1 
 
21.3% 
 
21.7% 
Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to Private Sector Agencies1 
 
19.1% 
 
35.6% 
Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to Public Health Agencies1 
 
21.2% 
 
41.3% 
 
Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to Public Works1 
 
 
24.3% 
 
 
24.4% 
Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to Transportation1 
 
23.6% 
 
45.4% 
Frequency of providing actionable intel 
to National Guard1 
 
22.5% 
 
56.0% 
Agency has processes for sharing 
terrorism info with public (Yes) 
 
42.8% 
 
58.0% 
1Frequently/Very Frequently 
 
The Distribution of Intelligence Products 
 Table 3.6 provides data related to how information is shared with others.   These results 
support the conclusion that both SLT and FC agencies distribute intelligence products using a 
variety of different outlets.  The most common way that both SLT and FC responses indicated 
that their products were distributed was email distribution lists.  A large number of fusion center 
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respondents also indicated that their agencyshared intelligence products through personal 
contacts, memorandums, formal reports, via national intelligence communication systems (e.g., 
RISS.net, Law Enforcement Online), and other secure portals.  Although smaller percentages of 
SLT respondents noted that their agency distributed products using these different mechanisms, 
50 percent indicated that they distribute through personal contacts, 43 percent used 
memorandums or formal meetings, 40 percent used formal reports, and 38 percent said that 
distribute via national intelligence communication systems.   
 
Table 3.6.  Distribution of Intelligence Products   
Method SLT Fusion Center 
Formal Reports1 40.3% 64.9% 
Periodic Memorandums 43.3% 66.2% 
Formal Meetings 42.5% 64.9% 
Secure Portal 35.9% 54.5% 
Email 65.5% 79.2% 
Telephone 35.1% 40.3% 
Personal Contact 50.1% 71.4% 
Website 20.0% 36.4% 
Video Teleconference 7.7% 20.8% 
Roll Call 22.5% 16.9% 
National Intel Systems 38.1% 61.0% 
Fax 17.8% 19.5% 
1Distributed 
 
 In some, it appears policies and technologies have contributed to a substantial amount of 
information sharing among and between law enforcement agencies and fusion centers.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this information is being used by recipients, however, the 
extent and effects of usage represent a different set of metrics. 
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Chapter 4:  Performance Metrics and Communication Networks 
It has been documented previously that there have been significant changes within SLT 
law enforcement agencies regarding understanding the contemporary (i.e., post-9/11) law 
enforcement intelligence function, building an intelligence capacity, and meeting the demands 
for information sharing.  The intelligence environment is changing at a rapid pace, and thus it has 
been difficult to assess the impacts of these changes.  How can we measure intelligence reliably 
to know if it has prevented terrorist acts?  Do we know if SLT law enforcement agencies have 
actually developed an operational “intelligence capacity”?  How do we assess the quality of 
intelligence?   How can the quality be improved?  How do we know how well SLT agencies 
coordinate with federal intelligence access points?  State level access points?  Do SLT law 
enforcement agencies understand the types of information that should be collected and shared?   
 It is important to note that there is not widespread agreement about whether performance 
measurement in the intelligence arena is even possible or desirable (Treverton, et. al, 2006).  
This would appear to be an important empirical question that is worth pursuing in future 
research.  It would be difficult for this research to proceed, however, without a foundational 
understanding of how law enforcement agencies currently decide what information is shared and 
why, and how key analytic hubs, like state fusion centers, effectively manage the massive 
amounts of information, make decisions about the quality of information, and are assessing 
performance among their personnel.  What are the performance priorities?  Is there concern with 
quantity or quality of products produced?   Are there concerns about how intelligence impacts 
investigations?   What other strategies are used to impact investigations?  What analytic tools are 
being utilized to analyze raw information?  Such critical information gathered from the key 
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producers and consumers of law enforcement intelligence can serve as the foundation for current 
and long-term assessment of our intelligence capabilities and the ISE in particular.  
 
Assessing Analyst’s Performance 
 Table 4.1 provides a listing of potential items related to assessing the performance of 
analysts.   The results reveal that the first priority in assessment is the quality of items produced 
by the analyst.  Over 70 percent of the FC respondents said the quality of strategic and tactical 
products were critical for assessment.  Over 51 percent of the FC respondents said that the 
quality of risk assessments were critical for assessment.  Forty-one percent of the FC respondents 
said making contacts with others outside the agency, and 31 percent said making contacts within 
the agency were critical for assessment.  The quantity of products produced and whether the 
intelligence work was linked to investigations, actions, or convictions was much less critical for 
assessing analyst performance according to FC respondents.  The logical reason for this finding 
is that the role of the analyst is to produce actionable intelligence.  It is the role of operational 
units to use this information to decide whether and how to use the intelligence.  Since the analyst 
has no influence on operational activities, assessing an analyst’s performance based on outcomes 
would hold limited value unless there was feedback from operational units that the information 
from a given analyst consistently had limited or no value. 
 
Table 4.1.  Assessing Analyst’s Performance 
Factors SLT FC Administration Supervisor Investigator Analyst 
Strategic Products 20.3% 27.0% 19.1% 23.3% 21.4% 13.2% 
Tactical Products 17.3% 25.7% 17.0% 23.3% 15.5% 13.2% 
Risk Assessments 13.3% 13.5% 10.6% 21.7% 14.3% 5.7% 
Quality of 
Strategic Products 
32.3% 71.6% 31.9% 36.7% 23.8% 41.5% 
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Quality of 
Tactical Products 
30.3% 70.3% 33.0% 35.0% 19.0% 39.6% 
Quality of Risk 
Assessments 
23.3% 51.4% 22.3% 26.7% 19.0% 32.1% 
Actions led to 
Investigation 
19.7% 14.9% 22.3% 21.7% 19.0% 11.3% 
Actions led to 
Arrest 
20.0% 9.5% 21.3% 23.3% 21.4% 13.2% 
Actions led to 
Conviction 
11.0% 8.1% 11.7% 16.7% 11.9% 1.9% 
Contacts with 
Personnel in 
Agency 
21.3% 31.1% 24.5% 20.0% 17.9% 20.8% 
Contacts with 
Personnel Outside 
Agency 
22.7% 40.5% 26.6% 23.3% 19.0% 18.9% 
 
In comparison, the SLT respondents also emphasized the quality of products produced 
but a lower percentage of respondents thought it was critical for assessing performance.  Over 32 
percent said that the quality of strategic products, 30 percent said the quality of tactical products, 
and 23 percent said that the quality of risk assessments was critical.  The contacts made by 
analysts and the quantity of products produced were not thought to be particularly important for 
assessing performance.  State, local, and tribal respondents were somewhat more likely to think 
that the work of analysts should led to investigations and arrests compared to the FC 
respondents.   The SLT analysts had a similar view of assessment compared to administrators, 
supervisors, and investigators, although a higher percentage of the analyst respondents thought 
that the quality of products was critical for assessment and a lower percentage thought that is was 
critical that their work led to investigations, arrests, and convictions.   
The research team wanted to look more closely at the performance priorities of the 
agencies by asking respondents to identify the top three factors critical to assessing performance 
by analysts.   These results are provided in Table 4.2.  Both FC and SLT respondents agree that 
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the quality of strategic and tactical products, as well as risk assessments, is critical to assessing 
the performance of analysts.  These factors were the top three items for both samples and when 
comparing all positions in the agency.   However, there was some variation when comparing the 
rank order of the rest of the items.  In general, FC respondents indicated that information sharing 
activities and the quantity of products produced were somewhat more important, and having 
analysts’ work lead to arrests, investigations, and convictions is somewhat less important 
compared to the rank ordering of items provided by the SLT respondents.    
Table 4.2.  Rank Order of Importance in Assessing Performance 
Factor SLT FC Administration Supervisor Investigator Analyst 
# Strategic 
Products 
7 6 8 7 8 7 
# Tactical 
Products 
10 7 11 8 11 7 
Risk 
Assessments 
11 9 10 10 12 7 
Quality of 
Strategic 
Product 
1 1 1 1 1 2 
Quality of 
Tactical 
Products 
2 2 2 2 3 1 
Quality of 
Risk 
Assessments 
3 3 3 3 3 3 
Actions led 
to 
Investigation 
5 8 4 4 5 4 
Actions led 
to Arrest 
4 10 5 4 2 4 
Actions led 
to 
Conviction 
9 11 9 9 9 7 
Contacts 
with 
Personnel in 
Agency 
8 5 6 10 9 7 
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Contacts 
with 
Personnel in 
Other 
Agencies 
6 4 6 6 6 6 
 
 
Creation of Intelligence Products  
 Another way to think about performance is to document the types of intelligence products 
that analysts are being frequently asked to be produced.  Table 4.3 presents data related to the 
creation of several intelligence products, and whether these products are never produced or 
produced every single day.   Thirty-two percent of FC respondents said their agency produces 
bulletins every day, 24 percent of the FC respondents said they produce alerts every day, 21 
percent said they produce warnings every day, 19 percent said they produce advisories every 
day, and 17 percent said they produce briefings every day.   The SLT respondents indicated that 
such products are not as frequently produced every day and between 20 and 25 percent noted that 
most of products were never produced by the organization.  Twenty-six percent of the SLT 
respondents said their agency never produces risk assessments, 24 percent said they never 
produce warnings or alerts, 22 percent said they never produce reports or briefings, and 17 
percent said they never produce bulletins.  It should be recognized that these are exploratory 
questions in order to develop a baseline for the types of products that may be available.  In some 
agencies and fusion centers, staffing limitations likely require that a fairly narrow list of product 
types be developed based on the perceived priority of the organization’s constituents.  In other 
cases, the strategic priorities of an organization may not include all types of products – for 
example some organizations may never produce a risk assessment because it is not part of their 
charter. 
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Table 4.3.  Creation of Intelligence Products 
Product                                SLT FC 
Bulletin                                      Never 
Daily 
17.0% 
21.6% 
1.3% 
32.9% 
Risk Assessment                        Never 
Daily 
25.5% 
6.2% 
6.4% 
2.6% 
Advisories                                  Never 
Daily 
21.5% 
13.8% 
2.7% 
19.2% 
Alerts                                         Never 
Daily 
17.8% 
15.9% 
1.4% 
24.3% 
Warnings                                   Never 
Daily 
23.8% 
14.2% 
4.3% 
21.4% 
Reports                                      Never 
Daily 
31.7% 
6.6% 
10.5% 
7.9% 
Briefings                                    Never 
Daily 
21.7% 
16.6% 
7.1% 
17.1% 
 
 Table 4.4a and Table 4.4b provide a more detailed accounting of the types of products 
produced by the agencies in a typical month.  SLT respondents (4.4a) and FC respondents (4.4b) 
were asked to identify within a range starting from 0 through over 50.    The research team asked 
respondents to estimate the number of analytic products, intelligence briefs made to federal law 
enforcement, intelligence briefs to state and local law enforcement, intelligence sharing 
meetings, the number of permanent intelligence files opened, and the number of temporary 
intelligence files opened.  Several findings can be observed based on their estimates.  First, the 
SLT respondents were more likely to not produce any of these products in a typical month.  
Twenty-three percent said that their agency did not produce any analytic products, 60 percent 
reported they do not provide intelligence briefs to federal law enforcement, 42 percent said they 
do not provide intelligence briefs to local and state law enforcement, 23 percent said they do not 
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attend information sharing meetings, 45 percent said they do not produce permanent intelligence 
files, and 37 percent do not produce temporary intelligence files in a typical month.  In contrast, 
only 3 percent of the fusion center respondents said their agency do not produce analytic 
products, 28 percent said that they do not brief federal law enforcement, 13 percent said they do 
not brief local and state law enforcement, 6 percent do not attend intelligence sharing meetings, 
18 percent do not open a permanent intelligence file, and 16 percent do not produce a temporary 
intelligence file in a typical month.   While one would expect the fusion centers to be much more 
active in information sharing activities as the data indicate, the findings pose some questions.  
For example, one would expect all fusion centers to produce intelligence products, provide 
briefings for SLT agencies, attend intelligence sharing meetings, and open intelligence files.  
Indeed, these activities are at the core role of fusion centers.  One possible explanation is that 
fusion centers have been developed at an inconsistent pace across the country.  Perhaps at the 
time these data were collected some of the responding fusion centers had been created but were 
simply not fully functional.  Future research should explore this issue closely. 
Table 4.4a.  Number of Products Produced in a Typical Month (SLT) 
Number # Analytic 
Products 
Intell Brief 
to Feds 
Intell to 
Local/State 
Intell Sharing 
Mtgs 
Permanent 
Intell File 
Temp 
Intell File 
0 23.3% 59.4% 41.7% 23.4% 44.6% 37.3% 
1-3 28.4% 30.5% 39.9% 46.0% 26.9% 27.6% 
4-6 12.8% 4.4% 8.7% 20.8% 10.2% 10.0% 
7-10 7.7% 2.3% 5.1% 5.7% 8.6% 11.1% 
11-20 12.5% 2.3% 3.3% 2.6% 4.2% 6.2% 
21-50 8.2% 0.8% 0.8% 1.0% 3.0% 5.1% 
51+ 7.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.5% 2.5% 2.7% 
 
Table  4.4b.  Number of Products Produced in a Typical Month (Fusion Centers) 
Number # Analytic 
Products 
Intell Brief 
to Feds 
Intell to 
Local/State 
Intell Sharing 
Mtgs 
Permanent 
Intell File 
Temp 
Intell File 
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0 2.6% 28.2% 12.7% 6.2% 17.6% 16.2% 
1-3 15.4% 50.0% 46.8% 22.2% 27.0% 20.3% 
4-6 21.8% 15.4% 21.5% 39.5% 14.9% 12.2% 
7-10 19.2% 2.6% 8.9% 17.3% 18.9% 9.5% 
11-20 11.5% 2.6% 6.3% 8.6% 13.5% 18.9% 
21-50 24.4% 1.3% 3.8% 6.2% 1.4% 12.2% 
51+ 5.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.8% 10.8% 
 
 
Both SLT and FC respondents reported that the agency typically produces between one 
and ten products each month, although, as one would expect, a higher percentage of the fusion 
center respondents reported that they produced between one and ten products for all categories 
considered.   Overall, however, both SLT and FC respondents indicate that their agencies are 
actively engaged in producing intelligence products in a typical month.  Nearly 49 percent of the 
SLT respondents said their agency produced between one and ten analytic products, 37 percent 
said they have between one and ten meetings with federal law enforcement, 54 percent said they 
have between one and ten meetings with state or local law enforcement, 73 percent had between 
one and ten intelligence sharing meetings, and 46 percent said that opened between one and ten 
permanent and temporary intelligence files in a typical month.  Eighty percent of the FC 
respondents said that their agency had between one and ten  intelligence sharing meetings, 77 
percent said that they had intelligence briefings with local or state law enforcement, 68 percent 
said that they had between one and ten intelligence briefs with federal law enforcement agencies, 
61 percent opened between one and ten permanent intelligence files, 42 percent opened between 
one and ten temporary intelligence files,  and 56 percent said they produced between one and ten 
analytic products in a typical month.  
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 84 
Table 4.5 provides the results for questions related to some of the impacts of the 
intelligence products produced as well as the types of analysis and methodologies being used to 
process intelligence.  Only 25 percent of the SLT respondents and 33 percent of the FC 
respondents said that intelligence products contribute to arrests frequently or always.  Fewer 
respondents indicated that these products had an impact on assets seized.  For context, the reader 
should recall that the intelligence function is designed to identify threats.  As a result, operational 
activities based on the intelligence product may interrupt a threat before an actual crime occurs.  
It should also be noted that the standard to open an intelligence case file is a “reasonable 
suspicion” of  a crime.  While there may be a criminal nexus with an intelligence target’s 
behavior, operational units may not be able to develop sufficient evidence to meet the more 
rigorous “probable cause” standard for an arrest.  The point to note is that whether an 
intelligence product results in an arrest or seized assets is not a conclusive measure of 
effectiveness.   
The rest of Table 4.5 provides a listing of different types of analysis that might be used to 
further the intelligence process.   In general, a small and similar percentage of both SLT and FC 
respondents indicated that their agency used many of these analyses on a daily basis.  For 
example, about 20 percent of SLT and FC respondents said their agency uses crime pattern 
analysis, 18 percent used crime mapping, 15 percent used hot spots analysis, and 10 percent used 
traffic analysis on a daily basis.  There were some substantial differences when comparing some 
of the analytic techniques which really show how FC and SLT agencies have some different 
needs and priorities in terms of analysis.  For example, it appears that sharing of products with 
others within the agency and across agencies is a higher priority in fusion centers.  Sixty percent 
of the FC respondents said that shared intelligence within their agency on a daily basis and 48 
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percent said they share it with other agencies on a daily basis.  In contrast, 40 percent of the SLT 
respondents said their agency shared intelligence within the agency on a daily basis and 34 
percent said they shared intelligence with other agencies on a daily basis.   In addition, the FC 
respondents indicated that analysts were involved in different types of analysis.  For example, 
they indicated that their analysts were more likely to do visual investigative analysis, link 
analysis, social network analysis, telephone toll analysis, and flow charting analysis.  Finally, the 
results show some evidence of the broader “all hazards” focus guiding fusion center practice as 
they were more likely to complete public health trend analysis on a daily basis.  These are 
findings that one would intuitively expect. 
Table 4.5.  Impact of Intelligence Products & Nature of Intelligence Activities 
Product/Operation SLT FC 
Contribute to Arrests1 24.6% 33.3% 
Contribute to Assets Seized 14.2% 16.9% 
Crime Pattern Analysis2 20.2% 19.1% 
Crime Mapping 16.0% 19.4% 
Geographic Profiling 10.1% 13.6% 
Hot Spots Analysis 13.5% 19.4% 
Traffic Analysis 7.9% 12.7% 
Produce Analytic Products 20.4% 26.9% 
Analyze Suspicious Activity 
Reports 
25.8% 43.3% 
Critical Infrastructure Risk 
Assessment 
8.3% 11.6% 
Criminal Commodity Vulnerability 
Assessment 
7.1% 8.2% 
Statewide/Regional Risk 
Assessment 
8.0% 11.1% 
Shared Intelligence with Agency  40.3% 59.4% 
Shared Intelligence with Others 33.7% 47.8% 
Identify Criminal Enterprises 15.4% 18.8% 
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Identify Threats 25.1% 30.3% 
Criminal Investigation Support 48.1% 58.5% 
Proactive Strategic Analyses 18.4% 18.8% 
Visual Investigative Analyzes 20.5% 31.7% 
Alerts & Notifications 31.7% 46.3% 
Deconfliction 21.2% 43.8% 
Public Health Trend Analysis 3.8% 15.4% 
Criminal Background Information 42.7% 57.8% 
Case Correlation 31.0% 38.5% 
Link Analysis 21.7% 39.4% 
Social Network 16.3% 40.0% 
Telephone Toll 14.0% 30.2% 
Flow Charting 14.1% 32.8% 
Table Tops 2.4% 1.5% 
Live Trainings 2.4% 1.6% 
1Frequently/Always   2Daily 
 
Communication Networks 
Two issues regarding communication appear to be particularly important to examine.  
There is value to understand more about connectivity to current technical systems that were 
constructed to promote information sharing, such as FBI’s Law Enforcement Online (LEO), the 
Regional Information Sharing System Network (RISS.net), the Homeland Security Intelligence 
Network (HSIN), and also know more about access to other sources of information.  These 
advanced technical systems are critical to the success of the information sharing environment, 
the ability of law enforcement to prevent and solve crimes, and meeting the larger goals of the 
homeland security community.   The analytic pieces of the intelligence puzzle will come from 
multiple sources, and the intelligence process must be supported by useful information 
technologies.  Similarly, local investigations are significantly enhanced when officers have easy 
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access to timely and precise information, as well as when they are well connected with other law 
enforcement agencies.   For these reasons, scholars have discussed how law enforcement is an 
area where “applications of information systems and practice are appealing and increasingly 
important” (Hu, Lin, and Chin, 2005: 235).  
Table 4.6 provides information on whether the agencies surveyed were members of 
various advanced communication systems and whether several of these systems met their 
intelligence and information sharing needs.  Most of the FC respondents indicated that their 
agency was a member of a regional RISS center, and a registered user of RISS.net, LEO, and 
HSIN.  In fact, at least 85 FC respondents indicated that they were registered users of these 
systems.  Less than half of the FC respondents indicated they were registered users of Automated 
Trusted Information Exchange (ATIX) and the FBI Network (FBINET).     Fewer SLT 
respondents indicated that they were registered users of each of these communication systems.  
Nearly 83 percent of the SLT agencies were registered users of LEO, approximately 63 percent 
were members of a regional RISS center or had registered users of RISS.net, but only 40 percent 
of the SLT agencies were registered users of HSIN, 15 percent were registered users of ATIX, 
and 21 percent were registered users of FBINET.   
Table 4.6.   Access to Advanced Communication Systems 
Question SLT FC 
Agency is a member of regional 
RISS center 
 
64.6% 
 
85.4% 
Agency personnel registered 
users of RISS.net 
 
63.4% 
 
85.5% 
Agency personnel registered 
users of LEO 
 
82.5% 
 
96.4% 
Agency personnel registered 
users of HSIN 
 
39.7% 
 
96.4% 
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Agency personnel registered 
users of ATIX 
 
15.0% 
 
42.0% 
Agency personnel registered 
users of FBINET 
 
20.6% 
 
45.2% 
RISS.net meets intell & info 
sharing needs1 
 
28.8% 
 
16.9% 
LEO meets intell & info 
sharing needs 
 
26.7% 
 
17.3% 
HSIN meets intell & info 
sharing needs 
 
25.0% 
 
23.8% 
ATIX meets intell & info 
sharing needs 
 
17.7% 
 
11.1% 
FBINET meets intell & info 
sharing needs 
 
33.3% 
 
25.6% 
1Definitely 
 
The FC respondents were also somewhat more critical of these communication systems 
in terms of meeting their intelligence and information sharing needs.  That is, a lower percentage 
of FC respondents said that RISS.net, LEO, HSIN, ATIX, and FBINET met their intelligence 
and information sharing needs.  Twenty-nine percent of SLT respondents said RISS.net 
definitely meets their intelligence and information sharing needs, 27 percent said that LEO meets 
these needs, 25 percent said that HSIN meets these needs, 18 percent said ATIX meets these 
needs, and 33 percent said FBINET meets these needs.   Only 16 percent of FC respondents said 
RISS.net definitely meets, 17 percent said that LEO definitely meets, 24 percent said that HSIN 
definitely meets, 11 percent said that ATIX definitely meets, and 26 percent FBINET definitely 
meets their intelligence and information sharing needs.  These findings are somewhat surprising 
since these are the primary portals for law enforcement agencies and fusion centers to share 
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sensitive but unclassified information.  Future research should explore this issue by more 
explicitly defining the meaning of “meeting needs”.  In light of these results, there are likely 
many different interpretations of this – the research team cautions the reader from drawing any 
definitive conclusion about the value of these systems based on these findings alone. 
Table 4.7 provides the results related to SLT and FC respondents access to various 
sources of information.  Access here implies that there is opportunity to pull data into the 
intelligence process for analysis.  In general, a large percentage of SLT and FC respondents 
indicated that they had access to motor vehicle reports, driver license records, correctional 
databases, National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS), National Criminal 
Information Center (NCIC), Sex Offender Registries, and LEO.  There were some substantial 
differences observed, however, when comparing the FC and SLT results.  In fact, a higher 
percentage of FC respondents indicated that there their agency had access to IntelLink, Infragard, 
health-related data, Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN), Law Enforcement 
Intelligence Unit (LEIU), HSIN, RISS, Open Source Information System (OSIS), the FBI’s 
Regional Data Exchange (R-Dex) and National Data Exchange(N-Dex)), FBINET, High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA), and the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN). 
For example, 20 percent of the SLT respondents but 42 percent of the FC respondents said they 
had access to IntelLink, 19 percent of SLT respondents but 63 percent of the FC respondents said 
they access to Infragard, and 34 percent of SLT respondents but 92 percent of the FC 
respondents said that they had access to HSIN.  Both because of cost and mission, one would 
expect fusion centers to have access to a greater array of data systems. 
 
Table 4.7.  Access to Sources of Information 
Source SLT FC 
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Motor Vehicle Records 92.9% 97.4% 
Driver License Records 92.6% 97.4% 
Correctional Databases 75.6% 85.5% 
NLETS 73.0% 90.8% 
NCIC 88.6% 93.4% 
IntelLink 20.2% 42.1% 
Infragard 19.3% 63.2% 
Sex Offender Registries 88.6% 93.4% 
Health-Related Information 23.3% 50.0% 
LEIN 19.3% 36.8% 
LEIU 18.2% 55.3% 
HSIN 34.9% 92.1% 
RISS 65.9% 93.4% 
OSIS 11.6% 31.6% 
LEO 74.4% 92.1% 
R-Dex N-Dex 13.1% 48.7% 
FBINET 22.4% 52.6% 
HIDTA 44.0% 71.1% 
HSDN 17.3% 57.9% 
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Chapter 5:  Introduction to Fusion Centers and Case Study #1: 
Michigan Intelligence Operations Center 
A key component of the ISE, fusions centers serve to coordinate efforts to identify risks 
to people, communities, and assets that support daily routines.  More specifically fusion center 
personnel collect, integrate, analyze, and communicate information from public and private 
sectors so that steps can be taken to prevent, mitigate, or respond to terrorist attacks.  By design 
and through practice, fusion centers are conduits between homeland security and law 
enforcement organizations operating at the local, state, and federal level, as well as industry 
groups (General Accounting Office, 2007b). 
The development of a network of actors to contribute information with a view to 
countering terrorist activities is not without challenges.  Previous studies have highlighted fusion 
centers with different goals, stakeholders and sources of funding, along with concerns about the 
long-term feasibility of these entities (Masse, O'Neil, & Rollins, 2007).  To investigate these 
issues further, we asked our FC respondents additional questions about the creation and 
maintenance of their center. 
 
Becoming operational 
More than half of participants (53.4%) reported the state fusion center attained 
operational status between 2005 and 2007.  24.7 percent of respondents indicated the center was 
operational prior to 2005, while 21.9 percent stated the center was operational between 2008 and 
2009.  Additionally, 78.8 percent of FC respondents said there were defined goals for collecting, 
analyzing, and sharing information; 76.3 percent also indicated there was a process in place to 
add or remove stakeholders.  
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Interestingly, 60% of the fusion centers responded that their agency had an all crimes/all 
hazards focus while only 6.3% indicated their focus was only on terrorism.  This is interesting 
because fusion centers have been accused of “mission creep” for expanding beyond the terrorism 
focus.  While beyond the scope of this study, suffice it to note that fusion centers, while 
information sharing partners with federal agencies, are nonetheless entities of states or major 
urban area collaborative operating under the authority and guidance of their parent 
jurisdiction(s).  While terrorism is certainly a priority of state and local jurisdictions, their daily 
and most frequent threat is from crime.  It is more efficient and operationally effective for fusion 
centers to take an all crimes/all hazards approach rather than the more narrow “terrorism only” 
focus.  As a result, this finding is not surprising.   
 
Table 5.1.  Respondents’ assessment of resources for fusion center development 
Resource % 
Fusion Center Guidelines1 58.7 
Baseline Capabilities1 58.1 
NCISP1 51.4 
ISE1 34.3 
National Preparedness Guideline and TCL1 29.0 
Annual Fusion Center Conference1 60.3 
Meetings and contacts with other fusion centers1 70.3 
Meetings and contacts with federal LE officials1 37.3 
Meetings and contacts with state LE officials1 44.0 
Meetings and contacts with local LE officials1 47.3 
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Other DHS provided materials1 43.3 
Training programs1 54.2 
1 Very helpful 
 
Table 5.1 summarizes findings about resources FC participants found “very helpful” to 
consider as their center moved towards operational status.  Leading items include meetings and 
contacts with other fusion centers (70.3%), the annual National Fusion Center Conference 
(60.3%), the Fusion Center Guidelines (58.7%), the Baseline Capabilities (58.1%), and training 
programs (54.2%).  It is interesting to note these resources are likely to involve interaction with 
colleagues working in a similar role (i.e. training  sessions and meetings) or are publications 
written for fusion centers guidance (i.e. Guidelines and Baseline Capabilities).  On the other 
hand, FC participants were less likely to value materials about the ISE (34.3%) and National 
Preparedness Guidelines and TCL (29.0%).  A somewhat higher number of respondents viewed 
meetings and contacts with local law enforcement (47.3%) as being more useful with respect to 
the center becoming operational than those held with state (44.0%) or federal (37.3%) 
counterparts. 
Thus the research team sees the fusion centers continuing to become operational and the 
majority of these are likely to handle information relating to crime, terrorism and natural threats.  
With a broader mission most fusion centers are therefore sufficiently nimble to develop 
interagency partnerships to reflect changing needs within their jurisdictions.  Similarly, in terms 
of identifying resources that assisted in centers attaining operational status, respondents found it 
very helpful when they consulted with colleagues in a similar position (i.e. lateral 
communication) or when they examined materials designed explicitly for fusion centers. 
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Maintaining a fusion center 
There are different ways to fund a fusion center’s activities including the government 
appropriations process, grant funds, and support through partnerships.  However, more than half 
of the FC respondents (59.6%) said the federal government provided 50 percent or more of their 
funds, and 17.3 percent of FC respondents indicated federal government provided all the funding 
for their center.  Anecdotally, the research team believes these data do not reflect the fusion 
center funding sources in 2011.  As a result of the financial exigencies faced by the U.S. there 
have been reduced available grant funds.  Through various fusion center meetings and 
conferences attended by the research team as well as conversations with fusion center directors, 
state and local governments have increased their proportional funding to support fusion centers, 
although current empirical data are not available. . 
 Previous research indicates the agency responsible for directing fusion center operations 
is mostly likely a law enforcement or public safety organization with statewide jurisdiction 
(General Accounting Office, 2007b).  Likewise almost two-thirds (64.3%) of FC respondents 
identified a state agency as their center’s lead agency, whereas a fifth (21.4%) said a municipal 
department fulfills this role.  State law enforcement agencies are also most likely to have 
management responsibilities (68.9%).  The most logical interpretation of these findings is to 
recognize there are 72 officially recognized fusion centers – one in each state and 22 fusion 
centers in major urban areas.  However, it is more complicated than that.  The structure of state 
law enforcement agencies vary – some states have a comprehensive full service state police 
agency.  Others have a more diversified approach with a state patrol for primarily traffic 
functions with a state bureau of investigation responsible for criminal law enforcement.  Other 
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states have created a state office of homeland security where the fusion center is housed.  Most 
fusion centers have an oversight by a Board of Directors, which have varying degrees of 
authority over fusion center operations.  The director of a fusion center may also rotate between 
agencies, which is particularly true of major urban area fusion centers.  Typically, fusion center 
leadership is idiosyncratic to the organizational structures, political factors, unique state 
legislation and even personality factors of the state or major urban area.  The question of future 
research is to determine which model(s) work(s) most effectively. 
 
Table 5.2.  Assignment of personnel to fusion centers from other agencies. 
 % 
State LE representative 87.3 
County LE representative 54.9 
Muncipal LE representative 62.0 
Tribal LE representative 0.0 
FBI intelligence analyst 60.6 
FBI special agent 36.6 
Federal DHS intelligence analyst 63.4 
State DHS intelligence analyst 26.8 
DEA intelligence analyst 2.8 
National Guard representative 63.4 
Legal representative 9.9 
Private sector representative 7.0 
Emergency operations representative 23.9 
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Public health organization 21.1 
Fire service representative 46.5 
Department of Corrections 23.9 
TSA representative 22.5 
 
 
 On average there are 12 analysts working at a fusion center.  Over a fifth of respondents 
(22.4%) said there is an intelligence analyst on duty in their center 24 hours a day, every day.  
However, as Table 5.2 shows, assignments of personnel to fusion centers from other agencies are 
commonplace.  The most frequent assignments include law enforcement representatives from 
state (87.3%) and municipal (62.0%) agencies, along with a FBI intelligence analyst (60.6%) and 
a federal DHS intelligence analyst (63.4%), and a member of the National Guard (63.4%).  In 
contrast it appears workers from the private sector (7.0%) seldom work in fusion centers.  There 
a several reasons for this but three are most prominent.  Civil libertarians are significantly 
opposed to private sector personnel working in fusion centers because of fusion center 
employees access to sensitive personal information could violate privacy protections.  Another 
significant reason is concern by the private sector is that proprietary information may be 
compromised through fusion center information sharing practices.  Another concern is that 
assignment to a fusion center may give a particular corporation some form of competitive 
advantage, hence the provision that a private sector representative must represent a sector, rather 
than an individual company.   Given these controversies, many fusion centers have opted to 
avoid the added challenges of a private sector appointment.  Indeed, most respondents (77.0%) 
indicated they worked in law enforcement prior to joining their fusion center and, unsurprisingly 
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given the sensitivity of law enforcement intelligence work, all but one of the respondents 
(98.7%) reported background checks are performed on all center personnel.  In light of the 
security requirements for fusion center personnel this single exception was likely a mistaken 
response. 
 
Perceptions of fusion center activities 
The research team asked several questions that asked respondents to assess the services 
their fusion center provides.  Ninety-two percent of respondents said they were very or 
somewhat familiar with the baseline capabilities for fusion centers, targets the United States 
Departments of Homeland Security and Justice (via the Global Intelligence Working Group) 
deem important for centers to attain in order to effectively share threat information while also 
protecting the rights and liberties of citizens.  Only a quarter (25.9%) believed their center is 
completely aligned with these priorities.  The Fusion Centers Baseline Capabilities were 
developed only shortly before the survey was administered; hence this finding is not surprising.  
Since that time, technical assistance has been provided to fusion centers to aid them in aligning 
their performance with the baseline capabilities.  At the time of this writing, all fusion centers are 
going through an assessment of their adherence to the Baseline Capabilities.   
Less than half of the respondents strongly agreed their center’s intelligence products have 
a consistent format (41.0%), are disseminated in a timely manner (21.8%), and are actionable 
(19.2%).  There is no uniform model for intelligence products and in 2009 there was significant 
criticism of the products released by some of the fusion centers.  As a result, while there is still 
no prescribed format, standards related to content validity and civil rights have been articulated 
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with training provided to fusion center directors.  Timely and actionable intelligence comes with 
experience and leadership.  Future research should explore these issues in greater detail. 
Respondents reported they receive and provide feedback to constituents about the 
information they share.  Over 40 percent of respondents indicated constituents offer feedback on 
a daily, bi-weekly, or weekly basis, while 30.3 percent said their fusion center offers feedback to 
collectors at a similar rate.  To draw upon the feedback FC respondents have received, the 
research team asked how they thought different constituents view intelligence-related analysis.  
According to respondents local (36.1%) and state (34.3%) law enforcement are most likely to 
find this activity very helpful, though this assessment drops for community leaders (12.5%) and 
private business (12.1%). 
 
Table 5.3.  Respondents’ top concerns regarding fusion centers and the intelligence function. 
Concern % 
Funding 27.7 
Sharing information 21.7 
Sustainability 15.7 
Staffing 12.0 
Civil liberties and privacy 10.8 
Focus is too broad 9.6 
Development of timely, actionable products 8.4 
Interagency cooperation and coordination 8.4 
Security of information 6.0 
Lack of understanding about intelligence needs and concepts 6.0 
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Another item in the FC survey asked respondents to detail their top concerns with respect 
to the intelligence function and how their fusion center operates.  The research team examined 
the submissions to create categories and counted the number of responses that matched a 
category, and then summed the counts.  Table 5.3 lists the top ten items that respondents 
discussed and the leading concerns relate to the future funding of their fusion center (27.7%) and 
information sharing practices (21.7%).  More specifically respondents expressed doubts about 
the availability of funds in subsequent years and they questioned whether the current levels of 
funding will be sustained (which they have not).  With respect to information sharing, 
respondents questioned how many agencies are willing to participate in intelligence activities 
and suggested trust between (and within) agencies at different levels of government is 
occasionally fragile.  It appears while improvements have been, fragility remains in some locales 
between fusion centers and some federal agencies. 
A limitation of a tally is that it treats concerns as discrete items when they are often 
interrelated.  For example, concern about funding also has implications for other items like the 
sustainability and growth of future center activities (15.7%), as well as worries about the center’s 
focus being too broad (9.6%); to the availability of trained staff (12.0%) and the timely 
development of intelligence products that are actionable (8.4%).  As such an alternative 
interpretation of respondents’ concerns is that they reflect a dynamic environment in which 
fusion centers are constantly evolving so that they can manage their environments and remain 
relevant to stakeholders.  As one respondent remarked, “The further we get from 911, the more it 
seems that intelligence and information sharing are no longer a priority.”  
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Michigan Intelligence Operations Center 
 As each fusion center is developed with the determined needs of a geographic region, 
case studies conducted from varying regions within the U.S. provide  a valuable glimpse into the 
different approaches, styles, and best practices of fusion centers across the country.  While there 
are certainly consistencies across different fusion centers, each state has differing policies, 
resources, and missions by which their fusion centers operate.  While many concepts may seem 
repetitive, the distinguishable characteristics, even if they are few, are what make this case study 
approach beneficial to the law enforcement population.  This chapter will explain the approach 
taken by the state of Michigan with the creation of the Michigan Intelligence Operations Center 
(MIOC).  
In accordance with the Fusion Center Guidelines10 published by the U.S. Department of 
Justice, Office of Justice programs, the state of Michigan identified a fusion center as an actual 
physical structure where government security and public safety partners collaboratively work 
together sharing information, developing intelligence, maximizing resources, streaming 
operations, and analyzing data to improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism.  On December 
20, 2007, Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm signed Executive Order No 2007-47 which 
officially established the Michigan Intelligence Operations Center11 (MIOC) as the sate fusion 
center for Michigan to enhance the state’s ability to improve prevention and preparedness.   
Housed in Lansing, Michigan, the MIOC is an “all threats, all hazards” fusion center.  
While it provides support for international and domestic terrorism, organized crime, identity 
theft, all gang types, narcotics and smuggling interdiction, financial crimes, crime mapping, and 
                                                 
10 For the complete Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era” 
report visit: http://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf 
11 Also referred to as the Michigan Intelligence Operations Centers for Homeland Security. 
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cybercrime, the MIOC also manages resources and information to best prepare for, and respond 
to, natural disasters.  In order to meet its mission, to promote public safety by operating in a 
public-private partnership that collects, evaluates, analyzes, and disseminates information and 
intelligence in a timely and secure manner while protecting the privacy rights of the public, the 
MIOC provides 24-hours-a-day (every day of the year) statewide information sharing among all 
levels of public safety agencies and private sector organizations in order to facilitate the 
collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence relevant to terrorism and public safety.   
 
Composition of the MIOC 
The Michigan State Police (MSP) and Michigan National Guard (NG) comprise the 
primary partnership which facilitates the MIOC.  While also working closely with the State 
Emergency Operation Center (SEOC) during times of emergency response, the MIOC relies 
upon formal partnerships with multiple law enforcement organizations.  Most notably, these 
organizations include, but are not limited to: 
• Michigan State Police 
• Michigan National Guard 
• Federal Bureau of Investigation  
• U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
• Michigan Homeland Security 
• Michigan State University Police Department 
• Michigan Department of Corrections 
• Michigan Department of Transportation 
• U.S Coast Guard  
 
Beyond these formal partners, the MIOC is also responsible for administering the State 
Information System (STATIS) and Michigan Intelligence Information System (MCIS) as well as 
being the state designated liaison for INTERPOL, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FINCEN), the Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network 
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(MAGLOCLEN), and the Criminal Intelligence Service of Ontario (CISO).  Furthermore, the 
MIOC is the state point of contact for the National Alert Warning Answering System and is 
responsible for reviewing Law enforcement Information Network (LEIN) requests by other law 
enforcement agencies and the Department of Energy.  Lastly, the MIOC facilitates information 
sharing to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the High-Intensity Drug Trafficking 
Areas (HIDTA) located in Detroit by assigning detective sergeants to these initiatives.   
 Given the private sector has a critical role in the protection of the state’s critical 
infrastructure, as well as their desire to protect their assets, employees, and customers, the private 
sector is an integral member of the MIOC.  Additionally, they provide important sources of 
information as private sector security often has better observation capabilities and knowledge of 
the activities occurring around their local facilities and around the world.  This data is useful to 
the fusion center analysts in identifying emerging trends or threats related to preventing terrorism 
and criminality.   
 
Advisory Board 
The advisory board for the MIOC was developed to serve as an advisory body within the 
Department of State Police.  Consistent with Executive Order 2007-47, and appointed by the 
governor of Michigan, advisory board members are represented by the following: 
• Department of State 
• Department of Military and Veteran Affairs 
• Department of Civil Rights 
• Department of Corrections 
• An individual representing local police departments in the state of Michigan (likely from 
the Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police). 
• An individual representing local sheriff’s departments in Michigan (likely from the 
Michigan Sheriff’s Association). 
• An individual representing the office of a county prosecuting attorney (likely from the 
Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan). 
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• Five Michigan residents representing federal homeland security or law enforcement 
agencies. 
• Three non-law enforcement residents from the state of Michigan. 
 
Functional Desks 
Michigan’s information sharing environment structure positions the MIOC to be the 
entity responsible for fusing threat information gathered for the purpose of providing early 
warning.  As such, each functional desk must identify potential threats that impact public safety 
and provide timely alerts to appropriate liaisons.  Similarly, each functional desk in the MIOC is 
designed based on a needs assessment (McDaniel et al., 2008).  Michigan homeland security 
operations identified the need for the fusion of shared information on critical infrastructure 
networks, environmental risks, and international trafficking concerns.  These conclusions were 
founded on an assessment in which the state of Michigan utilized an ethnographic study based on 
interviews and surveys of both the public and private sector.  This ethnographic approach was 
used to determine the mission and objectives of the MIOC and set its security goals as well.  The 
security goals were broadly stated as the protection of people and key facilities and institutions.  
A gap analysis yielded three fundamental operations to initially guide the MIOC.  Surveys 
exploring efforts to collect and analyze information focused on three core mission areas; 1) 
critical infrastructure protection; 2) border security; and 3) environmental health and welfare 
protection (McDaniel et al., 2008). 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection Desk 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) protection desk coordinates the 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of CIKR information and intelligence.  The security 
partners in this desk include state agencies that share a common mission of protecting the state’s 
CIKR.  This mission could be achieved through these agencies working together by pooling their 
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resources and skills, as well as collaborating with the state’s different CIKR owners.  The CIKR 
desk is considered a baseline capability for the state fusion center12.  The CIKR desk within the 
MIOC is the centralized location for all critical infrastructure information, warnings, reporting, 
dissemination, and program coordination.  The desk provides critical interface between the 
private and public sectors.  The roles and responsibilities of this desk are to conduct public and 
private sector outreach to promote capabilities of the MIOC, maintain and develop two way 
communications between the desk and the CIKR operators, and security mangers to encourage 
cooperation in information sharing and management, to work with MIOC analysts to collect and 
vet Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR), and finally to serve as the state link to the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) for CIKR programs and information sharing.   
The CIKR desk was created in the MIOC to centralize all CIKR information.  Within the 
MIOC, this desk is staffed by analysts from the state’s National Guard (NG) and the Michigan 
State Police (MSP).  They are the two state agencies participating in the MIOC homeland 
security initiative pertaining to the protection of the state’s CIKR.  In the future, other state 
public safety agencies with CIKR related functions may be assigned in the MIOC.  The design 
and processes for the CIKR desk were designed to be consistent with the Department of 
Homeland Security’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)13.  This approach includes 
the “protection plan strategy” which was the framework for the mission of the CIKR desk.    
Both the NG and MSP each bring unique expertise and resources to the CIKR desk.  The 
NG analysts assigned to this desk maintain the ability to analyze risks and vulnerabilities.  
Furthermore, the NG’s resources include equipment used in detecting gaps in the security 
                                                 
12 For the complete “Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers” report visit: 
 http://it.ojp.gov/documents/baselinecapabilitiesa.pdf 
13 For the complete “National Infrastructure Protection Plan” report visit: 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf 
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programs of critical infrastructures.  MSP’s current resources enable the desk to gather 
information and intelligence through both the law enforcement community as well as the patrol 
personnel on the streets.  This network enhances the analytical capacity of the desk.  Community 
members call the state police with suspicious activity reports which are then funneled to the 
MIOC.  Law enforcement officers who encounter suspicious activities throughout their patrols 
call the MIOC for verification of the SAR information and cross reference criminal databases.   
Given the majority of America’s critical infrastructure is located within the private sector, 
their inclusion as members of the MIOC and CIKR desk further enhance the desk’s capabilities.  
Though private sector liaisons are not integrated to the MIOC on a full-time basis, this desk 
shares intelligence analysis products with the private members.  Appropriately classified 
information is forwarded to private members on a "need to know" basis under the auspice that in 
turn the MIOC expects the private sector to collaborate with them by sharing pertinent private 
sector information consistent with the memorandums of understanding (MOU) that facilitate the 
partnership.  A pivotal aspect by which the CIKR desk collaborates with the private sector is the 
uniqueness of the analysts and any specific knowledge or subject matter expertise of sector 
operations they may bring to the desk that may be out of the MIOC analysts’ purview.  Most 
members of the private sector do not have the information capabilities to integrate threat 
information.  Effective protection of the state’s critical infrastructure requires the sharing of 
information and resources.  This sharing approach is facilitated by connectivity to the DHS 
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) - a national, web-based communications 
platform that allows multi-jurisdictional law enforcement entities, and other security partners to 
obtain, analyze, and share information. 
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Proposed Functional Desks 
 While they have yet to materialize as of the writing of this report, the MIOC has had 
discussion about further enhancing their preparedness and intelligence efforts by implementing 
an Environmental Risk Desk as well as a Border Security Desk.  Although not currently 
implemented, a brief discussion of these proposed functional desks is pertinent to the case study 
narrative as well as the intent of this report.  The concept of each desk maintains potential for 
other fusion centers or agencies to develop a similar approach.  
Conceptually the proposed environmental risk desk (ERD) would coordinate the 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of environmental and public health-related data relevant 
to terrorism and public health and welfare.  Unlike the CIKR Desk, which has the NIPP serving 
as the blue-print for its operations and a long-term relationship between the NG and MSP, the 
planned EPD would engage in varying initiatives across sectors that will hopefully serve to 
create the structural foundation and formal collaboration between the participating agencies.  
Partners of this desk would include state agencies that share the common organizational purpose 
of protecting the public’s health, whether focused on environmental, workplace, food supply, or 
water systems.  These agencies have a common purpose to develop public health and 
environmental intelligence, a goal which could be achieved by sharing their resources and 
expertise and collaborating with the state’s traditional private and public health-care providers.  
If the ERD were to come to fruition, it is expected that such a partnership would gradually 
evolve into a collaborative partnership, where formal arrangements would allow representatives 
from each security partner to serve as a liaison at the MIOC.  Moreover, such a future 
partnership and physical presence in the fusion center of the state would enable the ERD to take 
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a leading cooperative role and strategic actions on environmental and health-related information 
and intelligence. 
A second proposed functional desk is a Border Security Desk (BSD) which would be 
established by those agencies that have the common purpose of securing Michigan’s 
international border with Canada.  Whether the public or private agency mission is the 
prevention of the illegal introduction of humans or contraband into the state, or the agency 
mission involves regulation of the mode of transportation of contraband into the state, or the 
ownership of those transportation modes, the shared focus on the international border is 
becoming an increasingly important demand with respect to understanding and responding to 
security issues.  Such participating agencies would need to share information and, more 
importantly, share their experience of the potential trends in border security issues.  Thus, 
organizations whose core missions concern the identification of contraband can collaborate on 
their shared goal.  In fact, some of the initial federal and state agencies that may work together in 
a planned BPD could be as disparate as the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP), and the state’s health and agricultural departments.  
An additional concern to Michigan public safety/health is the danger of agricultural 
threats or agro-terrorism agents being introduced through the state’s ports of entries – such as 
diseases that could have a direct impact on the state’s economy.  One of the challenges for the 
proposed BPD is the inherent difficulty in ascertaining intelligence on persons or goods 
attempting to enter illegally until the attempt to enter results in apprehension.  Through the state 
and federal police agencies, the desk could expand its information capacity on people and goods 
illegally entering the state by collaboration with Canada.  The complexity of border security 
should therefore encourage participating agencies to initially work together and share resources 
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through a different collaborative partnership.  The starting arrangement would not be a full-
blown collaborative undertaking, but an open-dialogue network established on trust and two-way 
communication.  
The proposed BPD would likely work on a different continuum of collaborative effort.  
Agencies participating in this desk would have interactive contacts or exchange information, or 
they would conduct ad hoc activities between and among themselves to accomplish the shared 
purpose of detection of contraband.  The whole point is for the different agencies to begin 
working together and sharing resources, such as exchanging ideas, news, and reports.  It is hoped 
that this initial interaction would lay the groundwork for a future collaborative partnership, one 
that has a more formal arrangement where the different security partners of this desk detail 
analysts to the MIOC and collaborate in the detection and analysis of border security-related 
terrorism information. 
 
Information Resources  
 In order to facilitate the MIOC’s mission, the state of Michigan has identified standing 
information needs.  These information needs, consistent with standing intelligence requirements 
– those pieces of disparate information needed to maintain awareness of ever-present threats to 
the state and the U.S. homeland - have been established to maintain constant information flow 
with respect to the on-going threats identified by the state.  These standing information needs are 
as follows: 
Overt threats to U.S. Homeland Security    HSEC-01-00000-ST-MI01-2010 
Domestic extremism       HSEC-14-00000-ST-MI01-2010 
Prison radicalization       HSEC-14-03000-ST-MI01-2010 
International terrorism      HSEC-22-00000-ST-MI01-2010 
Critical infrastructure protection and key resources   HSEC-02-00000-ST-MI01-2010 
Illicit drugs and precursor chemicals     HSEC-05-00000-ST-MI01-2010 
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Air and marine interdiction      HSEC-13-00000-ST-MI01-2010 
Fraud (individuals and organizations)    HSEC-07-00000-ST-MI01-2010 
Alien smuggling and human trafficking    HSEC-08-00000-ST-MI01-2010 
Customs and border security      HSEC-04-00000-ST-MI01-2010 
Violent gangs and criminal organizations    HSEC-16-00000-ST-MI01-2010 
Plans and preparations for cyber-attacks against Michigan  HSEC-20-00000-ST-MI01-2010 
 
In order to maintain awareness with respect to these standing information needs, the 
MIOC maintains comprehensive, cross-indexed, information that is relevant and useful in 
identifying information related to these needs as well as criminal activities, suspects, and 
associates.  MIOC personnel collect and analyze vast amounts of information.  The MIOC uses 
this information to target specific criminal activity and terrorists/extremists to identify trends for 
proactive law enforcement planning.  Personnel within this section of the MIOC provide a 
variety of intelligence products to alert all law enforcement agencies of common problems, 
current trends, and the identity and method of operation of fugitives.  Specific sources – or 
connectivity – currently utilized by the MIOC include: 
• Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network 
(MAGLOCLEN)* 
• Law Enforcement Online (LEO)* 
• eGuardian* 
• E-Team 
• Criminal Justice Information Network* 
• I-Service Gateway 
• Rapid Start 
• Interpol 
• State intelligence database 
• Links to national databases 
• Investigative databases  
• Federal networks and databases 
• Department of Defense networks 
• Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)* 
• Homeland Security Data Network* 
• Riverglass 
*Denotes subscription to information sharing network  
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To manage this wide-range of information sources, the MIOC employs Memex 
intelligence software systems.  Memex, a SAS Company, provides intelligence management and 
analysis solutions for law enforcement, military intelligence and commercial organizations that 
help to improve intelligence processes, enhance public safety, and prevent and deter criminal 
acts.  Memex places a great deal of emphasis on information sharing, compatibility and 
compliance with existing law enforcement systems.  Its intelligence platform provides a single-
source portal for analyzing Records Management Systems (RMS), Computer-Aided Dispatch 
(CAD), intelligence files, Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR), open source data collection, and 
a variety of other data sources – whether via data integration, federated access, or a hybrid 
approach.  This compatibility enables the MIOC with the capability to seamlessly examine all 
the data in one place, using the same data mining tools and user interface, rather than having to 
log on and off different systems.  To help ensure information is flowing efficiently via Memex, 
the MIOC employs an individual dedicated to managing Memex and serving as a trained liaison 
with the Memex company.   
 
Fusion Liaison Officer Program (FLO) 
In an effort to further enhance their information gathering and sharing capabilities, the 
MIOC has a formal Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO) program.  FLO programs provide an effective 
way for fusion centers to engage with other law enforcement entities since FLOs serve as 
liaisons between their agency and the fusion center.  These FLO personnel help to facilitate their 
agency’s participation in regional information exchanges, ensuring their agency is a full partner 
in the fusion center and information-sharing processes.  This program may offer part of the 
solution to effectively support information sharing between fusion centers and local agencies, in 
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coordination with other initiatives.  As the time of this report, to be a member of the MIOC FLO 
program personnel must be an active sworn law enforcement officer, sworn firefighter, U.S. 
military, an analyst with a law enforcement agency, a member of a tribal law enforcement 
agency, or the Michigan Department of Corrections.    
The basic functionality of FLO members is that they must have consistent interactions 
with the community through calls for service, be able to share time between both their regular 
duties and the MIOC, and have the ability to successfully complete a background investigation to 
obtain the necessary security clearance.  Through these basic functions, FLO members are 
expected to be a conduit for criminal intelligence to and from their community, department, and 
the MIOC.  Being a FLO member also requires personnel to perform threat vulnerability 
assessments, provide on-scene support, maintain a comprehensive point of contact list, and 
educate other law enforcement officials and their communities about information sharing 
initiatives – such as the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative.   
Typical activities for an FLO include reviewing information bulletins or intelligence 
products disseminated by the MIOC, receiving or providing terrorist or criminal indicators 
awareness training, and fielding inquiries from agency colleagues or the fusion center.  The 
FLOs have the responsibility to develop the information-sharing network in their own agencies, 
broadening the reach of the program and increasing the benefit to all members of the agency.  As 
noted, further responsibilities may include conducting outreach to contacts in their own agencies, 
making their colleagues aware of the MIOC and its role in the region, disseminating information 
from the MIOC, providing criminal and terrorism awareness resources or training to help field 
officers identify indicators and warnings, and serving as a resource for colleagues.  Making this 
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program most effective is a coordinator at the MIOC, FLOs at a majority of local agencies, and a 
formalized plan and training program that describes the roles and responsibilities of the FLOs.   
Figure 1 illustrates the complex flow of information to and from the MIOC, its partners, 
and its resources.   
 
Figure 1. Information Flow to and from the Michigan Intelligence Operations Center 
 
 
Analytic Capability 
By managing the flow of information and turning intelligence into actionable knowledge, the 
MIOC supports law enforcement, public safety, and the private sector.  By analyzing data from 
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different sources, the fusion center supports efforts to address immediate or emerging threat 
related circumstances and events.  At the same time, it supports the implementation of risk-
based, information driven prevention, response, and consequence management programs.  
Analyst personnel within the MIOC also provide investigatory assistance in the areas of 
telephone toll analysis, charting of complex criminal investigations to aid with presentations to 
prosecutors and juries, and Tip Center information analysis for major criminal cases.  By 
assisting in these areas the MIOC is able to identify gaps in information needs across agencies 
and sectors.  Furthermore, MIOC analysts process all requests for information received from 
public tips lines.  This information is analyzed and disseminated to local and state agencies.  
These tip lines include the Help Eliminate Marijuana Planting (HEMP) initiative, arson, 
methamphetamines, suspicious activity reports, “Crime Stoppers”, and reported school violence.  
Analysis of the multiple information and data types is communicated to MIOC partners through 
a variety of intelligence products.  These products include, but are not limited to: 
• Michigan Law Enforcement Bulletin 
• Weekly Information Briefings  
• Special Intelligence Bulletin 
• Situational Awareness Bulletin 
• Intelligence-Led Policing and Protection Plans  
 
These analysis products are shared with partners and actively distributed (pushed) through secure 
information systems.  Furthermore, these products are uploaded to sharing systems where they 
remain available to be accessed (pulled) via queries that may be related to the content of the 
product.  
 
Privacy 
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The post-9/11 environment requires increased security needs that not only require 
enhanced information sharing, but also emphasize the need to balance the sharing of information 
with the rights of citizens.  Ethical and legal obligations compel personnel, authorized users, and 
participating entities to protect constitutional rights, including privacy and other civil liberties, 
and civil rights throughout the information sharing process. To accomplish this, appropriate 
privacy and civil liberties protection policies must be in place.  Like all fusion centers, the MIOC 
has developed and implemented a comprehensive privacy policy consistent with the Fusion 
Center Privacy Policy Development14 published by the U.S. Department of Justice.   
The purpose of the privacy policy is to articulate within the MIOC, to external agencies 
that access and share information with the MIOC, to other entities, and publicly that the MIOC 
will adhere to legal requirements and MIOC policy and procedural provisions that enable 
gathering and sharing of information to occur in a manner that protects constitutional rights, 
including personal privacy and other civil liberties, and civil rights.  The Michigan State Police 
has primary responsibility of the MIOC for the overall operation of its justice systems, 
operations, information collection and retention procedures, coordination of personnel, and the 
enforcement of the privacy policy.   
Primary responsibility for the activities of the MIOC, its systems, operations, and 
coordination of personnel and the enforcement of the privacy policy is assigned to the MIOC 
Director within the MSP.  The MIOC is guided by an agency-designated privacy committee that 
liaises with community privacy advocacy groups to ensure that privacy and civil rights are 
protected within the provisions of this policy and within the MIOC’s information collection, 
retention, and dissemination processes and procedures.  The MIOC privacy committee is guided 
                                                 
14 For the complete “Fusion Center Privacy Policy Development Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Policy 
Template” report visit: http://www.it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=nationalInitiatives&page=1181 
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by a trained privacy officer who is appointed by the Director of the MIOC who will select the 
most qualified individual to serve in this position.  The MIOC Privacy Officer receives reports 
regarding alleged errors and violations of the provision of this policy, receives and coordinates 
complaint resolution under the MIOC’s redress policy, and is the liaison to with the Program 
Manager’s Information Sharing Environment (ISE), ensuring that privacy protections are 
implemented through efforts such as training, business process changes, and system designs that 
incorporate privacy enhancing technologies.   
 
Training 
 Given the complex operations of the MIOC, such as the Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Resources Desk, Fusion Liaison Officers, comprehensive analytic strategies, and diverse 
partnerships, a wide-range of training is necessary to ensure consistency with MIOC policies.  As 
many of the MIOC policies (e.g. privacy) are developed in concert with those established by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the MIOC utilizes training programs offered by DHS 
to train their own personnel as well as formal partners and local agencies engaging with the 
MIOC.  While DHS-sponsored training programs for fusion centers are becoming less prevalent 
as a result of decreased budgets, fusion centers have to develop their own training programs.  
The MIOC is developing and recommending training programs for their partners.  These efforts 
are important in building awareness, institutionalizing the importance of criminal intelligence, 
increasing the value of intelligence personnel, fostering relationships among the law enforcement 
community, and improving the ability to detect and prevent acts of terrorism and other crime.  
All MIOC personnel are required to review the federal fusion center guidelines published by the 
U.S. Department of Justice.   
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 116 
 All persons holding manager/supervisor positions within the MIOC are required to 
review the following documents and attend the following training programs (while they remain 
available): 
• Fusion Center Guidelines Executive Summary 
• MSU Intelligence Toolbox Program 
• Criminal Intelligence for the Chief Executive 
• State & Local Antiterrorism Training (SLATT) 
• 28 Code of Federal Regulation Part 2315 
• Antiterrorism Intelligence Awareness Training Program (AIATP) 
 
Executives at the MIOC acknowledged one of the major areas for enhancing the center’s 
capabilities would be to market their resources and mission to their local law enforcement 
agencies.  Executives noted a general awareness of the fusion center by local agency personnel, 
however many agencies lacked knowledge with respect to the MIOC’s available resources and 
mechanisms for sharing information.  In efforts to remedy this shortcoming, local law 
enforcement agencies engaged, or seeking to engage, with the MIOC, the following training 
programs are provided by the MIOC: 
• Intelligence Liaison Officer (ILO) Training: The MIOC offers introductory intelligence 
liaison officer training geared towards the investigator and uniformed road officer.  This 
training program includes modules on: 
o MIOC-Fusion Center Overview  & MIOC Reporting & Contact Information 
o International Terrorism 
o Domestic Terrorism 
o Fraudulent Documents and Facial Recognition 
o Weapons of Mass Destruction Brief 
o Homeland Security Teams (Narcotics, Smuggling & Human Trafficking) 
o Organized Crime 
o Terrorism Screening Center (TSC) & Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 
• MIOC Onsite Field Training: The MIOC offers opportunities for employees of local law 
enforcement agencies to work and train directly with investigators and analysts in the 
MIOC. Field training is determined on a case by case basis. 
                                                 
15 Codified as 28 CFR Part 23 “Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies”, this regulation governs inter-
jurisdictional and multi-jurisdictional criminal intelligence systems that are operated by or on behalf of state and 
local law enforcement agencies and that are funded by or receive federal funds. 
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Chapter 6:  Case Study #2:  Florida Fusion Center 
 
 The vast majority of state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies in the U.S. are 
either unaware of, or struggling with, building an intelligence capacity.  These ambiguities are 
compounded by implementation fidelity  – best practices in one agency may not translate to 
another.  Such a problem creates an obstacle for conducting case studies on law enforcement 
intelligence practices.  A solution is to identify an environment where intelligence practices are 
most likely to be applied consistent with federal guidelines and recommendations and most 
generalizable to the broad law enforcement community.  Fusion centers provide such an 
environment as they are law enforcement organizations specifically structured to engage in law 
enforcement intelligence practices.  While the average fusion center has significantly different 
organizational characteristics as compared to the average local law enforcement agency, the 
principles of engaging in information sharing, establishing a system of performance metrics, and 
building communication networks are quite similar.     
This chapter provides a case study from the Florida Fusion Center.  The Florida Fusion 
Center is unique given a rich tradition of law enforcement intelligence within the state of Florida 
as well as the state’s geographic and demographic composition.  This case study is provided as a 
means to provide context for law enforcement intelligence practices.  Moreover, little is known 
about the operations and administration of fusion centers and thus the narrative to follow 
provides a unique glimpse into the fusion center environment.  Intersections between the case 
study and relevant constructs and the findings presented earlier will be discussed. 
 
The Florida Fusion Center 
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The Florida Fusion Center (FFC) is physically located within the Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement's (FDLE) Office of Statewide Intelligence, located at FDLE headquarters in 
Tallahassee, Florida.  Officially created in January 2007, the FFC operates under the authority of 
FDLE as recognized in the Florida State Statute 94316.  The mission of the FFC is to protect the 
citizens, visitors, resources, and critical infrastructure of Florida by enhancing information 
sharing, intelligence capabilities and preparedness operations for all local, state and federal 
agencies in accordance with Florida's domestic security strategy. The FFC serves as the state 
node in that it provides connectivity and intelligence sharing among the regional fusion centers 
as well as the regional domestic security task forces.   
For forty years the FDLE has operated a centralized intelligence unit that supported 
criminal investigative efforts of local, state and federal law enforcement agencies.  This rich 
history of law enforcement intelligence practices within the state of Florida presents a unique 
environment in which FDLE was able to respond quickly to emerging initiatives and flourish in a 
dynamic intelligence environment where other agencies have endured struggles.  This context 
provides a unique opportunity for this study to examine law enforcement intelligence practices 
within an intelligence environment that has evolved over time.  As a result of this evolving 
intelligence environment, the structure of intelligence and information sharing among law 
enforcement agencies and other organizations within the state of Florida has also evolved and 
thus requires a step-by-step explanation of how the different entities of the information sharing 
structure have been established and communicate.     
 
Structure of Law Enforcement Intelligence in Florida 
                                                 
16 943.0321  The Florida Domestic Security and Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Center and the Florida Domestic 
Security and Counter-Terrorism Database. This statute can be accessed at: http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/ 
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The Office of Statewide Intelligence and the Florida Fusion Center 
 While the state of Florida has been actively sharing information for decades, the heart of 
Florida’s intelligence operations was established in 1996 with the creation of the Office of 
Statewide Intelligence (OSI).  This new office within FDLE was designed to refine the analytical 
and investigative efforts of FDLE to be centered on an intelligence-led approach.  The OSI is 
comprised of multiple intelligence divisions to support the over-arching function of intelligence 
practices and intelligence-led policing.  To further enhance this intelligence-led approach 
adopted by FDLE, the Florida state fusion center was created in 2007 to expand information 
sharing to include a more broad “all-threats, all-hazards” approach to threat prevention.  While 
the OSI and FFC are staffed by similar personnel and both serve as a threat-prevention function 
of FDLE, they are separate entities operating together, separated by a key distinction that will be 
discussed.  Figure 1 illustrates the structure of FDLE’s Investigations and Forensic Science 
portion of the organization – the other significant portion of FDLE is public safety17.   
The primary mission of the OSI is to provide FDLE leadership with sufficient 
information so that they may make informed decisions on the deployment of resources to best 
carry out FDLE’s mission.  The OSI plays a primary role in the planning and direction, analysis, 
reporting, and evaluation of FDLE intelligence products and serves as the core resource of the 
Florida Fusion Center.  The OSI is responsible for the coordination of FDLE's intelligence 
efforts, analysis of intelligence and crime data information, and dissemination.  Although other 
functions take place in OSI, its primary focus is to ensure timely information are available so 
critical decisions can be made based on the best available intelligence.  
 
                                                 
17 For a complete FDLE organizational chart visit: http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/f3f99431-903b-4209-
8d00-b3e0e4bc4be4/Org-Chart.aspx 
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Figure 1: Florida Department of Law Enforcement Organizational Chart – Investigations and 
Forensic Sciences 
 
 
 
The OSI has had an all crimes approach since its inception that was reflective of FDLE's 
investigative strategy and focus areas.  This approach was enhanced with the addition of a 
domestic security mission after the attacks of September 11th, 2001.  Under the coordination of 
FDLE, seven regional domestic security task forces (RDSTFs) were created along with an 
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analytical unit within OSI to enhance domestic security and counter terrorism investigative 
efforts.  Each task force is co-chaired by an FDLE Special Agent in Charge and a sheriff from 
the region.  Beyond the RDSTFs, the OSI also contains strategic and operational focus teams that 
interact with and support regional intelligence centers as well as state, local, and federal agencies 
to monitor issues that could affect the state of Florida.     
 
Seven Regional Fusion Centers 
In 2007, FDLE conducted a gap analysis of the state of Florida’s information sharing 
processes.  The findings and recommendations from this gap analysis identified insufficient 
cooperation and information sharing with local law enforcement agencies within the state of 
Florida.  While this gap analysis will be discussed in more depth to come, its importance to the 
information sharing structure of the state of Florida pertains to the creation of seven regional 
intelligence centers.  An infrastructure and resources foundation for these regional intelligence 
centers had already been established in the seven critical regions of Florida with the RDSTFs and 
RIAs.  Logistically, financially, and functionally it made sense to place the regional fusion 
centers in these same seven regions.  The regional intelligence centers do not replace the existing 
RDSTFs or RIAs, they are separate entities that work along aside one another to enhance 
effectiveness across the board.  Figure 2 illustrates the seven regional fusion centers and their 
relation to the state fusion center.   
 
Figure 2: Florida Department of Law Enforcement - Regional Fusion Centers 
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In March 2008, Florida Governor Charlie Crist designated the FFC to serve as Florida's 
primary fusion center. While the regional fusion centers are in the process of becoming 
operational, the FFC provides resource and instructional assistance.  Regional fusion centers may 
provide operational support and situational awareness to local and state law enforcement 
agencies in their jurisdiction but only the FFC handles this function for the entire state.  The FFC 
also has a 24/7 investigative support center for situational awareness and some after hours 
tactical support.  It should be noted that while the primary state fusion center is in Tallahassee 
(the FFC) a regional fusion center is also located in Tallahassee.  The RIAs serve as the primary 
communication mechanism between the FFC and regional centers.  At the time of the site visit, 
the regional fusion centers in Miami Dade County and Orlando / Orange County were fully 
functioning with the other five centers becoming operational in the near future.  The FFC has 
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begun to conduct quarterly meetings that include representatives (ILO’s) from each of the 
regional fusion centers.  Figure 3 illustrates the structure of the regional fusion centers and uses 
the Orlando center as an example.  Each of the seven regional intelligence centers is structured in 
a similar fashion. 
Information collection requirements and priorities are established through two-way 
communication between the FFC and regional centers.  For purposes of protecting the state of 
Florida, the FFC establishes information collection requirements for the regional centers and 
requires information relative to the established requirements be pushed back to the FFC for 
further analysis and dissemination.  For example, the FFC may have information relevant to a 
certain type of insurance fraud occurring throughout the state of Florida and pushes out 
requirements pertaining to these activities to the regional centers.  Once the regional centers are 
aware of this emerging trend and identify information that may be relevant to the insurance fraud 
scheme, they push their intelligence products back to FFC for further analysis.  Once all seven 
regions are functional they will begin pushing information back to FFC where it can be analyzed, 
the 
Figure 3: Regional Fusion Center Structure – Orlando, FL Example 
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FFC can begin to create an entire state-wide picture of how insurance fraud is occurring in 
Florida and pushes this information back out to the seven regions for the officers and analysts to 
more accurately respond.  Moreover, if information comes in from Miami on specific individuals 
involved with insurance fraud and this information matches closely or is specifically related to 
other information provided from another regional center, this information can be fused together 
and pushed back to each region to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the 
individuals and actions. 
Beyond collecting information consistent with requirements established by the FFC, 
regional fusion centers are also tasked with the responsibility of collecting and analyzing region-
specific information on all-crimes and all-hazards.  Region-specific reports are then pushed on to 
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the FFC in order for the FFC to maintain a conscious awareness of crimes, individuals, and 
activities across the state of Florida as well as allocating necessary resources to specific regions 
when in need.  Each regional center is responsible for establishing partnerships with the 
community and private sector within their respective region.  For example, the FFC will not have 
an established formal partnership with the Disney Corporation directly – this would be the 
responsibility of the Orlando/Orange County regional fusion center.  Information provided by or 
requested from Disney would be managed by the regional center and then pushed to the FFC in 
Tallahassee in the form of an intelligence product. 
 
The Difference between the Florida Fusion Center and the Office of Statewide Intelligence 
 Once again, the OSI is responsible for providing intelligence products to FDLE 
executives to guide the planning and direction, analysis, reporting, and evaluation of FDLE 
operations.  Even though all of the OSI assets support the FFC, the two entities have different 
missions.  The OSI provides intelligence products to support FDLE cases and investigations – 
cases which are standard criminal investigations, especially those related to criminal enterprises.  
The FFC on rare occasions may lend support to FDLE cases; however the FFC mission is to 
provide strategic intelligence products related to terrorism, critical infrastructure and all-threats 
and all-hazards.  This structure can be explained by FDLE’s adherence to the Baseline 
Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers (DHS, 2008). The guiding purpose 
of these baseline capabilities is fusion centers to establish operating procedures consistent with 
the Program Manager’s Information Sharing Environment’s (ISE) model.   
According to the ISE model, fusion centers are responsible for terrorism, crimes that have 
terrorism nexus, and threats to critical infrastructure and key resources (GIWG, 2005).  This ISE 
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context is the approach adopted by Florida to operate their fusion centers.  From a functional 
perspective it is expected that there will be some investigation overlap between the OSI and FFC.  
This overlap is due to the fact that some crimes may or may not have a terrorism nexus and until 
the investigation can reach a sufficient point at which a terrorism nexus can be identified, both 
the OSI and FFC will continue to work the investigation simultaneously and in conjunction with 
one another.  If the investigation indicates a terrorism nexus, the OSI will turn the investigation 
over completely to the FFC.  Likewise, if the investigation indicates a lack of a terrorism nexus, 
the FFC will turn the investigation over completely to the OSI.   
 
Information Sharing: Local Law Enforcement, Non-Law Enforcement Organizations, and 
Federal Agencies 
Gap Analysis 
As mentioned, in 2007 FDLE conducted a statewide assessment of their information 
sharing capabilities to identify gaps for improvement.  The critical gap identified through this 
evaluation was the need for improvement in the relationship between the FFC and local law 
enforcement agencies; more specifically a gap in information collection provided via local 
agencies and local analyst products.  Many of the local agencies tended to interpret intelligence-
led policing as focused within their own agency (FFC, 2010a) as opposed to a broader 
philosophy of being part of the information sharing culture where locals think beyond 
jurisdictional boundaries.  This is critical given the FFC’s strong emphasis that for successful 
intelligence-led policing to occur, agencies must understand trans-jurisdictional responsibilities 
(FFC, 2010a).  Less than optimal relationships with local law enforcement were not unanimous 
as FDLE experienced a variation across the regions with respect to these relationships.  For 
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example, the FFC has a strong relationship with local law enforcement agencies in Pensacola 
developed though their collaborative experience managing natural disasters (hurricanes) and 
criminal investigations. 
Relationships with local law enforcement seemed to hinge on two factors; 1) local 
agencies recognizing what information needed to be pushed to the FFC and, 2) a lack of 
awareness of what the FFC actually provides.  This is not to say local agencies in Florida are 
opposed to developing consistent standards for information sharing, however, a gap existed with 
respect to understanding the intelligence-led policing philosophy and the resources available to 
assist them in achieving an operational intelligence capability.  This lack of knowledge is 
coupled with a lack of commitment from local law enforcement executives.  As mentioned by 
FFC personnel, the lack of support and buy-in at all levels of the organization is a key obstacle to 
effective information sharing.  The sub-par commitment is not in the form of unwillingness to 
share information, but insufficient resources needed to meet the standards for information 
sharing outlined by the FFC that ensure quality, legality and effectiveness.  Despite the identified 
gaps in communication with local agencies, many of them are involved in some form or fashion, 
be it having a formal ILO or simply an informal relationship to pass along information.  In fact, 
information overload from local agencies is a challenge both in terms of the FFC managing this 
information but also communicating the importance to local law enforcement for the need to 
analyze and evaluate the information as it relates to their region.  Similarly, the information 
overload issue arises as a result of needing a clearly defined dissemination strategy that has 
identified recipients and mechanisms are in place for appropriate two-way information flow.   
In response to these concerns, the FFC recognizes the need to market their products and 
resources with local law enforcement to increase awareness of what the FFC can provide for 
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local law enforcement and vice versa.  Currently this is being achieved through FFC personnel 
who meet continually with local law enforcement to provide region-specific information as well 
as keep them up to date on resources available to them through the FFC.  The creation of the 
seven regional fusion centers is also at the heart of the solution to this issue.  These regional 
centers are tasked with the responsibility of marketing their resources to local law enforcement 
within their region while developing and maintaining active information sharing channels.  The 
seven regional centers build the grass-roots partnerships for two-way communication flow and 
the FFC relies upon these regional centers to provide information from the community-level.  
Although it was beyond the scope of this case study, it would be quite informative to study the 
variations in these regional centers and how those variations were developed and the positive and 
negative impacts they had on information sharing.  This information flow allows the regional 
centers to identify region-specific or unique crime/hazard/terrorism trends and provide this 
information to the FFC in the form of an intelligence product that can be used to allocate 
resources to that region to respond to the identified needs.  Moreover, the FFC can use this 
information to track crime/hazard/terrorism trends throughout the state of Florida and 
disseminate this information across the state and country.     
 
Intelligence Liaison Officers (ILOs) 
 A critical component to the success of fusion centers across the country is the 
establishment of intelligence liaison officers (ILO).  As noted earlier, over 50 percent of the SLT 
respondents indicated that the agency had a TLO or ILO program. An ILO is intended to be a 
communication channel of raw information from his or her agency/organization who can 
integrate that agency/organization-specific information into the collective body of information 
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for analysis.  When the fusion center has intelligence requirements, the ILO is the 
communication channel back to the agency/organization to share, monitor, and process the new 
information needs (Carter, 2009).  An ILO must ensure that analytic products and threat 
information are directed back to the parent agency for proper dissemination. The ILO’s may be 
physically assigned to fusion centers, but a more common arrangement is for the ILO to perform 
his or her fusion center responsibilities simultaneously to those of their home 
agency/organization from that location. 
 The gap analysis conducted by FDLE in early 2007 identified the need to establish ILOs 
in the state of Florida.  By December 2007, 12 state agencies formally committed to the FFC by 
signing memorandums of understanding (MOU) with FDLE to contribute members to serve on 
the Executive Advisory Board and to serve as ILOs to support FFC operations.  All formal ILOs 
meet with FFC personnel each Wednesday of the week to maintain consistency of intelligence 
requirements and emerging issues.  These ILOs represent multi-discipline partners from 
education, fire rescue, communications, law enforcement and emergency management.  Below is 
a list of the agencies and entities which participate as ILOs in the FFC: 
• Department of Agriculture 
• Department of Business and Professional 
Regulation 
• Department of Corrections 
• Department of Education 
• Division of Emergency Management 
• Department of Environmental Protection 
• Fish and Wildlife Conservation 
Commission 
• Department of Financial Services 
• Department of Health 
• Department of Highway Safety 
• Department of Transportation 
• Office of the Attorney General 
• National Guard 
• Department of Homeland Security 
• US Attorney’s Office 
• Federal Bureau of Investigation 
• Drug Enforcement Administration 
• Florida Chiefs of Police Association 
• Florida Sheriffs Association 
• Florida Fire Chiefs Association 
• Agency for Enterprise Information 
Technology 
 
To formally become an ILO with the FFC, agencies/organizations must enter into a MOU 
with FDLE.  The MOU requires the ILO to recognize rules, regulations, and laws pertaining to 
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the disclosure of information as well as operating policies and procedures and performance 
expectations of FDLE/FFC.  This MOU also requires a minimum time dedication of one ILO day 
per week.   Additionally, ILOs must complete a background investigation, successfully obtain a 
secret-level security clearance (including civilian personnel), and complete a formal ILO training 
program set forth by the FDLE and the Fusion Executive Advisory Board.  All FFC members 
(and FDLE members assigned to the FFC) must also complete these trainings requirements.  
These training requirements are supplemented by monthly training schedules that address 
emerging issues in information sharing – such as 28 CFR Part 23 reviews, information sharing 
systems and privacy concerns.  Moreover, each ILO is responsible for an established benchmark 
for standard tasking that includes, but is not limited to: monthly encounters report (e.g. repeat 
offenders, traffic stops and tickets), review of their agency/organization databases18, actively 
push information back to the FFC, and complete strategic assessments for monthly encounters.   
Formal ILOs assigned to the FFC are expected to participate in a capacity deemed 
appropriate by the ILO’s agency/organization and will have the ability to be virtually connected 
to the FFC via electronic information sharing systems.  The intelligence system utilized by the 
FFC as well as other local, state and federal criminal justice agencies throughout Florida is 
known as the Statewide Intelligence Site - InSite.  This system operates on the secure 
information portal administered by FDLE, the Criminal Justice Network (CJNet).  InSite 
provides law enforcement agencies (federal, state and local) a secured computerized database of 
active criminal intelligence and active criminal investigative information to the legally 
authorized users across the state of Florida.  The FDLE is responsible for system administration 
to include audits for both the use of CJNet and InSite.  Access to the portal and the system 
                                                 
18 Florida Fusion Center personnel may ask for Intelligence Liaison Officers to run all the checks of their databases 
for persons which they are legally authorized to conduct.  For example, a database search may identify a name from 
a terrorism watch list that also appears in the Department of Education or Public Health information systems. 
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requires MOUs, Agency Agreements and Individual User Agreements.  All users of InSite are 
required to undergo additional background investigations and training before being granted 
access to the system.  All agency executives and individual users of InSite must acknowledge in 
writing an adherence to the FFC Privacy Policy as well as all applicable federal or state laws.  
Individuals assigned to the FFC from agencies outside FDLE are also bound by the Non-
Disclosure Agreement.  Civilians may be provided access to the system on a case by case basis 
for those who have a need to know and a right to know the information contained within the 
system.    
The ILOs not only provide additional terrorism information, but also enhance the all-
hazards perspective adhered to by the FFC given their proximity to threats that can emerge 
outside of the traditional law enforcement purview.  A unique example from the FFC of this all-
threats approach was working with emergency management personnel for hurricane evacuation 
plans.  Beyond the obvious threats posed by hurricanes, FDLE and emergency management 
planners has taken another step and are examining registered sex offenders living within the 
projected hurricane damage areas to determine an appropriate evacuation and contingent living 
options.  Together, the FFC and emergency management personnel identified the increase of a 
potential threat involving registered sex offenders being evacuated during a hurricane and 
directed to shelters where there may be large numbers of children with minimal adult oversight – 
such as many schools that serve as evacuation shelters during hurricanes.  As such, the FFC and 
emergency management personnel are working together to create appropriate hurricane 
evacuation plans for registered sex offenders living within high-impact hurricane areas in the 
state of Florida. 
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Threat Assessments, Intelligence Products, and Dissemination 
Utilizing information and intelligence products received from other law enforcement 
agencies, fusion centers, and ILOs, the FFC has developed a comprehensive process for 
intelligence and information sharing in support of the completion of strategic assessments, 
criminal investigations and, as emphasized the most at the FFC, situational awareness.  These 
processes are at the heart of the FFC function to plain and simply facilitate communication 
across organizations (FFC, 2010a).  Within their first six months of operations, the FFC 
completed 12 strategic threat assessments and 53 requests for information. During 2009, 
approximately 250 intelligence assessments on subjects and topics of interest were produced.  
As with any emerging initiative there has been improvement but issues still remain.  For 
example, when the Super Bowl was held at Raymond James stadium in Tampa, FL in 2009, the 
FBI requested the FFC to conduct a threat assessment of possible threats, actors, targets, and 
methods that could impact the Super Bowl.  Within this threat assessment, the FFC included a 
brief section on serious domestic threat groups in the Tampa area.  Once the assessment was 
disseminated to the FBI it was decided this information should not be included in the final threat 
assessment for the Super Bowl given the FBI’s threat prevention concerns were focused on 
international threat groups.  Despite a significantly higher likelihood of potential attacks coming 
from domestic groups/crime, this information was not included in the threat assessment and thus 
resulted in a less comprehensive intelligence product for dissemination. 
The FFC utilizes a “user-friendly, short and concise” (FFC, 2010a) format for their 
intelligence products and disseminates these products in multiple ways electronically.  
Intelligence products are posted to the Homeland Security Information Network Intelligence19 
(HSIN-Intel) website and Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Community of 
                                                 
19 For more information visit https://government.hsin.gov/ 
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Interest20 (HS SLIC) website.  Beyond these major Regional Information Sharing System 
websites, the FFC maintains an updated email distribution list for awareness products as well as 
an internal secure portal to share information with other law enforcement agencies on request.  
Moreover, the ILOs receive information on how to disseminate products during their ILO 
training program.  However, maintaining a consistent and timely standard for disseminating 
intelligence products has its challenges.  One primary obstacle faced by FFC personnel is that 
every 35-40 days the FFC’s access to federal databases gets automatically deleted to particular 
system nodes.  For example, HSIN has a variety of nodes that remove access on a regular basis 
for security purposes.  After a couple of days the FFC’s access is restored, but this becomes a 
routine inhibitor to information flow.  Information sharing inhibitors are not only technical, but 
bureaucratic as well.  The process of receiving timely products from federal agencies is an 
extremely complicated process due to the fact that there are so many layers of review and sign-
off on intelligence products before they go out.  This often results in stale information that is no 
longer applicable to current situations.   
   
Relationships with the Private Sector 
 The importance of establishing public-private partnerships with fusion centers is 
reiterated in a variety of reports and recommendations.  The extent of participation and format of 
these partnerships can vary greatly across fusion centers nationally.  The approach taken by the 
FFC is unique given the structure of the information sharing system in the state of Florida.  To 
begin with, active information sharing with the private sector occurs both at the state and 
regional fusion center levels.  At the state level, the FFC administers a website specifically 
designed to facilitate information exchange with private sector entities.  “Business Safe” is a 
                                                 
20 For more information visit https://hsin-intel.dhs.gov/ 
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program that includes an outreach program and website to the private sector.  BusinesSafe is 
designed to involve local businesses in protecting the safety and well-being of Florida’s residents 
and visitors from threats – both man-made and natural.  Florida’s seven RDSTFs have launched 
BusinesSafe to provide businesses with the necessary tools and resources to facilitate two-way 
communication with the regional fusion centers.  BusinesSafe provides sector specific fact sheets 
for businesses to reference21.  These sheets are categorized by the type of business and are 
patterned after a program that was created by the New York City Police Department after the 
attacks of September 11th – the NYPD Shield initiative22.   More specifically, the information 
provided via BusinessSafe is designed to help local businesses identify suspicious activities 
which may result in a threat to those businesses.  Private sector members can also sign up to 
receive electronic alert notifications via e-mail, cellular phones, and PDAs.  These notices 
provide information about breaking news, possible threats, suspicious activity and specific 
preparedness techniques pertinent to the local businesses.  Currently there are approximately 
4,000 local businesses in the state of Florida connected to BusinessSafe (FFC, 2010a). 
Additionally, businesses are able to register with a US Department of Homeland Security 
website23 which provides vital information on how to better protect their business from threats.  
To register for this secure website, private sector members must apply via the website and 
identify their regional protective security advisor (PSA).  The regional PSAs are representatives 
from the RDSTFs24.  Beyond the US Department of Homeland Security secure website, local 
businesses may also register to become a member of multiple other websites designed for sharing 
                                                 
21 For a list of specific sectors and fact sheets visit: http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/77cd6c85-8eed-4888-
855c-715de12dcaef/Sectors-Key-Resource-Areas-(1).aspx 
22 For more information visit http://www.nypdshield.org/public/ 
23For more information visit  http://cvpipm.iac.anl.gov/ 
24 For more information visit: http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/5a336d9b-cf38-4979-bd03-
d9bfe0f52738/DHS_Protective_Security_Advisor.aspx 
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threat information25 – all of these websites can be reached via the BusinessSafe website.  For 
example, the website “Business Owners Against Terrorism” (BOAT) provides local business 
owners connectivity with the North Florida Regional Domestic Security Task Force.  The BOAT 
website allows business owners, managers or employees to anonymously report suspicious 
behavior or activities to local law enforcement authorities. 
 Consistent with the approach that local business must identify their protective security 
advisor – the representative from the RDSTF – to gain access to secure websites, regional fusion 
centers are responsible for establishing and sustaining active two-way information flow with the 
private sector within their region.  The state fusion center (FFC) does not maintain partnerships 
with private sector companies – only the BusinessSafe website.  The FFC relies upon the 
regional intelligence centers for these partnerships.  The regional fusion center personnel push 
intelligence products from the private companies in their region to the FFC for further review 
and integration into other intelligence products.  If additional information is needed from a 
private organization, the FFC will communicate with the regional center where the business is 
located and the regional fusion center will then reach out to the business where information is 
sought.     
 
Intelligence Analysts: Performance Evaluation and Standards 
Analysts at the Florida Department of Law Enforcement  
Law enforcement intelligence is reliant upon the analysis of raw information and thus, 
intelligence analysts.  The FDLE and the FFC are sensitive to the importance of quality 
intelligence products.  The FDLE defines a law enforcement analyst as “any person who is 
                                                 
25 To view a list of additional private sector sharing websites visit: 
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/b46536cc-bd2d-4008-8023-4d27f427da63/Related-Links.aspx 
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employed or contract by a municipality, state or political subdivision thereof whose primary 
responsibility is to collect, analyze and disseminate data in the form of operational, strategic, 
investigative, intelligence and crime analysis to support, enhance and direct law enforcement 
missions (FFC, 2010a).  When asked what character traits FDLE looks for in an intelligence 
analyst, the FFC personnel indicated the importance of credibility, excellent written and oral 
communication skills and the ability to think critically.  Moreover, FDLE believes analysts are 
not just people who sit behind a desk and operate computer software, but have a genuine ability 
to reach out to others and be proactive about the case they are working on and how it may relate 
to other cases they are aware of but might not be assigned (FFC, 2010a).   
Despite hiring analysts with these characteristics, FDLE is cognizant of the need for 
professional standards to train and evaluate analysts in order to achieve quality intelligence 
products.  A critical issue facing FDLE and the FFC is that the regional fusion center structure 
presents challenges with respect to how to coordinate and ensure the quality of intelligence 
products throughout state.  This challenge of coordination and quality control is the result of 
some of the regional fusion centers were developed by local agencies that are currently being 
incorporated into a state-wide regional structure.  Moreover, regional fusion centers operate, for 
the most part, separate from the FFC and even though the FFC provides an FDLE analyst in all 
regional fusion centers, FDLE will not dictate to the regional centers. 
 
Analyst Training  
One way of addressing the analyst quality and standards challenge is through the 
development of a required analyst training academy.  In 2003, the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement developed the Florida Law Enforcement Analyst Academy (FLEAA).  This 
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academy was the first of its kind in the nation.  Analysts learn criminal and intelligence analysis 
skills that are used by law enforcement and other emergency responders to successfully prevent 
crime and conduct complex investigations.  The FDLE's long-term goal in creating the FLEAA 
was to establish and provide a uniform training curriculum in the area of criminal intelligence 
and law enforcement analysis.  During this six-week academy, analysts are challenged with 
hands-on training, assignments and weekly quizzes.  They develop the skills necessary to 
complete individual and group research projects.  Following the completion of all course work, 
analysts take a comprehensive examination.  Successful graduates receive a state certification as 
a law enforcement analyst. The FLEAA is traditionally offered twice a year.  To better prepare 
analysts for the academy, FDLE also developed two pre-requisite courses.  The first is a 40-hour 
Florida Basic Analyst Training (FBAT) course.  This course is designed to train newly and 
recently hired analysts in the field of law enforcement analysis.  The course offers instruction 
blocks that lay the groundwork for their career in criminal or intelligence analysis. There is a 
very high demand for this course and it is traditionally offered two to four times a year. 
During 2005, FDLE developed a new course titled "Computer Applications and 
Analytical Techniques" which is also a 40-hour course designed to train analysts in using 
computer applications to conduct investigative analysis.  Once again there is a very high demand 
for this course as well and it is traditionally offered two to four times a year.  The basic and 
computer courses serve as training "stepping stones" and are required to be completed prior to 
attendance in the FLEAA.  Currently, other acceptable prerequisites are being considered.  The 
FDLE has been planning the launch of an advanced course since fall 2005.  This course will fill 
an existing void between the basic course and the FLEAA.  The intent is for this training to 
concentrate on the applications and techniques taught in the basic course and allow for more 
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hands-on advanced investigative analysis.  The advanced course is delivered to analyst academy 
graduates and will focus on emerging topics of concern in criminal intelligence analysis – such 
as fusion centers, suspicious activity reporting and intelligence-led policing. 
Currently, the FDLE training program is funded through Law Enforcement Terrorism 
Prevention Program funds issued from the Department of Homeland Security.  Students 
attending these courses must be assigned to an analyst position with a local or state law 
enforcement agency in the state of Florida.  This funding allows FDLE to offers the FLEAA 
training courses free of charge to all state, county and municipal law enforcement and 
investigative agencies.  
 
Analyst Performance Evaluation and Analyst Promotion 
 To reinforce and maintain consistent quality among intelligence analysts, FDLE has 
employed the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods for analyst performance 
evaluations.  To begin with, the entry-level analyst at FDLE is a “Crime Intelligence Analyst I” 
(CIA I).  The position of CIA I can be attained following the successful completion of all the 
applicable application/selection processes which includes approved exercises and interviews, as 
well as meeting the minimum qualifications for the position.  Prior to the expiration of the CIA I 
probationary period, the analyst must successfully complete the 40 hour FBAT and the 40 hour 
“Computer Applications and Analytical Techniques” course.  The next analyst level at FDLE is a 
“Crime Intelligence Analyst II” (CIA II).  A CIA I may be upgraded to a CIA II upon attaining 
one year of analytical experience and successfully completing the aforementioned training 
requirements.  Any promotion from the position of CIA I to CIA II is be contingent upon the 
satisfactory completion of all probationary requirements, a minimum rating overall of 
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“Achieves”26 on the analyst’s work plan and the recommendation of the analyst’s supervisor and 
approval via the analyst’s chain of command to the Special Agent in Charge or equivalent. 
The next progression for analysts at FDLE is to become a “Certified Crime Intelligence 
Analyst” (GA I).  A CIA II may be promoted to a GA I upon attaining two years of analytical 
experience as a CIA II with the FDLE and successfully completing the FLEAA.  The final 
progression for analysts at FDLE is to become a “Senior Crime Intelligence Analyst” (GA II).  A 
GA I may be promoted to a GA II upon attaining five years of analytical experience as a GA I as 
well as becoming a certified analyst instructor; successfully complete an additional 40 hours of 
advanced analyst training; maintaining membership and active participation in a professional 
organization, which is pertinent to the analyst’s job assignment and approved by the member’s 
supervisor, and lastly maintaining a minimum rating of “Achieves” on the analyst assignments.  
Upon becoming a GA II, the analyst will have additional responsibilities that include, but are not 
limited to: assisting in the development and approval of curriculum for all course work in the 
FLEAA; assisting in the development and monitoring testing processes within the FLEAA; and 
administering proficiency exams for CIA candidates and FLEAA candidates. 
In addition to the minimum requirements of evaluation for career progression, FDLE 
goes beyond evaluating their analysts at pre-determined intervals.  Analyst products are not only 
reviewed when they are tested for the progression of their skills, but also on a day-to-day basis as 
senior personnel examine daily intelligence products and investigative support work.  If an 
analyst’s quality of work is thought to be less than sufficient, the inadequate product is returned 
to the analyst with comments and a follow-up discussion from senior personnel on the areas for 
improvement.  The FDLE emphasizes the importance of quality over quantity (FFC, 2010a).   
                                                 
26 Analysts receive one of three evaluations of their intelligence products as related to FDLE’s benchmark for quality 
analysis; “Excels”, “Achieves”, and “Below”  
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Protecting Citizens’ Civil Rights 
 As many fusion centers across the country have come under public scrutiny for 
information sharing practices, whether legitimate or not, the FFC emphasizes transparency with 
respect to their operations.  The FFC has a vigorous privacy policy which is open for public 
review and posted to the FDLE public website27.  As explained in the FFC privacy policy 
document, the intent of the FFC is to: 
 
“The Florida Fusion Center (FFC) is committed to the responsible and legal compilation 
and utilization of criminal investigative and criminal intelligence information and other 
information important to protecting the safety and security of the people, facilities, and 
resources of the State of Florida and the United States. All compilation, utilization, and 
dissemination of information by FFC participants and source agencies will conform to 
requirements of applicable state and federal laws, regulations and rules, and to the 
greatest extent practicable be consistent with Fair Information Practices. The intent of 
this policy is to abide by all privacy, civil rights and civil liberties guidance issued as part 
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, National Fusion Center 
Guidelines, State and Major Urban Area Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities and the 
National SAR Initiative. All local, state, tribal and federal agencies providing suspicious 
activity reports (SAR) with a nexus to Florida or participating with the Florida Fusion 
Center (FFC) by virtue of submitting, receiving or disseminating SAR information, 
criminal intelligence or criminal investigative information via the FFC are required to 
adhere to the requirements of the Florida Fusion Center Privacy Policy” (FFC, 2010b:3). 
 
All members of the FFC are required to review, acknowledge and adhere to the FFC 
Privacy Policy.  All participants and source agencies, which include all individual users of the 
InSite system, are required to review and adhere to the FFC privacy policy.  The FFC provides a 
printed copy of their policy upon request to all entities participating in the FFC and InSite and 
requires a written acknowledgement to comply with this policy and the provisions it contains.  
All FFC personnel, participating agency members, personnel providing information technology 
services to the agency, private contractors, InSite users and any other information sharing partner 
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is required to comply with applicable laws protecting privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.  
The FFC has adopted internal operating policies and procedures that are in compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations protecting privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties including but 
not limited to, the U.S. Constitution and state, local, and federal privacy, civil rights, civil 
liberties, and legal requirements applicable to the FFC.  Florida State Statutes 11928 – Public 
Records - is one applicable law pertaining to the criminal intelligence and criminal investigative 
efforts of the FFC and participating agencies.  In order to maintain consistency and adherence of 
the privacy policy by all actors involved, the FFC has created an internal Standing Privacy 
Review Board that actively reviews information sharing policies.   
A very unique aspect of the FFC in response to a heightened suspicion of fusion center 
activities with respect to civil rights issues is that the Director of the FFC receives guidance from 
a Constitutional Protections and Privacy Advisory Board (CPPAB) that collaborates with 
community privacy advocacy groups to ensure that privacy and civil rights are appropriately 
protected by the FFC’s information acquisition, dissemination and retention practices as defined 
by the FFC's written policy.  The CPPAB is comprised of three members not actively associated 
or employed by an FFC participating agency.  The members are individuals with well established 
credentials in the fields of criminal justice and/or the law.  Currently the CPPAB members are 
comprised of an ACLU Director from the state of Florida, a retired Special Agent in Charge with 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Director of the Center for Advancement of Human 
Rights at Florida State University.  The members are appointed by the FFC Executive Advisory 
Board to serve for at least two years.  The CPPAB will periodically review and recommend to 
the FFC Executive Advisory Board updates or changes to the FFC's policy and procedures for 
                                                 
28 For more information visit 
http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=Ch0119/ch0119.htm 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 142 
protecting civil rights and civil liberties in response to changes in applicable laws, or as 
otherwise necessary.  The CPPAB may be consulted to participate in any independent inquiry 
into complaints alleging violation of the privacy rights policy and will advise the FFC Executive 
Advisory Board of their findings and any recommended corrective action.   
 
Conclusions 
 
 This overview of the administration and operation of the Florida Fusion Center has 
provided the necessary context for issues discussed earlier as well as provide some indication of 
best practices regarding building an intelligence capacity.  While fusion centers differ from most 
other state, local, and tribal agencies, their role in the intelligence/information sharing process 
gives light to the facilitators and inhibitors of information sharing at the local level.   
 Perhaps the best illustration of information sharing and intelligence-led policing that can 
be extracted from this case study is the process and communication channels established 
throughout the structure of Florida’s intelligence system.  In the context of an individual agency 
at the local level, establishing communication channels for information sharing would essentially 
involve that agency to develop a process to manage collection requirements, develop 
partnerships with the private sector, and partnerships with the community.  These steps represent 
the information collection infrastructure of police agencies that allow an agency to maintain the 
“pulse” of their community while also allowing for two-way communication of raw information.  
While this form of infrastructure aids the single agency is applying ILP to their specific needs, 
this also allows the single agency to engage in information sharing across jurisdictions and report 
on the types of trends and threats they feel are relevant.  Such a process also allows for 
information to be pushed on to state fusion centers.  This model is consistent with that of 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 143 
Florida’s state fusion center and its seven regional fusion centers.  Simply put, each regional 
fusion center acts independent and is responsible for their regional issues – just as independent 
local agencies would be responsible for their jurisdiction and report to the state fusion center or 
to other agencies seeking information they might feel is useful.   
 The FFC adheres to an “all threats, all hazards” philosophy intended to prevent threats 
from reaching fruition.  “Threats” is an all-encompassing term which refers to street crime, 
complex criminality, terrorism, and natural disasters.  In short, the goal of this philosophy is to 
not only remain cognizant of traditional threats, but threats that have been outside the traditional 
law enforcement purview.  Such a philosophy requires a variety of information sources and 
communication channels.  The FFC has established sources consistent with this information 
collection environment that include public-private partnerships with Disney and “BusinessSafe”.  
Moreover, the “BusinessSafe” portal allows for the submission of suspicious activity reports 
(SARs) – a threat-based source of behavioral information endorsed by practitioners.  In addition, 
the importance of trans-jurisdictional information gathering and sharing was reinforced as a 
necessary function of intelligence-led policing.  Once again, the philosophy of information being 
collected and for purposes of focusing on threats across jurisdictions – not just the jurisdiction in 
which an agency is located.   
  From an organizational structure perspective, all intelligence (and crime) analysts were 
civilian (non-sworn) personnel.  An obvious caveat to the civilianization of the FFC as compared 
to local agencies is that it can logically be assumed that civilian employees within an 
intelligence-specific agency will be responsible for intelligence-specific tasks whereas civilian 
employees within a general local agencies may be tasked with responsibilities other than 
intelligence – thus clouding the effect of civilianization on ILP within local agencies.  The FFC 
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relies on many formal policies and procedures to guide their intelligence practices – thus being 
high in formalization.  Perhaps the best example of formalization is the memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) that is required by agencies/organizations that formally partner with the 
FFC.  This MOU guides requirements for information sharing, collection, retention, and 
dedication of personnel and resources. 
The influence of organizational context presented itself when the gap analysis indicated a 
significant lack of administrative commitment to the ILP philosophy as well as a requirement for 
comprehensive training on intelligence-related issues.  It was noted by FFC personnel that the 
lack of support and buy-in at all levels of the organization is a key obstacle to effective 
information sharing.  It is also worth noting that insufficient commitment is not in the form of 
unwillingness to share information, but insufficient resources needed to meet the standards for 
information sharing outlined by the FFC – most likely a result of no executive buy-in.  Training 
is greatly valued and required within the Florida intelligence system.  While all intelligence-
related personnel are required to receive training on intelligence issues, analysts receive the most 
comprehensive training.  This aspect of the FFC is also related to the importance of quality 
performance evaluation.  Executives of the FFC acknowledge the importance of quality 
intelligence products to guide decision making.  In order for quality products to be made 
available, analysts that create the products must be trained consistent with professional standards 
and expectations.  Moreover, beyond the exhaustive training requirements, analysts are evaluated 
on the quality of their products – not the number of products.  The quality of products is 
determined by senior intelligence analysts in the form of a blind-review.  If an apparent decrease 
in quality is observed, the analyst can be required to attend further training programs.  
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The Florida Fusion Center identified a significant lack of understanding as to the concept 
of intelligence-led policing among local law enforcement agencies across the state of Florida.  
The ambiguity of ILP is one of the largest hurdles of adoption and research.  This lack of 
understanding further demonstrates the need for additional research on law enforcement 
intelligence practices.   
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Chapter 7:  Case Study #3:  Southern Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center 
This chapter provides a case study from the Southern Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center 
(SNCTC) as a means to build on the concepts discussed and to provide additional context for the 
conceptualizations and empirical findings of the present study.  The SNCTC has a somewhat 
different structure for carrying out its mission.  Furthermore, the SNCTC is designed to facilitate 
information sharing across a much different geographic and demographic area as compared to 
the FFC and MIOC.  For example, the SNCTC is largely focused on activities within Clark 
County – specifically the city of Las Vegas, NV and the tourism/hospitality industry whereas the 
FFC is designed to manage multiple large cities, a large, spread-out geographic area, as well as a 
large tourism base.  These different structures provide another unique insight into an 
intelligence-specific organization.   
 
The Southern Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center  
Housed in a 24,000 square-foot, non-descript airport office park, the SNCTC became 
operational on October 1, 2007.  On March 18, 2009, Las Vegas Metro Police Sheriff Doug 
Gillespie testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Intelligence, 
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment during a session titled “Homeland Security 
Intelligence: Its Relevance and Limitations” (HCHS, 2009).  During his testimony, Sheriff 
Gillespie stated that the Las Vegas Metro Police Department and the SNCTC were committed to 
the key components of an effective fusion center – intelligence-led policing and an “all-threat, 
all-hazards” mission.  Sheriff Gillespie explained that the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department employs the intelligence-led policing philosophy and that analysis of crime data, 
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coupled with the execution of innovative policing tactics, is the cornerstone of their efforts to 
successfully prevent risks to society.   
 
All-Threats, All-Crimes Approach to Fusion Centers 
Despite the name of the SNCTC as a “counter-terrorism center”, Sheriff Gillespie 
explained that the SNCTC could be more effective by taking a more broad "all-crimes, all-
hazards" focus since law enforcement does not want to miss out on the criminal element that 
eventually turns out to be a terrorist.  The SNCTC‘s core mission is to provide tactical and 
strategic analytic support to regional stakeholders.  The tactical analysis section provides timely 
and actionable information to command staff and field personnel.  The strategic analysis section 
complements tactical operations by developing long-term analytical products.  Specific units 
exist to target gangs, counter terrorism, and narcotics as well a criminal analysts section to 
produce a variety of issue-specific products on issues facing the Clark County region.  The 
SNCTC has established strong relationships with local industry, the public health community, 
and emergency management agencies to further enhance this approach.  
Awareness training is provided to private sector businesses on how to identify and report 
suspicious behavior. Co-located with the analysts, the SNCTC houses a 24/7 watch station 
capability, investigators that handle tips, leads and suspicious activity reports, critical 
infrastructure protection group, and the All Hazards Regional Multi Agency Operations and 
Response (ARMOR) unit.  This ARMOR team consists of local, county, state and federal experts 
in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) response, detection, and 
identification.  The SNCTC has developed a privacy policy that is founded on 28 CFR Part 23.   
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Mission 
The mission of the SNCTC is to improve communication and coordination among 
international, federal, state, local, tribal, and private agencies.  This mission is achieved through 
the combining of relevant information from disparate databases concerning terrorism, critical 
infrastructure, and raw information pushed from the community.  The SNCTC is the regional 
hub for receiving information, providing analysis and dissemination of actionable intelligence to 
the participating agencies, Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), All Regional Multi-Agency 
Operations and Response (ARMOR), and other appropriate law enforcement, public safety and 
intelligence entities.  The SNCTC produces written reports concerning criminal trends and threat 
assessments in the Southern Nevada region and provides analytical case support and tailored 
analytical products.   
 
Management and Structure  
The SNCTC defines a “member agency” as an agency that contributes at least one full-
time employee or one full-time contractor that is co-located at the SNCTC site dedicated to 
fulfilling the SNCTC’s mission.  A “contributing agency” is defined as an agency that 
contributes personnel on a part-time or surge (as needed) basis.  Any local, state, or federal 
agency with statutory law enforcement, public safety, or public health jurisdiction may join the 
SNCTC upon approval by the board of governors.  In general, all agencies that have invested in 
the SNCTC are referred to as “participating agencies”.  Each of these participating agencies must 
agree upon and enter into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the SNCTC that 
outlines responsibilities and commitments to the center.  On the average work day, the SNCTC 
houses 60 employees from various agencies and organizations. 
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Board of Governors  
The SNCTC is overseen by a board of governors comprised of agency executives, who 
all have equal voting rights, from each of the participating agencies.  The chairperson of the 
board of governors is the executive of the agency that is designated as the fiscal agent for the 
SNCTC –which is currently the Las Vegas Metro Police Department.  The board of governors, 
which convenes as a whole twice a year, provides mission guidance and policy direction.  
Additionally, they resolve conflicts or disputes that might arise related to policies or the mission. 
The board of governors appoints the executive director for the SNCTC who has day-to-day 
command authority over members assigned to the center.  As staffing patterns change and full-
time employees are added, contributing agencies may change their status to become member 
agencies.  Each agency executive - who sits on the board - must possess, or be eligible and apply 
for a minimum security clearance at the level of “secret.” 
 
Collections Section 
The deputy director of collection leads the collections section, which is responsible for 
the collection of hazard, threat, and suspicious activity information from a wide variety of 
sources and the distribution of the finished analytic products to the appropriate customers.  There 
are two groups that comprise the collections section: the collection management group and the 
operations group - each supervised by a first line supervisor.  The primary function of the 
collection management group (CMG) is to ensure that the SNCTC has a constant, robust 
situational awareness of all threats, hazards and crimes occurring in Clark County and the state 
of Nevada.  The CMG also coordinates all matters associated with the terrorism liaison officer 
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program (TLO), and is responsible for the content and implementation of the SNCTC website 
and SAR programs.  The operations group (OG) is responsible for the development of 
information sources, and the lawful collection of this source information.  The OG is also 
responsible for the investigation and follow-up of suspicious activity reports, and other tips and 
leads.  On occasion the OG is called upon to provide dignitary protection liaison for U.S Secret 
Service protection details, and other high-level dignitaries. 
 
Analysis Section 
The deputy director of analysis leads the analysis section and is responsible for the 
collation, synthesis, analysis, and production to meet the intelligence needs identified by the 
requirements committee (to be discussed subsequently), or any ad hoc intelligence need 
established by the SNCTC.  The analysis section consists of two distinct, but inter-related 
groups: crime analysis group and counter-terrorism analysis group.  Personnel assigned to the 
crime analysis group are responsible for strategic, operational and, tactical crime analysis, 
fulfilling the crime analysis requirements established by the requirements committee. The 
counter-terrorism analysis group is responsible for the analysis of terrorism threat information, 
and the production of situational awareness, threat assessment, strategic, and tactical analytical 
products, also meeting the requirements established by the requirements committee. 
 
Intelligence Requirements Committee 
As stated by a SNCTC executive, intelligence-led policing is fueled by intelligence 
requirements (SNCTC, 2010).  The most significant approach taken to identifying intelligence 
requirements for the SNCTC is the creation of a requirements committee.  The purpose of this 
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committee is to establish the information, intelligence and production requirements of the 
SNCTC and to establish the priority in which these requirements are addressed by personnel 
assigned to the SNCTC.  Moreover this committee is responsible for ensuring that agencies 
receive the intelligence products that meet their needs – whether these products are related to 
organized crime, motorcycle gangs, or terrorism.  Requirements for information collection fall 
into three categories;  
1) Ad hoc requirements (highest priority, information related to a wide-range of possible 
emerging threats). 
2) Priority requirements (information related to an identified, time-sensitive threat). 
3) Standing requirements (information related to an identified, on-going threat).   
This intelligence requirements committee is comprised of command-level managers, who 
are responsible for designing, approving and/or implementing initiatives, and who possess 
decision-making authority for their employing agency.  Personnel who are assigned to the 
SNCTC are not permitted to be members of the committee in order to reduce potential conflicts 
of interest.  In general, the positive outcomes of this committee are wide-ranging.  Though more 
specifically, the result of the inclusion of the requirements committee into the business process 
of the SNCTC is better coordination of the human and technological resources available to the 
participating agencies of the SNCTC.  Arguably the most important outcome of this committee is 
the assurance that the intelligence needs of each of the participating agencies are met.  Also, with 
improved communication on the daily activities of the SNCTC, the partner agencies will realize 
a greater return on their personnel investment. 
The requirements committee is responsible for providing four necessary outputs.  The 
first, standing intelligence needs, are semi-permanent and enduring information and intelligence 
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needs that will change very little over time.  Examples of this need are the weekly LVMPD 
action reports and analysis of every terrorist attack on a hotel or tourist destination.  Second are 
the priority information needs that are requests for information or intelligence that are assessed 
and determined by the requirements committee to have a high priority.  Third are the top priority 
information needs which occur during times of crisis or emergency and require immediate 
attention, and the suspension of work focused on standing and/or priority information needs.  
Lastly, a matrix of priorities, comprised by the committee, reflecting the priorities assigned to 
each standing or priority information need.  SNCTC executives use this matrix as a guide in 
prioritizing and allocating work to SNCTC personnel. 
From a procedural perspective, the requirements committee meets on the second and 
fourth Wednesdays of every month at the SNCTC.  The executive director of the SNCTC is 
responsible for facilitating the meeting, and provides the committee with updates relative to the 
progress made towards completing each of the existing requirements.  Each member of the 
committee is responsible for preparing to briefly summarize any initiative or action that resulted 
from a completed requirement.  This type of feedback ensures that the intelligence and 
information needs of the participating agencies are being met by the SNCTC as well as ensuring 
that the requests for intelligence align with intended actions. 
 
Quality Assurance Section  
The deputy director of quality assurance leads the quality assurance section that is 
comprised of three groups.  The first is the security group that is responsible for the operational 
and physical security of the SNCTC and all classified environments, the maintenance of all 
access and alarm systems, and the proofs of compliance for all security matters.  This group is 
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also the single point of contact for all applications for security clearances, and maintains a roster 
of security clearances including dates for renewal investigations.  Second is the privacy 
protection group that is responsible for ensuring that the SNCTC adheres to all pertinent laws, 
rules, and regulations relating to the protection of personal privacy and civil liberties.  This group 
is also responsible for implementing the program and systems necessary - through training 
personnel - to provide regular and periodic audits to ensure compliance and provide proofs of 
compliance for all SNCTC investigations and intelligence products.  Last is the performance 
measurement group tasked to develop and collect the data to measure the ability of the SNCTC 
to perform its established mission.  Furthermore, this group seeks to determine if the work 
accomplished by the SNCTC aligns with the intelligence requirements set forth by the 
requirements committee.   
 
Direction of SNCTC and Resource Control 
Oversight and specific control over an agency’s SNCTC resources and the continued 
dedication of resources to the SNCTC is retained by the participating agency - which are kept 
fully informed of all analytical developments by its respective subordinates, as appropriate 
security clearances permit.  Salaries of the SNCTC personnel are paid by their respective 
agencies.  LVMPD, as the fiscal agent, provides office space, equipment, and supplies to carry 
out the administrative operation of the SNCTC.  Once the original seed money from federal 
and/or state grant funding is no longer available, sustainment for the SNCTC will be the 
responsibility of all participating agencies.  This includes any additional equipment required by a 
participating agency and will be the responsibility of that agency to supply.  Any and all 
expenditures by each participating agency are subject to the home agency’s budgetary processes 
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and to the availability of funds and resources pursuant to applicable laws, regulations, and 
policies.  When entering into a memorandum of understanding with the SNCTC, agencies 
expressly acknowledge that the language in the agreement no way implies that Congress or the 
Federal government will appropriate funds for such expenditures. 
 
Supervision of SNCTC  
Day-to-day supervision of matters assigned to the SNCTC is the responsibility of the 
LVMPD.   Analysts are assigned based upon subject matter expertise and serve the entire 
southern Nevada region.  As additional analytical resources become available, supervisory 
personnel from other member agencies are added.  Each participating agency is subject to the 
personnel rules, regulations, laws and policies applicable to their respective agencies and abides 
by appropriate security agreements concerning the handling of classified and sensitive material.  
If a complaint made against any SNCTC member, while acting within the scope of their SNCTC 
assignment, they are reported to the SNCTC director.  The executive director reports the 
complaint to the board of governors and the respective agency’s direct supervisor of the SNCTC 
member under complaint.  The executive (from the board of governors) of the complaint 
member’s agency is responsible to conduct an investigation with assistance of the SNCTC 
executive director.   
The SNCTC initially consisted of a combined body of the LVMPD supervisory and 
management staff, analysts, and support personnel, together with agents, analysts and support 
personnel assigned from the participating agencies.  The MOU utilized by the SNCTC 
establishes and outlines the intent of the participating agencies to centralize and co-locate.  This 
fusion is intended to provide resources, expertise, and information to maximize their ability to 
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detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to all crimes and all hazards in the greater Clark County, 
southern Nevada region.  The benefits of collaboration and communication between the 
contributing agencies are readily apparent and widely recognized as absolutely essential.  
Further, the MOU established a framework for the organization of the SNCTC and to address 
issues that are common to the participating agencies.  The MOU is to set out a common 
understanding of the policies and procedures that the SNCTC follows, in providing intelligence 
and coordination of service to the citizens encompassed by the populated areas of southern 
Nevada.   
 
Analyst Environment 
Analyst personnel at the SNCTC are comprised of a senior analyst to oversee all analytic 
functions, a private sector-specific analyst (to be discussed forthcoming), and four full-time 
analysts - both crime and intelligence analysts.  Crime analysts are responsible for providing 
tactical and/or operational assessments to decision makers whereas intelligence analysts are 
responsible for providing case and/or strategic products.  The analyst room is physically 
structured in the form of a “news room” with cubicle walls that stand only a few feet tall.  This 
physical layout is to enhance awareness of each analyst’s work in that each analyst will be in an 
environment where they will over-hear other analysts talking about cases or queries that they 
may also have information on and a connection can be made.  This approach is consistent with 
the idea of eliminating barriers (such as bureaucracy) for more direct communication and thus, 
more effective information sharing.  
 
Law Enforcement and Public-Sector Partnerships 
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 The SNCTC has participating agencies from the public sector that go beyond the 
traditional law enforcement arena.  Maintaining the “all-threats, all hazards” approach to 
intelligence, the SNCTC has engaged in partnerships with emergency response/preparedness 
agencies, local public schools, and federal law enforcement agencies.  At the time of the case 
study, the SNCTC has received formal partnerships from the following public sector agencies 
and organizations: 
• Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) 
• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
• Henderson Police Department (HPD) 
• North Las Vegas Police Department (NLVPD) 
• Clark County School District Police Department (CCSDPD) 
• Clark County Fire Department (CCFD) 
• Las Vegas Fire & Rescue Department (LVFR) 
• Nevada Department of Public Safety (NDPS) 
• United States Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS) 
• United States Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
• Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority (LVCVA) 
• City of Las Vegas Department of Law Enforcement and Detention (LVDLED) 
• Southern Nevada Health District (SNHD) 
• North Las Vegas Fire Department (NLVFD) 
• Nevada High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (NV HIDTA) 
• Clark County District Attorney (CCDA) 
 
Partnerships with the Private Sector – Suspicious Activity Reporting 
One of the SNCTC’s greatest strength is the ability to collect SARs from the community 
and private sector.  Even though there is a constant need to improve SAR education and 
awareness for identification and reporting – being achieved by the SNCTC through the “See 
something, Say something” campaign – the SNCTC has one of the most sophisticated, user-
friendly, and effective methods of both identifying and collecting SARs.  The means by which 
SARs reach the SNCTC are the product of a formal partnership with the Las Vegas Convention 
and Visitor Authority (LVCVA), a successful partnership with the hospitality industry in Las 
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Vegas as a whole, and a user-friendly website interface that will be discussed in the following 
section.   
The LVMPD entered into a formal agreement29 with the LVCVA to enhance the private-
sector SAR initiative.  This agreement outlines the responsibility for both agencies to provide 
certain services to the public in accordance with their respective statutory authority.  More 
specifically, the LVMPD is responsible for the day-to-day supervision of matters assigned to the 
SNCTC, which was established to improve communication and coordination among public 
safety agencies to maximize their ability to detect, prevent, investigate and respond to all crimes 
and all hazards in the greater Clark County and southern Nevada region.  The LVCVA 
determined that being a formal and active participant of the SNCTC was in the best interest and a 
direct benefit to the hospitality industry in Clark County.  As such, the LVCVA is now a member 
of the board of governors of the SNCTC and is required to contribute personnel or provide the 
financial support to hire personnel in order to fulfill the mission of SNCTC.   
In order for this formal partnership to work effectively, the participatory role of the 
LVCVA in the SNCTC was adapted to allow participation without violating any statutes or laws 
regarding confidentiality and privileged information that only law enforcement agencies have 
access and right to access to in terms of certain classified and/or criminal information.  To best 
serve this purpose, the LVMPD hired a private-sector specific intelligence analyst, dedicated to 
the interests of the hospitality industry, whose position is financially supported by the LVCVA.  
This intelligence analyst is an employee of LVMPD and is assigned to the SNCTC for the 
purpose of responding to the needs and security of the hospitality industry.  Moreover, this 
intelligence analyst is not considered an employee of LVCVA for any purpose and only serves as 
a liaison between the LVCVA and SNCTC to represent the interests of the hospitality industry.  
                                                 
29 Interlocal Agreement pursuant to the provisions of 277.180 
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The LVCVA does not have any right to control the work of the intelligence analyst, their 
assignments, work schedules, conditions of employment or any other aspect of the relationship 
with LVMPD. 
Even though the private sector is primarily concerned with criminality related to gaming 
in Nevada, they are committed to an all-threats approach with the SNCTC.  A highly successful 
example of this partnership is the SAR awareness program the SNCTC has with the hospitality 
industry in Las Vegas.  In partnership with The University of Nevada Las Vegas Institute for 
Security Studies, state and local public safety, and homeland security agencies, the SNCTC 
developed a terrorism SAR awareness video titled “Nevada’s Seven Signs of Terrorism30”.  The 
video - available in both English and Spanish languages - provides an informative walk through 
key behaviors and activities that are the hallmark of terrorist planning and preparations.  While 
the video uses local examples in order for viewers to personally relate to the information, the key 
to the success of the terrorism SAR video is the fact that hotels in Las Vegas now require all 
employees to view the video – a promising indication of commitment to the partnership between 
the SNCTC and the private sector hospitality industry.  
 
Information Sharing and Records Management 
Collection  
 The SNCTC recognizes intelligence information as defined by the Fusion Center 
Guidelines (GIWG, 2005) and National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (GIWG, 2003) as the 
product of systematic gathering and evaluation of raw information on persons or activities 
suspected of being criminal in nature.  Criminal intelligence information submitted and stored 
within the SNCTC system/network is required to minimally meet the following three criteria:  
                                                 
30 This video is available at: http://www.snctc.org/View-DVD.asp 
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1) Reasonable suspicion 
2) Be obtained legally 
3) Have relevance to a subject’s suspected terrorist or criminal activity 
Reasonable suspicion – or criminal predicate - means there is enough information to establish 
sufficient facts or basis to believe a subject or group is involved in definable illegal activity.  
This includes, but is not limited to, an enterprise that represents a significant/recognized threat to 
the population; is undertaken for the purpose of seeking illegal power or profits or poses a threat 
to the life and property of citizens; involves a significant permanent criminal organization or is 
not limited to one jurisdiction.  Legally obtained refers to the information gathered and 
maintained through lawful means with authorized access that is relevant to the identification of a 
subject and the individuals’ or groups’ known or suspected involvement in terrorist or criminal 
activities.  The SNCTC does not retain information related to political, religious, social views, 
associations (businesses, partnerships, etc.) or activities that are not related to criminal conduct 
or activity. 
The SNCTC also utilizes different sources of information to enhance the intelligence 
fusion process.  Many of the resources commonly accessed for information do not meet the 
criteria established for criminal intelligence and are not subject to 28 CFR Part 2331.  Non-
intelligence information may include data from law enforcement resources, public information 
outlets, and open sources such as the internet, newspapers, and other publications.  Sources of 
information typically accessed by the SNCTC include:  
• Criminal history records 
• Warrants 
• Case or investigative information from other systems 
                                                 
31 Codified as 28 CFR Part 23 “Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies”, this regulation governs inter-
jurisdictional and multi-jurisdictional criminal intelligence systems that are operated by or on behalf of state and 
local law enforcement agencies and that are funded by or receive federal funds. 
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• Tips and leads 
• Field Contacts 
• De-confliction systems 
• Driver’s license, telephone subscriber, etc. 
• Identification systems (AFIS, finger prints, mug shots, etc.) 
 
In an effort to reduce the duplication of records and diminish the probability of maintaining 
dated, inaccurate information, to the extent possible, the SNCTC uses links and pointing tools to 
connect identifying data to a subject and the individuals’ or groups’ known or suspected 
involvement in terrorist or criminal activities.  The SNCTC utilizes the collection and storage of 
non-criminal identifying information as applicable by 28 CFR Part 23 - which allows for the 
collection and storage of non-criminal identifying information in criminal intelligence systems 
under the following conditions32:   
• Information must be clearly labeled as non-criminal. 
• The field in which it is entered must be searchable. 
• Information must be relevant to subject=s identification or criminal activity. 
• Data cannot be used as the independent basis for meeting reasonable suspicion threshold. 
• Political, religious, social views, associations (businesses, partnerships, etc.) or activities 
that are not related to suspicious conduct or activity are not permitted to be maintained.  
Storage 
The submission of information to the SNCTC system/network is critical to the overall 
success of its mission.  As previously mentioned, criminal intelligence and non-intelligence data 
must be maintained separately in accordance with federal regulations.  The SNCTC determined 
all data shall be kept in electronic format to ensure the security of information, minimize 
vulnerability, control audit activities, and expedite search and analysis activities.  The originating 
agency is responsible for identifying information, attaching the correct labels, and saving or 
storing information in the designated criminal intelligence and non-intelligence areas of the 
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SNCTC system/network.  Paper documents are only available when electronic format is not an 
option, and stored under appropriate measures.   
All criminal intelligence files contain a minimum of core information fields.  In addition, 
the originating agency may include relevant and pertinent information as consistent with 28 CFR 
Part 23.  The SNCTC intelligence files include: 
• Name of subject (e.g. individual, organization, business, or group) 
• Subject identifiers 
• Suspected criminal activity 
• Officer(s) involved 
• Agencies/Bureaus involved 
• Source 
• Date of original submission 
• Date of revision(s) 
• Description of Activity 
• Analysis 
• Recommended Action 
 
Information contained in working files can only be non-intelligence data.  It is important 
for the SNCTC to minimize duplication of information.  Information received by the SNCTC 
that is relevant to a file already on record is recorded by documenting the link to its location.  In 
the event that data or information received is in paper form, it is scanned to an electronic format, 
labeled, and stored appropriately.  The original paper hard copy is destroyed or returned to the 
originating agency depending on their policies or agreement with SNCTC.  The SNCTC employs 
multiple classifications types for analytic products as well as certain pieces of raw information.  
An explanation of these classification types can be found in Appendix E.   
In addition to the core file fields, the SNCTC requires the submitting agency to 
appropriately label all information intended for storage in the SNCTC systems/network.  Both 
criminal intelligence and non-intelligence information is required to be labeled to denote the 
level of sensitivity or classification (restricted, limited, controlled, for official use, open source), 
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level of confidence (reliable, usually reliable, unreliable, unknown), and validity (confirmed, 
probable, doubtful, unknown). 
Moreover, every named subject included in any submission must be reasonably suspected 
of direct involvement in criminal activity and must be properly labeled to identify the association 
– such as subject, associate, relative, or employee.  For organizations or groups to be identified, a 
significant portion of the subject’s activity must be criminal.   
 
Dissemination 
Information on the SNCTC system/network is disseminated using an established 
automated notification system to key personnel and participating agencies.  This process 
maintains an electronic audit trail of notifications for security and auditing purposes.  
Participating agencies that receive electronic notifications are responsible for maintaining the 
appropriate security of all information as outlined by their agreements with the SNCTC.  The 
SNCTC staff documents the release of all information - excluding the automated notifications 
mentioned above - using the appropriate form.  Release of information requires verification of 
the inquirer’s identity, right-to-know33, need-to-know34, and may be required to necessitate 
approval from the original source and/or an SNCTC executive.  Recipients of 
intelligence/information/data from the SNCTC must agree to comply with 28 CFR Part 23 
regulations.  Each release form is maintained electronically and linked to the associated 
intelligence file being requested. In the event of an emergency or critical incident, the SNCTC 
                                                 
33 The “right to know” dissemination standard is determined valid in a circumstance where the individual requesting 
the sensitive information is determined to have the official capacity and/or statutory authority to receive the 
information being sought. 
34 The “need to know” dissemination standard is determined valid in a circumstance where if the information to be 
disseminated is pertinent and necessary to the recipient in order to prevent or mitigate a threat or assist and support a 
criminal investigation. 
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director may approve the dissemination of information classified as restricted, limited, or 
controlled to law enforcement agencies, public safety, and emergency personnel who are 
coordinating information with responders on the scene.  The release of information to private 
individuals for non-law enforcement purposes is restricted by Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) 
239C35 and requires the SNCTC director’s approval.   
Under NRS Chapter 239C Homeland Security (subsection 210), the Governor of Nevada 
declared certain documents prepared and maintained for the purpose of preventing or responding 
to an act of terrorism to be confidential.  Further, documents (including records or other items of 
information) are not available for inspection by the public if such a disclosure creates a 
substantial likelihood of compromising, jeopardizing or otherwise threatening the public health, 
safety or welfare.  Protected information under this statute includes, but is not limited to, the 
following: 
• Critical infrastructure (maps, drawings, plans, etc) 
• Emergency response plans 
• Emergency radio transmission information 
• Training, handbooks, manuals related to emergency response plans 
• Other documents as determined by Executive Order 
 
Original Documentation - Third Party Prohibition 
  The SNCTC does not allow original documentation obtained from an outside agency to 
be released to a third party by SNCTC staff without prior approval from the originating agency.  
However, some MOUs between the SNCTC and member/participating agencies contain this on-
going approval.  This includes both criminal intelligence information and data considered to be 
non-intelligence.  It is the discretion of the SNCTC staff to choose to refer the requestor to the 
originating agency for further assistance.  If the SNCTC believes original documentation 
                                                 
35 Full reference for NRS 239C is available at: http://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/NRS-239C.html#NRS239CSec010 
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received from an outside agency should be released, a SNCTC executive coordinates with the 
originating agency to request permission to disseminate - or request a modified or redacted 
version that can be reclassified for release purposes.  Only the originating agency can redact, 
modify information, and/or authorize release of their information.  If the SNCTC is the original 
source of the information marked restricted, limited, controlled, or for official use only, and a 
request is received or determination is made to provide the information to agencies outside of 
law enforcement, SNCTC executive may approve modification and redaction for the purposes of 
reclassifying the information for distribution to other non-law enforcement entities as 
appropriate.   
 
Approved Methods for Information Dissemination 
The SNCTC disseminates information using the most secure methods available based on 
the sensitivity level of the information, available mechanisms for sharing information with the 
inquirer, and timeliness.  Based on the criteria discussed previously, the SNCTC has approved 
the following mechanisms for the dissemination of information:  
• Verbal communication; via telephone or in person. 
• Hand delivered; appropriate labeling. 
• Interoffice mail; appropriate labeling required. 
• Approved secure electronic mail, using appropriate encryption applications.   
 
Access to the SNCTC system/network maybe directly available to participating agencies not 
located within the SNCTC.  Appropriate security controls to prevent unauthorized access or 
damage to information stored in the system have been adopted by the SNCTC.   
 
Public Request for Information 
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All public requests for information made to the SNCTC must be directed to the records 
compliance administrator.  Only a SNCTC executive, under the guidance of the SNCTC board of 
governors, SNCTC policies, and in accordance with all established agreements, has the authority 
to approve the release of information to the public.  Only the subject of the information on 
record, or a legal representative, may obtain access to the requested information.  A legal 
representative’s authorization must be written and notarized and the person authorized must have 
picture identification to receive the information.  The SNCTC follows a strict dissemination 
policy.  The requestor will be advised if he or she is not entitled to the information.  Juvenile 
information and certain victim and witness information are protected from disclosure by law.  
The SNCTC reserves the right to redact and delete information it deems prudent to protect from 
public disclosure in accordance with all laws, regulations, and policies. 
An individual making a public request for information must fill out a form at the SNCTC 
and provide the following: 
• Name 
• Copy of driver’s license or other government issued photographic identification (e.g. 
military id, passport, alien card) 
• Name of employer 
• Citizenship 
• A statement of the purpose for the request to inspect the information.  (Note:  Nothing in 
the supporting statutes prohibits an SNCTC employee or public officer from contacting 
law enforcement to report suspicious or unusual requests to inspect information). 
 
The SNCTC observes persons during inspection of information they have requested in a 
location and in a manner that ensures the information is not copied, duplicated, or reproduced in 
any way.  Restricted documents may be copied, duplicated or reproduced only under the 
following circumstances and in compliance with all other laws, rules, and policies governing 
information requested: 
• Lawful order of a court of competent jurisdiction. 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 166 
• As reasonably necessary in the case of an act of terrorism or other related emergency.  
• To protect the rights and obligations of a governmental entity or the public. 
• Upon request of a reporter or editorial employee, affiliated with a news association, or 
commercially operated and federally licensed radio or television station for use in the 
course of this employment or affiliation. 
• Upon request of a registered architect, licensed contractor (or designated employee of) 
for use in their professional capacity. 
 
Information Review and Purge 
In an effort to preserve citizens’ civil rights related to the retention of information, the 
SNCTC has in place an ongoing review of criminal intelligence and non-criminal intelligence 
(SARs) files for relevancy, importance, and sensitivity required to delete inaccurate or outdated 
information and remain in compliance with federal regulations.  Automated system audit trails, 
purges, and reports are periodically reviewed.  Additionally, manual review and destruction 
processes are followed to ensure both electronic files and hard files remain in compliance with 
the SNCTC’s privacy/records policies.  As mandated by 28 CFR Part 23, there is a five-year 
maximum retention of criminal intelligence information.  The SNCTC determines the start date 
by the initial date information (subject record or file) is stored in the SNCTC system/network.  
Any significant change or update to the information resets the purge date to be five years from 
the point of change - the changing of an address, phone number, or noncriminal associations are 
not considered significant changes.  As such, if a criminal intelligence file remains without 
significant changes during the five-year period it is removed from the SNCTC system/network.  
This system automatically generates a report at six months prior to purging for files meeting this 
criterion.  The originating agency reviews the file scheduled for destruction for currency and 
accuracy, and then an approval decision for removal of the document, along with an explanation 
as to why the information shall remain, is made.   
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Non-intelligence information is consistent with the same review period and purge criteria 
as intelligence data.  Information scheduled for purge is returned to the originating agency or 
disposed of in accordance with the originating sources’ requirements.  These purging 
requirements from the originating agency must be in writing with the SNCTC.  
Information/intelligence/data that is approved for purging is documented as such and removed 
from the system by the originator of the information.  Any paper documents containing criminal 
intelligence information approved for destruction are disposed of using approved destruction 
methods.  Electronic files are purged (deleted) from the SNCTC system/network by the 
originating agency, supervisory authority, or information technology authority at their request.  
Paper documents are destroyed by shredding to prevent the reconstruction of any of the 
documents.  Approved shredders are located in the SNCTC facility and all files and record 
destruction take place on site at the SNCTC.   
 
Information Security Inside the SNCTC 
The electronic storage of information on the SNCTC system/network is the most secure 
and therefore the recommended method for retaining all information.  As stated previously, 
paper copies are kept to a minimum at the SNCTC and any paper documents classified at the 
restricted, limited, and controlled level are kept in a locked cabinet in a designated secure area of 
the SNCTC.  Less classified documents – such as For Official Use Only - are kept secure within 
a locked area (e.g. file drawer) or office.  The SNCTC has gone to great efforts to secure the 
facility and its equipment from unauthorized access.  However, additional responsibility for 
protecting information lies with those individuals working within the SNCTC.  The following 
safeguards are required to be adhered to by SNCTC staff: 
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• Do not leave documents in clear sight when in work areas.  
• Always remove and store documents in a manner appropriate to their classification when 
leaving the work area. 
• When using photocopiers, facsimiles, etc. do not leave originals behind. 
• Be aware of others in the immediate area when documents are open for viewing on 
computer screens.  Use the minimize function to limit exposure. 
• Follow computer protection policies when setting passwords. Change passwords 
immediately if suspicion of compromise arises. 
• Do not provide your password to anyone. 
• Always turn your computer off when leaving the area for an extended period of time; and 
at the end your work day. 
• Immediately notify the appropriate authority if you suspect information is missing, has 
been altered, or has been accessed without authorization.   
 
Information Access  
Each participating agency retains sole ownership, exclusive control over, and sole 
responsibility for the proprietary information it contributes to the SNCTC.  All work that is the 
product of and originates from an employee of a participating agency clearly identifies the 
contributing agency and also clearly states that the information is and remains the sole property 
of the contributing agency under that agency’s exclusive control.  All joint reports or products of 
collaboration between participating agencies and the SNCTC are considered property of the 
SNCTC.  However, the dissemination of joint products is dependent upon approval from any of 
the contributing participating agencies.  Each participating agency has the sole responsibility to 
ensure the accuracy of information it has contributed to the SNCTC.  If the participating agency 
becomes aware of any inaccuracy in information it has contributed, it has the responsibility to 
correct that information and communicate this correction to the SNCTC.  Each participating 
agency is responsible for ensuring that all shared information is collected for legitimate law 
enforcement purposes to investigate, prevent or mitigate suspected criminal activity and/or 
threats.   
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All participating agencies’ information and records system designs must ensure that audit 
trails, system security, and information dissemination correspond to the mission of the SNCTC.  
The following are key aspects that must be incorporated into each participating agency’s 
information and records system design: 
• Collection Limitation 
• Data Quality 
• Use Limitation 
• Security Safeguards 
• Openness  
• Individual Participation 
• Accountability 
 
Any report prepared by a participating agency must be classified at the level of the highest 
classification of any material it contains and cannot be disseminated to any party who does not 
possess that clearance level as well as the right-to-know and/or need-to-know. 
The SNCTC handles both “classified” and “sensitive but unclassified” law 
enforcement/public safety information.  Participating Agencies are only granted access to 
classified or sensitive information if they have the appropriate security clearances.  Any SNCTC 
members seeking access to classified information who do not possess secret/top secret 
clearances, depending on the level of access to classified information sought, are subject to a full 
background investigation with access to the sensitive information contingent upon receipt of an 
appropriate security clearance.  In these circumstances where a background investigation is 
required, the participating agency is responsible for all costs associated with obtaining the 
necessary security clearance for their member. 
All participating agencies, their employees, and their contractors must agree not to 
disclose classified or sensitive information to anyone not authorized to receive information at the 
specified classification level, and who does not also have a need- and right-to-know, without the 
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express written permission of the originating agency.  Moreover, all intelligence products and 
intelligence sharing must comply with 28 CFR Part 23 standards. 
 
Reports and Products 
The SNCTC has an established system of report production and dissemination for other 
public safety agencies and non-government consumers.  To begin with, the SNCTC utilizes a 
web portal called “All-Data Virtual Information Sharing Environment” (ADVISE) to 
disseminate products and other communications.  The ADVISE system allows the SNCTC to 
disseminate and/or post a wide-range of general information products.  Information typically 
available through program reports are; tips and leads, case files, intelligence files, SNCTC 
products, and a reference / research library.  For agencies or organizations soliciting information 
from the SNCTC, their initial point of contact is the watch station.  This point of contact is a 
phone line staffed by trained personnel to provide constant situational awareness and identify 
emergent patterns in crime, hazards and risks.   
The type of products provided by the SNCTC follow an intelligence/information 
production plan.  A standardized format is required for all products.  This format includes a 
single banner that is agency-neutral across the top of the documents.  Agencies that provide joint 
cooperation for compiling products are identified in the product narrative.  Furthermore, the 
production plan identifies three categories of products: 
• Situational Awareness Reports 
• Periodic Reports 
• Ad hoc Reports  
 
Situational awareness reports are the most general and straightforward product from the 
SNCTC.  These reports include a synthesis of open-source information and typically include the 
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latest and most pertinent information related to breaking news, significant crime events, and 
bulletins from the National Operations Center (NOC)36.  In short, these reports are intended to 
provide the SNCTC community with a rich situational awareness of their areas of responsibility.  
Periodic reports are centered on counter-terrorism analysis.  These reports are broken down into 
five sub-categories of types of terrorism.  Even more specifically, these five sub-categories have 
their own methodology for crime analysis that incorporates 42 categories of analysis.  Periodic 
reports are disseminated to SNCTC consumers on daily, weekly and monthly intervals.  The final 
type of reports is ad hoc.  Somewhat similar to the situational awareness reports, ad hoc reports 
provide more detailed crime advisories, tactical intelligence support, Homeland Security alerts 
(urgent), Homeland Security advisories (important), threat assessments (less important), and 
requests for analysis from other agencies.   
 
Information Sharing Functional Exercise 
From November 2-12, 2009, the SNCTC spearheaded a functional information sharing 
exercise with three Nevada Fusion Centers, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security / FEMA, 
and the State of Nevada / Clark County / City of Las Vegas Emergency Management – this 
exercise was referred to as “Operation Silver Rogue”.  The objectives of the exercise were to 1) 
detect, recognize and act upon indicators and warnings of potential criminal/threat activity, and 
2) properly share and conduct investigations and operations related to potential terrorism.  The 
exercise indicated strengths and weaknesses.   
                                                 
36 The National Operations Center provides real-time situational awareness and monitoring of the homeland, 
coordinates incidents and response activities, and, in conjunction with the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 
issues advisories and bulletins concerning threats to homeland security, as well as specific protective measures. The 
NOC – which operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year – coordinates information sharing to help 
deter, detect, and prevent terrorist acts and to manage domestic incidents. Information on domestic incident 
management is shared with Emergency Operations Centers at all levels through the Homeland Security Information 
Network (HSIN). 
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The most significant strength exhibited during the exercise was that intelligence sharing 
and coordination between the three Nevada fusion centers was effective.  The Terrorism Liaison 
Officer program with the private sector provided effective information sharing. Participants of 
the exercise found the analyst and executive briefings to be effective.  The SNCTC staff made 
effective use of predictive and geo-spatial analysis and discussed various modes and locations of 
attack.  Weaknesses identified during the exercise included a critique of the ADVISE system 
given its limited search capacity.  Moreover, there was a lack of a formalized reporting, vetting 
and storage process for SARs.  The SNCTC lacked a formal Request for Information (RFI) 
tracking system.  Lastly, there was disconnect in the information flow between the analytical 
staff and the investigative staff.  
 
Access to the SNCTC via Internet  
To enhance communication for information sharing between the SNCTC and its 
public/private partners, they have created a comprehensive and extremely user-friendly website 
by utilizing federal funds.  The SNCTC’s website - www.SNCTC.org - is multi-tiered.  Tier 
access is as follows: 
• Tier 1: Public Access 
• Tier 2: Private Access 
• Tier 3: Public Safety Access 
 
The first tier, designed for the public to access, is the information displayed without having to 
login to the website.  This is where the public can learn more about what the SNCTC is and its 
mission.  Anyone who visits the website also has the ability to submit a SAR form to report 
anything they may have witnessed.  The second tier, designed for the private sector to access, 
requires login information to move beyond the public realm.  Access and login credentials are 
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granted by the SNCTC upon review when requested by persons who are not already affiliated 
with the SNCTC.   
Second tier information that can be viewed after signing into the website is typically 
information that is pertinent to the private sector/hospitality industry.  While specific information 
cannot be disclosed here, this information is typically “need-to-know” or “be on the lookout” to 
increase the level of preparedness/prevention among private sector organizations.  Tier three is 
the most restricted access tier and is accessible only by public safety and law enforcement 
personnel.  Once again login access must be granted by the SNCTC after a more comprehensive 
vetting process.  This information typically includes access to SAR reports, intelligence 
products/reports, and additional sensitive information posted by the SNCTC for other law 
enforcement.  This portion of the website is also referred to as the SNCTC Trusted Information 
Exchange (STIX).  
 
Homeland Security Hotline – SNCTC Watch Station 
The SNCTC manages a toll-free Homeland Security Hotline that is staffed twenty-four 
hours a day, seven days a week by watch station personnel.  The purpose of the hotline is to 
facilitate the collection of suspicious activity reporting (SAR).  It is the policy of the SNCTC that 
every suspicious activity report is investigated by the collection branch or the operations group.  
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) retains the statutory authority to investigate terrorism 
cases, and all SARs are immediately transmitted to the FBI personnel assigned to the SNCTC.  
The watch station is staffed by personnel from the analysis section, regardless job 
classification and/or employing agency.  The primary responsibility of the watch station is to 
maintain constant situational awareness of the southern Nevada metropolitan area as well as the 
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State of Nevada.  This situational awareness is made possible by integrating the computer-aided 
dispatch displays of each of the participating agencies.  It is the responsibility of the watch 
station personnel to report to the appropriate jurisdiction any emergent public safety or public 
health issues as soon as they become evident.  
The watch station position is one of the most critical operational positions within the 
SNCTC.  It is responsible for recognizing significant public safety events locally, nationally, and 
globally.  It is one of the centerpieces to help achieve the SNCTC’s mission to prevent, reduce, 
and disrupt crime and terrorism through the early warning of all-crimes, all-hazards, and all-
threats.  The watch station also assists in the support of critical incidents, emergency responses, 
and investigations.  The watch station is where real time analysis begins, and it is therefore 
critical that personnel assigned are actively engaged monitoring events.  Therefore, the person 
manning the position has the responsibility and authority to direct the completion of time 
sensitive requests to and from other members of the analysis section, all SNCTC partners, and to 
coordinate the dissemination of such information to decision makers. 
 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Protection 
The SNCTC has developed a privacy policy that utilizes 28 CFR Part 23 as a foundation, 
and with the guidance provided by the U.S. Department of Justice Privacy Policy Development 
Guide, Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit Intelligence File Guidelines, and the Global Justice 
Information Sharing Initiative.  The SNCTC is transparent with their privacy policies, and 
welcomes review and input from local civil liberties communities.  The SNCTC expects 
participating agencies to share their informational databases with other participating agencies to 
the extent allowable and authorized by the individual agencies guidelines, Nevada law, and 
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Federal law.  Personnel from participating agencies utilize their own forms, recordkeeping, and 
reporting methods.  Reports prepared by the SNCTC are shared with all SNCTC analysts and 
sworn personnel, with the proper security clearance and the need to know.  Moreover, the 
SNCTC’s privacy policy draws upon the eight privacy design principles developed by the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s Fair Information Practices37.  These 
principles are: 
• Purpose Specification - Define agency purposes for information to help ensure agency 
uses of information are appropriate.  
• Collection Limitation - Limit the collection of personal information to that required for 
the purposes intended. 
• Data Quality - Ensure data accuracy. 
• Use Limitation - Ensure appropriate limits on agency use of personal information. 
• Security Safeguards - Maintain effective security over personal information.  
• Openness - Promote a general policy of openness about agency practices and policies 
regarding personal information. 
• Individual Participation - Allow individual’s reasonable access and opportunity to correct 
errors in their personal information held by the agency.  
• Accountability - Identify, train, and hold agency personnel accountable for adhering to 
agency information quality and privacy policies. 
  
The SNCTC has established mechanisms (interagency connectivity, public records 
subscription services, etc.) to create access to existing data sources from participating and 
member agencies to share data with the goal of identifying, developing, and analyzing 
information and intelligence related to terrorist activity and other crimes for investigative leads.  
This capability facilitates the integration and exchange of information between the participating 
and member agencies. 
 
Collection Limitations 
                                                 
37 For more information visit: http://www.oecd.org 
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Given the mission of the SNCTC is to develop information and intelligence products by 
cooperating with other agencies and organizations.  The decision of these agencies to participate 
with the SNCTC, and the information they provide, is voluntary and is governed by the laws and 
rules governing the individual agencies as well as by applicable federal laws.  Because the laws, 
rules, or policies governing information and intelligence that can be collected and released on 
private individuals will vary from agency to agency, limitations on the collection of identifying 
information is the responsibility of the collecting agency and the original source information.  
Each agency that contributes information is to abide by the collection limitations applicable to it 
by law, rule, or policy.  Information contributed to the SNCTC must be done in conformance 
with those limitations.  The SNCTC does not store information that has been collected in 
violation of these laws, rules or regulations. 
 
Data Quality 
The agencies participating or coordinating with the SNCTC are responsible for collecting 
the information, remain the owners of the information contributed, and are responsible for its 
quality and accuracy.  Since inaccurate and/or identifying information can have a damaging 
impact on the individual concerned and on the integrity and functionality of the SNCTC, any 
information obtained through the SNCTC must be independently verified with the original 
source from which the information was extrapolated before any official action (e.g., warrants or 
arrests) is taken.   
 
Limitation of Information Use 
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Information obtained from or through the SNCTC is only used for legitimate law 
enforcement investigative purposes.  A legitimate law enforcement investigative purpose means 
the request for information can be directly linked to a law enforcement agency’s criminal 
investigation or is a response to a confirmed lead that requires follow-up to prevent a criminal or 
terrorist threat.  The board of governors takes the necessary measures to make certain that access 
to the SNCTC’s information and intelligence resources is secure and have the authority to 
prevent any unauthorized access or use.  The board reserves the right to restrict the qualifications 
and number of personnel who can access the SNCTC and suspend or withhold service to any 
individual violating the SNCTC’s privacy policy.  The board also reserves the right to conduct 
inspections concerning the proper use and security of the information received from the SNCTC 
to further ensure the integrity of their information sharing practices.    
All personnel who receive, handle, or have access to information from the SNCTC 
receive training on information/intelligence requirements.  Every authorized personnel with 
access to the SNCTC understand that this access can be denied or rescinded for failure to comply 
with the applicable restrictions and use limitations.  All such personnel must agree to the 
following rules:  
• Data will be used only to perform official law enforcement investigative-related duties in 
a manner authorized by the SNCTC. 
• Individual passwords will not be disclosed to any other person except as authorized by 
SNCTC management. 
• Individual passwords will be changed if authorized personnel of the SNCTC or members 
of the Center suspect the password has been improperly disclosed or otherwise 
compromised. 
• Background checks will be completed on personnel who will have direct access to the 
Center by the participating agency for which the individual is employed. 
• Use of data in an unauthorized or illegal manner will subject the user to penalties 
established by the board of governors, discipline by the user's employing agency, and/or 
criminal prosecution. 
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Transparency  
The SNCTC is intent on promoting transparent information sharing practices.  As such, 
the SNCTC, and its participating agencies, are open with the public concerning data collection 
practices - when such openness does not jeopardize ongoing criminal investigations.  The 
SNCTC and participating agencies refer citizens to the original collector of the data as the 
appropriate entity to address any concern about data accuracy and quality – once again when this 
can be done without compromising an active inquiry or investigation. 
 
Accountability 
When a request for information is made to any of the SNCTC information applications, 
the original request is automatically logged by the system identifying the user initiating the 
request.  When information is disseminated outside of the agency from which the original 
request is made, a secondary dissemination log is maintained in order to track information for 
audit purposes and provide notification in the event errors are identified or corrections are 
necessary.  Secondary dissemination of information is only allowed by a law enforcement 
agency for a law enforcement investigative purpose or to other agencies as provided by law and 
in accordance with SNCTC policies.  The originating agency from which the information is 
requested maintains a record of any secondary dissemination of information.  This record reflects 
(at a minimum):   
• Date of release. 
• Name of releasing individual. 
• Name, verification of inquirer (need-to-know and right-to-know will also be 
documented).  
• Information released. 
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Recipients of SNCTC information are advised on, and agree to protect, its confidentiality and 
restrict its access based on right and need to know.  SNCTC information cannot be disseminated 
outside the recipient’s organization without the written permission of a SNCTC executive.  
Given the nature of law enforcement intelligence, the need for such protective use is necessary as 
any unauthorized disclosure of SNCTC information could damage or compromise ongoing or 
future investigations and operations.  Furthermore, SNCTC information that is disseminated 
remains the property of the SNCTC and recipients must agree to comply with requests to 
immediately seal or destroy information obtained upon notification by a SNCTC executive.  The 
SNCTC may request a recipient to sign a non-disclosure agreement prior to the release of any 
information.  Refusal to sign such an agreement can limit or prohibit disclosure of requested 
information to that particular recipient.  The SNCTC director, deputy director of quality 
assurance, and/or privacy protection officer is responsible for conducting or coordinating audits 
and investigating misuse of the SNCTC’s information under the oversight of the board of 
governors.  
 
Intelligence-Led Policing: Requirements Driven 
In order for the SNCTC and their respective partners to have an effective intelligence-led 
policing (ILP) philosophy, a formal requirements process is necessary to guide information 
collection – this process is controlled by the requirements committee.  Intelligence requirements 
are designed to fill intelligence gaps – typically with respect to case-specific information (case 
requirements) or on-going threats (standing requirements) – by focusing collection efforts.  It has 
become increasingly evident that many agencies working with the SNCTC are uncertain as to 
what requirements actually are and how they can benefit their efforts.  In order to address this 
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uncertainty, the SNCTC has urged other agencies to formulate their intelligence requirements as 
questions.  This is a straightforward approach to identifying what information is necessary to 
analyze and thus input into the intelligence-led policing cycle.  An example of an intelligence 
requirement question may be “Is there radicalization in Nevada prisons?”  Agencies working 
with the SNCTC are urged to compose their requirement questions and forward them to the 
SNCTC with the intent of identifying emerging threats and issues. 
 
Self-Proclaimed Strengths and Weaknesses  
While an estimate on quantity or sources was not provided, one of the SNCTC’s greatest 
strengths is its ability to gather raw information from the community in the form of suspicious 
activity reports.  This improvement of increasing intelligence and information “receptors” is the 
result of the growth of awareness within the community and other public safety agencies above 
and beyond the SAR initiatives.  For example, it is important for the SNCTC – and fusion 
centers in general – to market their resources and products to all law enforcement and the public.  
Given that fusion centers are a fairly new concept in the law enforcement arena, a great deal of 
misunderstanding and/or misconception exists as to the utility of fusion centers.  Most local 
agencies are unaware of the resources and products provided by fusion centers and the 
applicability these products have for their everyday public safety missions – not just terrorism.   
An additional strength of the SNCTC is that it contains multiple capabilities under a 
single roof.  As it has been discussed, a variety of agencies and organizations are represented 
within the SNCTC – from law enforcement and the public/private sectors.  Arguably the three 
most unique capabilities are the All Regional Multi-Agency Operations and Response (ARMOR) 
that focus on CBRN threats, the private-sector specific analyst funded by the LVCVA, and a 
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representative from the Clark County Public Schools.  The ARMOR unit consists of a multitude 
of advance technological and strategic equipment for not only responding to CBRN threats, but 
also equipment that aids everyday law enforcement in a variety of situations and special events.  
The school representative is funded by the Clark County school dispatch to increase the level of 
school preparedness as well as aiding law enforcement’s awareness of issues and threats arising 
from and taking place in Clark County schools.  Another strength indicated by the SNCTC is 
their ability to leverage funding from federal sources and through the commitments of the 
LVMPD and other agencies/organizations.   
Lessons learned have also attributed to improving some SNCTC weaknesses into 
strengths.  The previously discussed watch station was created to serve as a primary point of 
contact for those reaching out to the SNCTC.  Rather than speaking to “anyone who picks up the 
phone”, this watch station personnel has a working knowledge of the different on-going 
initiatives and current issues within the SNCTC and can direct the inquiry to the correct person.  
Moreover, the watch station personnel maintain the most heightened sense of awareness as to 
emerging threats in the southern Nevada region.  Additionally, an experienced senior analyst was 
hired by the SNCTC to supervise all analysts and their functions to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness of the intelligence products.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 As compared to the Florida Fusion Center, the Southern Nevada Counter-Terrorism 
Center is quite different, but has similar baseline consistencies.  With respect to the current 
study, the SNCTC is perhaps a further disconnect from how most local agencies would engage in 
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law enforcement intelligence practices; however relevant constructs are once again observed 
within this environment.   
 To begin with, the SNCTC subscribes to an “all threats, all crimes, all hazards” 
perspective.  Moreover, this approach emphasizes the importance of collection requirements that 
incorporate suspicious activity reports (SARs).  Such an approach requires the development of 
partnerships with the community and private sector in order to educate them on SARs as well as 
establish channels for two-way communication of this information.  Similar to the FFC, this 
perspective is exemplified through formal partnerships with non-public safety participating 
agencies – such as the Southern Nevada Health District, Clark County School District, and Las 
Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority.  
The importance of SARs was further demonstrated after the functional field exercise 
“Operation Silver Rogue” when one of the concluding recommendations was to further educate 
the community and private sector on SARs.  Furthermore, sharing information across 
jurisdictional boundaries was deemed imperative.  An “all-threats/hazards” philosophy combined 
with SARs, community policing, and trans-jurisdictional communication are characteristics 
consistent with the C&C model of intelligence-led policing. 
 Structurally, the SNCTC is reliant upon a high degree of formalization.  A variety of 
formal personnel positions, committees, advisory boards, and policies/procedures guide the 
center.  As it was mentioned previously, this is anticipated to be the nature of many 
comprehensive intelligence capacities across the country – whether they are fusion centers, state 
agencies, or large local agencies.  Simply put, the more bureaucratic an agency is, the more 
likely they are to be formal.  Interestingly, it was noted by a SNCTC executive that formalization 
might play a role as an inhibitor of successful intelligence-led policing.  An identified weakness 
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– or obstacle – the SNCTC faces are the institutional inhibitors of getting policies put in place in 
a timely and effective manner.  As with all large law enforcement bureaucracies, a certain 
amount of red tape can be expected.  However, the landscape of intelligence and information 
sharing relies upon expedient decision making and the operational hierarchy of large agencies, at 
times, can inhibit the sharing of information in a manner consistent with the “need to know”.  
This view is shared by organization theorists who argue formalization stifles innovation 
(Mastrofski, 1998).    
 Formalization is perhaps explained to an extent by functional differentiation – or the 
presence of different units.  The SNCTC relies upon a variety of specialized units to vary out 
specific tasks.  These units include the Collections Section (comprised of the Collection 
Management Group and Operations Group), Analysis Section, Intelligence Requirements 
Committee, and the Quality Assurance Section.  Furthermore, the development of the multi-tier 
web portal that allows for two-way communications further enhances this capability.  Interviews 
with the SNCTC personnel indicated these units greatly enhanced the ability of the SNCTC to 
carry out their intelligence-led mission as a result of having specialized persons responsible for 
specialized tasks – thus increasing effectiveness and efficiency.  
 The SNCTC requires analysts to maintain responsibility for a variety of analytic products 
as well as services.  Products include those that have been discussed previously – such as risk 
assessments, trend patterns, and executive reports.  However the services aspect is somewhat 
unique and is primarily concentrated on what the SNCTC calls the “watch station”.  A lesson 
learned from “poor practice” was rather than having an operator be responsible for incoming 
calls directly to the SNCTC, these calls are now answered by analysts or intelligence-specific 
persons with knowledge of the operations and different units.  The phone calls received by the 
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watch station are typically SARs, requests for information, or a tip from another law enforcement 
agency.  When an operator was answering these calls they were not knowledgeable about the 
actual operations of the SNCTC and this created a barrier in the communication channels – as 
well as increasing issues due to quality of interpretation on behalf of the operator.  With analysts 
or intelligence-specific personnel answering the calls, the information coming in was 
immediately entered into system and could also be acted on immediately if a tactical response 
was required.  Commitment is rather straightforward and was demonstrated by the lead law 
enforcement executive Sheriff Doug Gillespie.   
The importance of commitment to note in this observation is in reference to two aspects 
1) the commitment towards intelligence practices as the forefront of law enforcement, and 2) the 
devotion of resources from Las Vegas Metro Police Department to be the primary fiscal agency 
of the SNCTC – dedicating finances, personnel, and equipment.  Lastly, the importance of 
quality intelligence products is demonstrated by the Data Assurance Section and importance of 
data quality.  This section of the SNCTC (which is made up of three groups) is tasked with the 
responsibility of securing the physical security of the SNCTC as well as making sure the SNCTC 
is compliant with legal information collection, dissemination and retention.  Of more relevance is 
the performance measurement group that is tasked to develop and collect the data to measure the 
ability of the SNCTC to perform its established mission and determine if the SNCTC outcomes 
align with the intelligence requirements set forth by the requirements committee.  These 
performance measures are at the organizational-level and not the analyst level.  However it can 
be logically assumed that as analysts are responsible for the creation of intelligence-products on 
which the SNCTC bases its decisions for strategic and operational planning that the SNCTC 
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recognizes the importance of quality analyst performance evaluation – even though this was not 
directly observed or documented.   
 Once again, the SNCTC has provided a unique example of an intelligence-environment 
that is different from most local agencies.  Despite the differences, relevant ideas remain 
consistent as the underlying philosophy of law enforcement intelligence practices should remain 
consistent regardless of size of responsibility.  Just as it is expected that different local agencies 
will have different intelligence-led policing philosophies, fusion centers will as well.  These 
differences will play a critical role in future research as the most influential factors attributing to 
successful adoption and practice are identified across different environments.   
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Chapter 8:  Summary of Key Findings, Policy Implications and Research Needs 
 
Although the federal government has provided support to build an intelligence 
infrastructure to more effectively respond to terrorism, there has been virtually no empirical 
work that describes the major issues and obstacles faced by SLT law enforcement agencies and 
fusion centers on intelligence-related issues.  Law enforcement leaders seek informed solutions 
for effectively managing the intelligence function and guidance that will allow them to gauge 
how well they are doing in terms of accomplishing intelligence goals.  This study is a critical 
first step in documenting the status of the progress made accomplishing key intelligence goals, 
and we believe this study contributes to the knowledge of and literature pertaining to intelligence 
practices in the United States.  In this final chapter, the research team attempts to accomplish 
three goals.  First, provide an overview of the key findings from the study.  Second, discuss 
policy implications.  Third, highlight limitations with this research and suggest future research 
needs.  
 
Summary of Findings 
 The research team surveyed state, local, and tribal law enforcement officers and fusion 
center personnel and conducted three case studies to better understand intelligence practices, 
information sharing, performance metrics, and communication networks.  This section highlights 
some of the key findings.   
1.  It appears that significant progress has been made post 9/11 installing fundamental 
policy and procedures related to building the intelligence capacity of law enforcement 
and fusion center agencies.  Both respondents from state, local, tribal law enforcement 
agencies and fusion centers indicated that they were familiar with intelligence guidelines 
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and standards, had a good working knowledge of threats in their community, and have 
some working knowledge of intelligence-led policing.   Personnel also indicated that they 
have attempted to take advantage of the wide range of training opportunities available for 
intelligence analysts.    
2.  Despite the progress that has been made, there is significant room for improvement 
and development.  For example, although respondents indicated that they were familiar 
with national standards and guidelines, they also expressed the belief that the policies and 
procedures within their agency have yet to reconcile with these requirements.  Similarly, 
the respondents noted they were aware of the threats, but identified a need to build a 
capacity to better identify these threats and noted shortages in resources and personnel in 
accomplishing these goals.  Also, they were aware of key civil rights and privacy issues, 
but respondents reported there is considerable work that needs to be done in their 
agencies to ensure agencies are fully compliant.38      
3.  Fusion centers appear to be farther along addressing many different issues, including 
instituting an intelligence-led policing philosophy, establishing and being compliant with 
privacy issues, and fostering relationships with other agencies.  Not all fusion centers 
were fully functional at the time of the survey, but had plans and goals to provide them 
direction along with guidance available from their peers as well as federally-supported 
training and technical assistance. 
4.  Critical to prevention and response is the sharing of information.  In addition, it is 
clear that a wide range of law enforcement, community, government and private 
                                                 
38 It should be noted that since this survey was administered there were two new training programs on civil rights 
and privacy delivered to law enforcement intelligence personnel (one from DHS and one from BJA/DOJ).  In 
addition, during this time period fusion centers have developed and submitted privacy policies for review through 
joint DHS/DOJ technical assistance. 
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businesses may have information that is important to the intelligence fusion process thus 
it is important to build relationships with a diverse range of agencies and organizations.  
Both SLT and fusion center respondents indicated that that they have worked at building 
relationships with different agencies especially other law enforcement agencies, but 
fusion centers had closer relationships with a more diverse range of agencies and were 
more likely to be working with National Guard, transportation, public health, homeland 
security, emergency management, fire marshal, and critical infrastructure personnel.    
5.  Although many information linkages have been established, the respondents also 
indicated that they were not completely satisfied with these relationships.  That is, it 
appears that the personnel were working with other agencies and making connections, but 
they think the relationships need further development to ensure consistent, substantive 
and timely information sharing.   
6.  There is an overwhelming amount of information going into and out of these agencies, 
and it is likely, without having enough analysts within the organization or analysts not 
effectively trained to process this information, that there are missed opportunities for 
strategic and tactical understanding of homeland security and criminal threats.     
7.   Both SLT and FC respondents agreed that the quality of intelligence products 
produced should be critical to the assessment of performance by analysts.  There was 
some variation when comparing the two samples of respondents Information sharing and 
the quality of products was somewhat more important to fusion center respondents while 
having intelligence that led specifically to arrests, investigations, and convictions was 
more important to the SLT agency respondents.  This difference may be indicative of a 
misunderstanding among SLT officers regarding the value and purpose of intelligence 
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analysts as well as the responsibility of operational units to act on the intelligence 
products in order to interrupt threats and pursue investigations 
8.  An analysis of the types of products produced and analytical procedures used on a 
daily basis also highlighted some of the differences in the intelligence mission of state, 
local, tribal law enforcement agencies and fusion centers.  Specifically, fusion centers 
were more likely to be fostering information sharing connections, conducting a greater 
range of different types of analysis, and working with public health and other hazards 
related data on a daily basis.  This should be expected given the roles and national 
standards for fusion centers. 
9.  It is important to consider the formal communication patterns that support and impede 
the intelligence process.  These systems are critical because they provide an additional 
way for homeland security and intelligence officials to promote a necessary 
understanding of the procedures that need to be followed for better information sharing.  
The findings that were presented indicated that both SLT and FC respondents think that 
they have access to key communication systems and other sources of information that 
might be used to enhance intelligence products.  Fusion center respondents were however 
somewhat more critical when asked whether RISS.net, LEO, HSIN, ATIX, and FBINET 
meets their intelligence and information sharing needs.   Not surprisingly, the results also 
indicated that a higher percentage of fusion center respondents noted that they had access 
to various critical sources of intelligence information, including HSIN, RISS.net, 
FBINET, LEIU, and Health Related data.   
10.   The case studies of fusion centers are valuable in that they provide in-depth 
coverage of structural, policy, and strategic approaches that have been successful.  The 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 190 
organizations studied were guided by a litany of formal policies and comprised of 
multiple task-specific units.  These formalities allow for a strategic division of labor for 
specialized persons to perform specialized tasks – thus improving effectiveness and 
efficiency.   
11.  Each of the case studies also revealed that the fusion centers were “works in 
progress” and that the agencies had to update and embrace changes motivated by shifts in 
their external environment.  For example, the Florida Fusion Center conducted an 
assessment of information sharing gaps between law enforcement agencies within the 
state of Florida.  One of the findings from this gap analysis was that local law 
enforcement was not engaging in information sharing as a result of poor, or nonexistent, 
commitment to the intelligence-led approach.  At the Southern Nevada Counter-
Terrorism Center, a strong administrative commitment to an intelligence-led approach 
was established when Sheriff Doug Gillespie announced (multiple times) that the Las 
Vegas Metro Police Department (the primary agency of the SNCTC) was going to fully 
embrace this new philosophy.  
 
Policy Implications  
 The status of law enforcement intelligence in SLT agencies appears to be similar to the 
early development of community- and problem-solving policing during the early 1990s.  Law 
enforcement officers and executives recognize the importance of intelligence yet the 
implementation of law enforcement intelligence remains uneven a decade after 9/11.  Several 
factors may contribute to this.  First, the philosophical underpinnings of law enforcement 
intelligence was significantly changed and broadened, hence a resocialization process among 
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intelligence personnel had to occur.  Second, while the 9/11 attacks remain as the benchmark for 
change, in reality new standards – such as the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan and 
training programs did not emerge until 2003.  Moreover, new standards and directions continue 
to evolve even at the time of this writing.  Third, it simply takes time to develop new 
organizations such as fusion centers and get them at an operational level.  Similarly, training and 
developing new policies in America’s 16,000 law enforcement agencies is a massive task, 
particularly when new processes – such a participating in a fusion center – must be marketed and 
sold to the agencies as wise investment in resources.   
Uneven development and evolution is even more the case when considering the 
intelligence-led policing philosophy and practice.  Although respondents were familiar with the 
term ILP, the results suggest that most agencies are at an early stage of implementation.  Indeed, 
there are different conceptual understandings of ILP and different visions of the role ILP should 
hold in law enforcement organizations.  Like the community policing movement, these results 
reveal clear needs for training and commitment of resources and for addressing the tension 
between specialization and generalization.  Additionally, the goal of increasing intelligence 
capacity and adopting ILP comes at a time that SLT agencies operate under significant budgetary 
constraints.  Finally, the results suggest the potential for fusion centers to serve a critical role in 
continued development of the law enforcement intelligence capacity in local agencies.   
 Although the results of this study point to clear progress in the development of law 
enforcement intelligence capacity, they also reveal challenges.  Clearly, there is a need for the 
commitment of resources in the form of personnel and training.  Given the federated and 
decentralized structure of law enforcement in the U.S., it is critical that mid- to large agencies 
have analysts who can conduct local level analysis as well as push information and intelligence 
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to Fusion centers..  Small agencies need to have intelligence liaison officers who can serve as 
“nodes” in the intelligence network.  This requires commitment of resources at a time that many 
agencies are not hiring or even cutting personnel.  Law enforcement executives as well as 
policymakers at local, state, and federal levels will need to consider the implications of these 
budgetary issues.  While many executives acknowledge that the use of analysts make the agency 
“work smarter” thereby having a great effect on crime and community order, it remains a 
difficult concept to sell to the public and politicians. 
 It is also clear that there is a need for continued and expanded training.  This includes 
specific training for analysts, fusion center personnel, and intelligence managers. It also, 
however, means more general training for all SLT personnel on ILP and the role of SLT officers 
in the intelligence process to include what types of information can be shared, the process for 
sharing information, and the application of guidelines to protect privacy, civil rights and civil 
liberties. 
 Law enforcement executives also need to seriously consider and resolve several issues 
related to specialization and generalization.  At one level is the issue of whether the intelligence 
capacity is viewed as specifically focused on homeland security and the threat of terrorism or 
whether it is viewed as building “all-crimes, all-hazards” capacity.  On the one hand, the need to 
develop capacity and expertise focused on terrorism can justify a more specialized focus.  As the 
commander of a local police department intelligence unit told us, “what keeps me awake is 
missing a tip or lead suggesting an Al Qaeda-type attack.”  On the other hand, the results of this 
study, combined with prior studies, suggests the potential power of the “all-crimes, all-hazards” 
focus.  Prior research demonstrates the high level of involvement of terrorist groups in a variety 
of criminal activity that brings these individuals in contact with SLT agencies (Damphouse and 
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Smith, 2004; Smith et al. 2002; Hamm, 2005).  The present study indicates a high proportion of 
Suspicious Activity Reports involving all-crimes.  These results suggest that the continued 
development of the network of SLT agencies, linked to fusion centers and federal law 
enforcement and ultimately linked to the Intelligence Community (with appropriate firewalls and 
privacy safeguards) will be best served through the all-crimes, all-hazards information flow.  
Additionally, it strikes us that the costs of the investment in intelligence capacity will yield the 
greatest benefits for SLT agencies when the capacity equips such agencies to address not only 
terrorism but a range of criminal threats (e.g., organized crime, gangs, violent crime, drugs). 
 A parallel question of specialization/generalization relates to training and responsibilities 
within SLT agencies.  On the basis of these findings, it appears that most agencies to date have 
developed intelligence capacity through training of officers and analysts dedicated or at least 
focused on intelligence assignments.  Thus, the respondents to our surveys indicate a fairly high 
level of knowledge and expertise themselves but report much lower levels of familiarity 
throughout the organization.  Again, this is similar to early stages of community- and problem-
oriented policing when specialist officers were tasked with implementation but the majority of 
officers and supervisors focused on so-called “real policing.”  The danger is that the intelligence 
function becomes a specialized function divorced from the larger organization, what Toch and 
Grant (1991) once referred to as an “innovation ghetto.”  The risk is that information flow from 
street-level officers and investigators to analysts does not occur.  Similarly, analysts do not fully 
understand the needs of officers and investigators. This, too, suggests the need for broad training 
on the intelligence function, the role of analysts, and ILP.  
 The development of a national network of 72 fusion centers (as of this writing) represents 
a monumental undertaking and achievement.  Yet, there has been criticism of the fusion centers 
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in two broad areas:  Fusion center operations39 and the protection of civil liberties40.  The results 
of the current study suggest that the fusion centers are playing a critical role in the nation’s 
domestic intelligence capacity and could play an even more important role in the future.  The co-
location of personnel from SLT, federal law enforcement and, in some cases, the private sector 
appears to mitigate some of the historic, cultural, and organizational barriers to information 
sharing. Consequently, the fusion center’s occupy an organizational or network “space” that is 
“closer” to both federal law enforcement and the SLTs.  They appear to be a critical network 
“node” for the movement of information and intelligence “up-from” and “back-to” the local 
level.  Further, the survey results and case studies reflect the specialized expertise in terms of 
both human capital (analysts) and technology that many SLT agencies will never attain (with the 
exception of large metropolitan departments).  The fusion centers are already displaying an 
impressive range of information sources and high frequency actionable intelligence products.  
Based on these findings, the loss of these fusion centers would result in both a loss of analytic 
capability and a disconnect between SLT and federal law enforcement and ultimately the 
intelligence community.  Consequently, these results appear to call for continued investment and 
development of the network of fusion centers.  
 Perhaps the most critical point for successful intelligence is the quality of the analysis.  
The need for continual training of analysts, particularly in the area of critical thinking, and the 
recognition that analysts are practicing professionals – not simply “civilians in the intelligence 
unit” – are among the factors which need to be recognized and address by law enforcement 
                                                 
39 Masse, Todd, Siobhan O’Neil, and John Rollins.  (2007).  Fusion Centers:  Issues and Options 
for Congress.    Washington, DC:  Congressional Research Service. 
 
40 German, Michael.  (undated).  What’s Wrong With fusion Centers?.Washington, DC:  American Civuil Liberties 
Union.   
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leaders.  Greater attention by management needs to be provided for the professional development 
of intelligence analysts in order to increase the quality and utility of analytic outputs. 
 
Future Research 
As noted previously, there have been significant developments in law enforcement 
intelligence since this survey was administered:  New standards and guidelines from the Global 
Intelligence Working Group and the Program Manager’s Office for the Information Sharing 
Environment; training and technical assistance on civil rights and privacy; new initiatives for 
training and development of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative; self-
assessments by fusion centers on the Baseline Capabilities including technical assistance for all 
fusion centers on this assessment; and the creation of the Fusion Centers Directors Association.  
Other more localized initiatives have also occurred.  As a result, this same survey administered 
today would likely produce somewhat different results.  Nonetheless, this first collection of 
baseline data is important for future comparisons and identifying critical issues. 
Given the nature and sudden emergence of law enforcement intelligence practices, it is 
reasonable to assume that a significant portion of the persons that did not respond to the survey 
were likely re-assigned and no longer responsible for the intelligence function or were newly 
appointed and had little to any knowledge of such practices.  These transitions certainly pose 
significant challenges for a building intelligence capacity as there is a steep learning curve for 
understanding policy issues, civil rights concerns, and information sharing opportunities that 
have to be understood.  However given such circumstances, the responses that comprise the 
present study are thought to be the most valid from the available population of key personnel.   
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The low response rate presented a challenge for the current study.  Although multiple 
efforts were made to contact respondents and encourage participation, it was still difficult to 
increase the response rate.   The length of the survey was certainly an issue as not only was there 
over 100 questions asked, but many of the questions had 20-25 response options.  In addition, 
because of the turnover as well as that multiple personnel were selected from a single agency, 
often a single respondent completed the survey on behalf of the agency.  The length of the 
survey, however, provided us with rich context on a wide variety of critical intelligence issues 
and the results, although exploratory, provide a good introduction to intelligence practices in the 
United States.   
The case studies provided environments where developed intelligence practices could be 
observed to provide valid contexts for the issues discussed in the current study.  While these 
environments were greatly beneficial for the current study, examining an environment 
specifically at the local level where intelligence-practices are still being developed would have 
also benefited the current study.  By not including a more representative environment of 
intelligence practices, the current study lacks specific insight as to how certain relationships are 
evolving.   In addition, it would have been beneficial to have been able to spend more time at the 
fusion centers studied in order to develop some of the ideas even further.  For example, the 
regional centers in Florida are critical to the intelligence successes there, but we were unable to 
examine variations in the connections across these regional centers, how they have had to adapt 
because of regional differences, and how the nature of crime, terrorism and hazard concerns 
faced in a region might impact the nature of their relationship.   
Although this study provides some keen insights into the status of intelligence practices 
in the United States, it is an exploratory study and there is still a significant need for additional 
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research to better understand the transition to integrating intelligence work into strategic and 
tactical decisions.  There should be a significant commitment to more completely examine the 
work of state and major urban area fusion centers.   This study looked closely at three—chosen 
because the survey respondents and subject matter experts identified them saw as fair 
opportunities to explore the concerns highlighted in this study more closely.  There are, however, 
72 fusion centers across the country, and thus a need to better understand whether the work 
identified here is representative of what is occurring elsewhere in the country, but importantly, 
how variations in critical variables—such as resources that are available, philosophical 
differences, structural and historical issues, and geography impact the nature of relationships and 
outputs of fusion centers.   
Law enforcement has changed dramatically over the last thirty years, impacted by the 
philosophical shifts to community and problem-oriented policing.  Intelligence-led policing is a 
logical and important extension of these changes.  We saw clear evidence of the fusion centers 
using a “problem solving” approach in designing new policies and practices, conducting survey 
work and analysis to identify strategic needs and then crafting policies based on their findings 
and evaluating whether or not the changes had any impact.  We suspect that fusion centers are 
implementing a variety of strategies to meet the demands of their external environment, 
overcome perceived weaknesses in service delivery, or in response to a specific need or 
identified service gap.  In addition, we would suspect that fusion centers would embrace the 
opportunity to implement new strategies if funding was made available to address specific issues.  
An evaluation component of these strategies would be critical to better understanding what 
works and what is promising in terms of pushing intelligence practices forward.   
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Just as there is a need to examine ILP at the fusion center level, there is a similar need to 
examine ILP at the SLT level.  Beyond a recognition of the term ILP, the current findings 
suggest there is confusion on what ILP means and what it would look like if an agency fully 
adopted this model.  Yet, the results also reveal agencies like Las Vegas Metro that have fully 
adopted this philosophy.  Research is needed to understand this variation across agencies as well 
as in-depth understanding of the nature, structure, costs, and benefits of ILP at the agency level.  
This research also concluded that a large amount of information is being shared across 
institutions, and importantly, the respondents indicated that a significant number of analytic 
products are being produced and shared every month.  It is difficult for agencies to make full use 
of these products simply because there is such an overwhelming amount of information.  It 
would be of considerable value to first attempt to better understand the type of intelligence that is 
being shared within these analytic products, perhaps content analyzing a good sample of 
products, particularly to determine if they are operationally “actionable”.  Moreover, it would be 
important to ask SLT respondents what products are the most useful to them and why, and also 
to identify any strategies that exist to make the processing of this information more efficient and 
useful.  This is particularly important because the majority of law enforcement agencies do not 
have adequate resources or personnel to evaluate this information.  
Finally, although we are able to provide some insights into the formal communication 
networks, there would also be value to in examining informal communication systems and the 
feedback mechanisms in these systems that promote or hinder information sharing.  What 
network ties exist and are absent across organizations, how is intelligence and procedures related 
to intelligence distributed across these ties, and what factors (e.g., size of agency, geographic 
proximity, agency reputation) influence the functioning of these network ties?  The examination 
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of these informal networks would be significant because they provide an additional way for 
homeland security and intelligence officials to promote a necessary understanding of the 
procedures that need to be followed for better information sharing.  For example, Lessons 
Learned Information Sharing (llis.gov) completed a study in December 2005 that examined 
information and intelligence sharing requirements (LLIS, 2005).  LLIS convened four focus 
groups with subject matter experts on this topic, and solicited feedback from other key members 
through its website.  There were several important findings regarding information sharing and 
training needs, but the finding that both informal and formal networks have been established to 
address limitations in guidelines and process is particularly important.  This finding supports 
other NIJ-sponsored law enforcement research that demonstrates sophisticated informal 
networks for information sharing (Chamard, 2003; Roberts and Roberts, 2006; Weiss, 1998).    
We believe that would be great value in documenting these networks.   
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